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I. SUITS UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Pleading and Proving Retaliatory Discharge-Less Protection for
Government Employees
The Seventh Circuit, as well as the Supreme Court this past term,
decided retaliatory discharge cases in which they limited the first
amendment freedoms of government employees. The decisions appear
to mark a trend away from previous case law which broadened the
protection afforded the speech and expressive activities of government
workers.' In the Seventh Circuit decision of McClure v. CywinskP an
employee claimed that he was discharged for refusing to become in-
volved in politics. He had overheard a telephone conversation in
which his employer commented that although one employee who was a
senator's friend was working out well, the plaintiff was "just a window
dressing" who he would get rid of later. Further evidence in the case
indicated that plaintiff was assigned a small amount of work, that a
secretary kept a log of his comings and goings, that his office conditions
were substandard, etc. Plaintiff then taped a telephone conversation
between himself and the defendant in which the defendant told him he
had to cancel a planned trip. After plaintiff tried to play the tape for
the agency director, he was terminated. 3 The jury returned a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff, awarding $50,000 compensatory and $75,000 pu-
nitive damages. The court then granted defendant's motion for judg-
ment n.o.v.
In its analysis the Seventh Circuit began by assuming that absti-
nence from politics constitutes protected activity.4  The correctness of
this assumption is reflected in the recent Supreme Court decision of
Connick v. Myers5 holding that "official pressure upon employees to
1. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (finding that a public school
teacher could not be dismissed for writing a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the School
Board's allocation of funds); Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (hold-
ing that once an employee shows that his conduct was a motivating factor in a termination deci-
sion, the defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached
the same decision even in the absence of the protected conduct); Givhan v. Western Line Consoli-
dated School, 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (protecting the right of a school teacher to contribute to public
debate, even if such takes place in a private setting).
2. 686 F.2d 541 (7th Cir. 1982).
3. Id at 543.
4. Id. at 544. See also Perry v. Local Lodge 2569 of Int'l Ass'n of Mach., 708 F.2d 1258 (7th
Cir. 1983), holding that a preliminary injunction was warranted in that plaintiff showed a reason-
able likelihood of establishing that the union's "agency shop" provision was inadequate to protect
her first amendment right not to be coerced into financing the union's political objectives.
5. 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983).
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work for political candidates. . constitutes a coercion of belief in vio-
lation of fundamental constitutional rights."' 6 The Seventh Circuit
went on to find, however, that the district court properly granted judg-
ment n.o.v. for the following reasons: first it found that plaintiff proba-
bly failed to prove that his unwillingness to work in a political
atmosphere was a motivating factor in his discharge; that while a rea-
sonable juror could have found that political considerations were im-
portant to the employer in that he hired other employees as political
favors, this does not necessarily establish that politics was a motivating
factor in the decision to dismiss the plaintiff.7 The court stated that
even if plaintiff established that his apolitical activity "played some mi-
nor role in the discharge decision," the district court judge correctly
concluded that no reasonable juror could find that plaintiff satisfied the
standard of proving his protected activity was a "motivating factor.",,
Further, even if the jury could reasonably have concluded that Mc-
Clure's dislike of politics in the workplace was a motivating factor in
his dismissal, the jury could not reasonably have found that the agency
would have retained the plaintiff despite the illegal tape recording
incident.9
In granting judgment n.o.v., the court is to view all facts in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and it is to allow
a jury verdict to stand if it is supported by circumstantial evidence.10
The Seventh Circuit in a retaliatory discharge suit decided the previous
term, Egger v. Phillips1 held that a district court erroneously granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant where the record indi-
cated a genuine issue of fact as to motive. In that opinion the Seventh
Circuit stated that it sufficed that the evidence submitted by the plain-
tiff raised an inference that he would not have been transferred but for
his first amendment activity. 12 It also criticized the district court for
weighing the evidence regarding plaintiff's activities where issues of
motivation were involved.1 3 It would appear that the "window dress-
ing" comment as well as some of the other evidence introduced by the
plaintiff in this case clearly sufficed to support a jury verdict that plain-
6. Id. at 1691.
7. 686 F.2d at 545-46.
8. Id. at 546-47.
9. Id at 548.
10. Konczak v. Tyrrell, 603 F.2d 13, 15 (7th Cir. 1979). See also Freeman v. Franzen, 695
F.2d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1982), holding that a district court is not free to set aside the jury's verdict
provided plaintiff's version of the facts is "not patently absurd."
11. 669 F.2d 497 (7th Cir.), rev'don other grounds (en banc), 710 F.2d 292 (1982).
12. 669 F.2d at 503.
13. Id.
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tilfs apolitical stance was a motivating factor in his discharge. The
distinction the court appears to draw between "some minor role" and
"a motivating factor" is unclear. Further the court's willingness to "re-
weigh" the motivation question and overturn the jury verdict in light of
the record is troublesome.
In any event, the court proceeded to conclude that the jury's ver-
dict could not stand because the plaintiff failed to show a causal rela-
tionship between the defendant's conduct and plaintiffs claimed
constitutional deprivation.' 4 The facts indicated that the taping inci-
dent wherein plaintiff presented an illegally taped conversation of the
defendant to the agency director was the real cause for dismissal, and
that it was the agency director alone and not the defendant who was
responsible for the discharge. The court stated the general rule regard-
ing uncontradicted evidence, i.e., that such testimony which stands un-
contradicted and which is in no way discredited, must be taken as true
and that no judgment can be permitted to stand against it. 15 In this
case, the agency director specifically testified that he decided to fire the
plaintiff because of the taping incident and nothing in the record con-
tradicted his testimony, nor was there any reason to doubt the credibil-
ity of his testimony. 16 Of course, the court's addition of this argument
for sustaining the district court's action-a theory never discussed be-
low-does not mitigate the blow the court has struck to the expressive
freedom of government employees.
Government workers fared no better in the Supreme Court this
term. In Connick v. Myers 7 an employee in the District Attorney's of-
fice was discharged for an alleged act of insubordination, i.e., circulat-
ing a questionnaire concerning the office's transfer policy, office
morale, political pressure, etc.' 8 The district court found that the ques-
tionnaire involved matters of public concern and the state had not
clearly demonstrated that it interfered with the operation of the em-
ployer's office. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the em-
ployee's speech concerned primarily a matter of personal interest, in
that the questionnaire came immediately following plaintiffs opposi-
tion to a recommended transfer to a different division, and it was,
therefore, entitled to less protection.19 The Court conceded that the
14. 686 F.2d at 548-50.
15. Id at 548, citing, Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co. v. Howell, 401 F.2d 752,
754 (10th Cir. 1968).
16. 686 F.2d at 549.
17. 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983).
18. Id. at 1686-87.
19. Id at 1690-91.
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questionnaire played a part in the dismissal and that the employer
could not have proved a Mt. Healthy defense-that plaintiff would
have been discharged based simply on her refusal to accept the transfer
order. It held, nonetheless, that the termination was justified.
20
Several circuit courts have held that once a plaintiff shows that
protected speech was a motivating factor in a discharge decision, the
state must prove substantial interference with the operation of its office
in order to justify such a dismissal.2' The Supreme Court, however,
rejected such a heavy burden and instead relied on a broader balancing
approach, looking to the nature of the employee's expression as well as
the context in which such expression occurs. 22 Concluding that the
protected status of speech is a question of law, not of fact, the Supreme
Court was free to review the district court decision without adhering to
the clearly erroneous standard.
23
The Court's decision is troublesome for two reasons. First its new
emphasis on whether the employee's speech addresses a matter of pub-
lic concern suggests a very dangerous precedent, one which narrows the
class of subjects on which public employees may speak without fear of
retaliatory discharge. The questionnaire which the plaintiff circulated
concerned matters of office morale and the conduct of elected offi-
cials-matters which presumably could be viewed to be of public con-
cern. As the dissent suggests, federal judges should be extremely
sensitive in determining what is a matter of public concern and should
broadly rather than narrowly construe the concept.24 The majority's
characterization of the incident as simply an extension of plaintiffs dis-
pute over her transfer is a troublesome conclusion in light of the lower
court's findings.
The decision also breaks with tradition in its rejection of the
stricter burden that most circuit courts impose on the defendant once a
finding of protected speech has been made.25 Instead of requiring the
"material and substantial interference standard," the majority resorts
to its earlier Pickering decision suggesting a balancing approach which
examines all factors surrounding the communication. 26 In light of the
20. Id. at 1694.
21. Kim v. Coppin State College, 662 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1981); Key v. Rutherford, 645
F.2d 880, 885 (10th Cir. 1981); Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1980); Rosada v. Santiago, 562 F,2d 114, 117 (1st Cir. 1977).
22. 103 S. Ct. at 1690.
23. Id. at 1690 n.7.
24. Id. at 1698-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent contrasts the Supreme Court's recent
rejection of the task of determining what is a matter of concern in the defamation area. Id
25. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
26. 103 S. Ct. at 1691-92, citing, Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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district court's findings that no concrete evidence had been presented
indicating disruption of the office, impairment of plaintiff's working re-
lationship with her superiors, nor any evidence that plaintiff's work
performance was in any way hampered, the Supreme Court apparently
relies on "apprehension of disruption" as sufficient to justify retaliatory
dismissals.27 The majority argues that an employer should not have to
wait for actual office disruption or the destruction of working relation-
ships prior to taking action. 28 This standard, however, gives employers
unbridled discretion to censor speech based on speculative fears of dis-
ruption, contrary to the Supreme Court's decisions in such cases as
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District29 holding
that "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of a disturbance is not
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression." 30
The Connick case is especially troublesome because the question-
naire sought out information which could prove to be quite valuable to
the public in evaluating the performance of its elected officials. The
decision obviously deters employees from engaging in such conduct. It
makes it clear that a Pickering defense is a potentially strong weapon
that can be used in addition to the Mt. Healthy defense in justifying
government action against its employees. 31
B. Access to Public Forumsfor the Expression of
First Amendment Rights
A second interesting case in the first amendment area concerns the
validity of the Illinois Election Code and its rationing of access to the
ballot by those who wish to pose questions to the electorate. 32 The pro-
vision was being challenged by the DuPage County Citizens For Nu-
clear Arms Freeze who wanted a question on the ballot seeking citizen
endorsement of a freeze on further testing, production and deployment
of nuclear weapons. The Illinois Code permits private groups to get
advisory questions placed on the ballot in a local political subdivision
27. 103 S. Ct. at 1700-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
28. Id at 1692.
29. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
30. Id. at 508.
31. Contrast the recent Fifth Circuit decision of Williams v. Board of Regents, 629 F.2d 993
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 452 U.S. 926 (1981), in which the Fifth Circuit upheld the trial court's
refusal to even submit the issue regarding the protected status of the speech to a jury. Once it
found that the speech involved a matter of public concern, the court ruled that a Pickeringdefense
was unavailable as a matter of law. In Connick the Supreme Court conceded that at least some of
the speech involved a matter of public concern, and yet it engaged in a balancing to conclude that
first amendment rights were not violated.
32. Georges v. Carney, 691 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1982).
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election, but it requires the signatures of twenty-five percent of the reg-
istered voters to do so. In addition, it limits the number of questions
that can be placed on the ballot to three, the first three submitted. Fur-
thermore, public bodies, such as the County Board, are not required to
obtain any signatures in order to submit a question and thus they have
a clear advantage over a private group in getting their questions before
the electorate.
Last term the Seventh Circuit dealt with a similar question regard-
ing access to so-called public forums. In Perry Local Educators'Associ-
ation v. Hohlt,33 it considered the question of access to a school district's
internal mail system by groups other than the major teachers' union.
Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between the union and
the school board, all competing unions were denied access to the mail
system. The Seventh Circuit characterized the decision as a case in-
volving "equal access" rather than focusing on the nature of the forum,
i.e., once the school system made available a forum for the expression
of first amendment rights, it could not discriminate among ideas or
among speakers without satisfying strict scrutiny analysis.34 It stated
that "[dliscriminatory treatment of speech on the basis of its content or
on the basis of the identity of the speaker usually requires rigorous
scrutiny because it presumptively violates the first amendment's pri-
mary and overriding proscription against censorship."'35
The Illinois Code challenged here would appear to raise similar
questions of equal access and censorship, in light of the fact that public
bodies need not satisfy the signature requirement and can in effect pre-
empt a private group's ability to get questions on the ballot. In fact a
few years earlier the County Board had met one day prior to the filing
deadline and had in a span of fifteen minutes added eleven questions
on the ballot, thus preempting the citizen group that was proposing a
ballot question on property tax reductions.36 Although the latter ques-
tion was a binding as opposed to an advisory question and thus the
signature requirement was less, the point is that the public body could
preclude private citizen access because of the first-come-first-served
rule. The Seventh Circuit nonetheless departed from its earlier analysis
in Perry and found no first amendment violation due to the "nonpub-
lic" nature of the forum.37
33. 652 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1981).
34. Id. at 1300.
35. Id. at 1293.
36. 691 F.2d at 303 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 302.
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Ironically, at the same time Georges was decided, the Supreme
Court was reversing the Seventh Circuit's holding in Perry.38 The
Court specifically rejected the Seventh Circuit's characterization of the
case as an equal access decision. Instead it held in a 5-4 opinion that
the case did not involve a public forum and therefore the policy only
had to be "reasonable. ' 39 Since it found no indication of discrimina-
tion on the part of the School Board, nor an intent to discourage any
particular viewpoint, it upheld the differential access as reasonable and
as consistent with the school district's interest in preserving the prop-
erty for the use to which it was lawfully intended, i.e., enabling the
recognized union to perform its obligation as the exclusive representa-
tive of all teachers.4° Having rejected the first amendment argument,
the Supreme Court summarily dismissed the equal protection claim,
again applying simple rational basis analysis.
4 '
The Seventh Circuit's analysis in Georges was quite similar. It rea-
soned that since there is no constitutional right to use the ballot box as
a forum for advocating policies, the state was under no obligation to
allow advisory questions to be placed on the ballot.42 The ballot is not
a vehicle for communicating messages but rather a vehicle for putting
questions and laws to the electorate. Conceding that the twenty-five
per cent requirement made it "practically impossible" to get advisory
questions on the ballot, the Seventh Circuit nonetheless reasoned that
since the county could have totally prohibited such questions, the
twenty-five percent rule was permissible. 43 It did caution, as the
Supreme Court had in Perry, that there was nothing in the record indi-
cating public censorship of ideas, i.e., public bodies had never tried to
submit advisory questions and there was no indication that this device
was being used by the county to take sides on particular issues. Thus
Illinois was not discriminating either directly or indirectly against the
free expression of controversial ideas. It was simply "not providing a
novel forum for advocating ideas.""
Again following the Supreme Court's analysis in Perry, the Sev-
enth Circuit went on to hold that in the absence of viable first amend-
ment claims, charges of discrimination would be disposed of on a
38. 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983).
39. Id. at 957.
40. Id. at 958.
41. Id. at 959-60.
42. 691 F.2d at 300-01.
43. Id. at 301.
44. Id. at 302.
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minimal rationality basis.45 It generally found that public bodies
should be entitled to more liberal access to the ballot since their resolu-
tions have a "presumptive democratic legitimacy," that is lacking with
regard to private citizen groups.46 Since the plaintiffs were thus un-
likely to prevail in a full trial on their complaint, the court affirmed the
district court's denial of preliminary relief.
Although the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Georges appears to fol-
low very closely the Supreme Court's position in the recent Perry case,
the challenged provision would appear to be problematic even apply-
ing the minimal rationality standard. As the dissent persuasively ar-
gues, the majority in upholding the twenty-five percent signature rule
in effect has condoned the state's right to ostensibly grant a right of
access and at the same time to make that access wholely illusory.47 The
dissent also notes the arbitrariness of the three question limit which,
when combined with the first-come-first-served principle and the fact
that local governing bodies do not have to comply with the twenty-five
percent rule, makes it quite possible and likely that the county board
may preempt the ballot spaces at its whim. The dissent points to the
1980 incident discussed previously as an indication of the censorship
problems raised by the Illinois Code.4
8
Although the state has an obviously legitimate objective in main-
taining an orderly advisory question system, the means it has chosen
are totally irrational in that they effectively preclude citizen sponsors'
advisory questions from ever getting on the ballot. Accepting the ma-
jority's analysis, one would have to conclude that the state never really
intended to give citizens any access to the advisory questions system
and that the twenty-five percent rule was a rational means of affecting
this denial-clearly an illogical explanation of the state legislative en-
actment. As the dissent notes, ". . . we cannot approve a statutory
technique the disingenuousness of which, as described by the majority,
combines an apparent opportunity to speak with a real commitment to





47. Id at 303 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). "A state cannot simultaneously provide an avenue of
political expression and burden its use with conditions that, as the majority concedes, can never be
met." Note that the district court struck the 25 percent rule, although it concluded that plaintiffs
were not entitled to relief due to the valid three question limit, which would have in any event
precluded plaintiffs' access to the ballot.
48. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
49. 691 F.2d at 304-05 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
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Both the twenty-five percent rule, as well as the clear opportunity
for government censorship posed by the three question limitation com-
bined with the first-come-first-served principle that can be manipulated
by the local governing board, pose serious first amendment questions
which hopefully will be addressed more closely on remand. Unlike the
facts in Perry where government never fully opened the forum, here
Illinois has ostensibly created a public right of access to the ballot on
the part of citizen groups where advisory questions can be raised, and
yet at the same time its regulations render the forum illusory. The total
arbitrariness and irrationality of the provision is obvious. The fact that
a citizen group seeking a proposed question on property tax reductions
was in fact precluded in 1980 by an eleventh hour meeting of the
county board indicates the real threat of government censorship posed
by the statute.
C Freedom of Religion: Balancing Religious Freedom Against
Legitimate State Concerns
In the case of Menora v. Illinois High School Association,50 plain-
tiffs were a group of orthodox Jews who challenged the Illinois High
School Association's (IHSA) rule forbidding basketball players from
wearing hats or other head wear. As stipulated by the parties, orthodox
Jewish males are required by their religion to wear a head covering at
all times, i.e., a small skull cap that covers the crown of the head. Thus
the Association rule requires the plaintiffs to choose between their reli-
gious observance and participating in interscholastic basketball. The
district court held that the hazards posed by the skull caps (yarmulkes)
were too slight to justify putting the plaintiffs to this choice. 5 1 After full
trial, the record failed to disclose even a single instance of a basketball
player slipping on or being injured by such a head covering. It thus
concluded that the unsubstantiated concern for safety did not justify
the rule's burden on religious freedom.52
While conceding the impermissibility of such a choice, the Seventh
Circuit characterized the issue quite differently. It argued that plain-
tiffs could obviate the state's concern with safety by simply devising a
method of affixing a head covering that would prevent it from falling
off during the basketball game. The majority reasoned that the rule
would then pose no burden at all to religious freedom. 53 The Seventh
50. 683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1982), ceri. denied, 459 U.S. 1156 (1983).
51. 527 F. Supp. 637, 645-46 (N.D. IUl. 1981).
52. Id.
53. 683 F.2d at 1035.
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Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that lack of evidence as
to safety hazard justified judgment for the plaintiffs, arguing instead
that "[t]he state need not await disaster to regulate safety."'54 It noted
instead that the state's concern, even if relatively slight, would be com-
pelling in relation to what it described as a "non-burden" on the plain-
tiffs religious freedom. 55 In short, the plaintiffs had no constitutional
right to wear yarmulkes insecurely fastened by bobby pins and thus
they could not complain if the Association refused to let them do so.
Rather than dismissing the case, however, it held that the district court
should retain jurisdiction to give plaintiffs the opportunity to propose
to the Association a form of secure head covering. 56 It cautioned the
Association at the same time that its continued refusal to interpret or
amend its rule to permit such a head covering would no doubt result in
reinstatement of an adverse judgment against it.57
The Seventh Circuit's rather novel approach to the balancing
question, although somewhat interesting, appears to have little founda-
tion in law. Following a full trial, the district court concluded that the
state failed to justify its interference with free exercise. As the dissent
notes, the greatest problem with the majority decision is that it requires
the plaintiffs now to take additional affirmative steps despite the de-
fendant's intransigence as to application of its rule.58 Indeed, the Na-
tional Federation of State High School Associations which governs the
IHSA specifically responded to the yarmulkes rule by saying that the
head gear is illegal regardless of the method of attachment. 59 Further,
the Association's failure to substantiate its safety concern should have
resulted in affirmance of the lower court ruling. In short, although the
majority has perhaps devised an efficient and pragmatic resolution of
competing interests, it is doubtful that this is a proper role for the court
to play.
D. Religious Freedom in the Prison Context
The Seventh Circuit decided two rather interesting cases involving
the free exercise rights of prisoners. 60 In the first case, Madyun v. Fran-
54. Id. at 1034.
55. Id
56. Id. at 1035.
57. Id. at 1034.
58. Id at 1037 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
59. Id.
60. The Seventh Circuit decided a third case, Garza v. Miller, 688 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983), involving a challenge to various conditions in a prison, includ-
ing the absence of religious services. Plaintiff, an Orthodox Jew, alleged that a rabbi never visited
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zen,6 1 a prisoner claimed that he was punished for his refusal to submit
to a "frisk search" by a woman guard even though the refusal was
based on his Islamic faith forbidding physical contact with a woman
other than a wife or mother.62 The Seventh Circuit noted the absence
of precise guidance from the Supreme Court as to the proper standard
for analysis of prisoner free exercise claims. The Supreme Court did
hold in Cruz v. Beto,63 that "reasonable opportunities must be afforded
to all prisoners to exercise the religious freedom guaranteed by the first
and fourteenth amendments without fear of penalty." The Court, how-
ever, was simply reversing the lower court's dismissal for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted and remanding the
case for a hearing on the merits. The lower courts have totally divided
on the question of the appropriate standard to be used in prisoner reli-
gious freedom cases. 64 Some appellate courts have analyzed prisoner
free exercise claims under the compelling state interest standard uti-
lized by the Supreme Court in non-prison cases, 65 while other courts
have utilized a mere reasonableness test, affording extreme deference to
prison officials. 66 The Seventh Circuit specifically rejects both of these
analyses and instead opts for the Second Circuit's use of an intermedi-
ate approach, one requiring that prison rules be justified by an impor-
tant objective and that the restraint on religious liberty be reasonably
adapted to achieving that objective.
67
Applying the newly articulated standard to the present fact situa-
tion, the Seventh Circuit concludes that the state does have a substan-
Marion, nor were religious services conducted or religious holidays observed. The court in a
cursory response indicated that the record failed to show any requests for religious observances.
Although stating the Supreme Court standard from Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972),
that "reasonable opportunities must be afforded to all prisoners to exercise the religious freedom
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth amendments without fear of penalty," the record failed to
establish that prison officials had denied plaintiff such a reasonable opportunity. The lack of
programs was attributable to the lack of request, and not any affirmative refusals by prison offi-
cials. Compare the earlier decision of Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967), upholding
prisoner's rights to religious services.
61. 704 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1983).
62. Plaintiff was sentenced to 15 days in segregation for his refusal to submit to the search.
Id. at 956.
63. 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972).
64. 704 F.2d at 960 n.7. In fact, one writer has identified seven different standards for analyz-
ing prisoner free exercise claims. See Comment, The Religious Rights of the Incarcerated, 125 U.
PA. L. REV. 812 (1977).
65. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Cases applying this standard are cited in 704 F.2d at 960
n.7.
66. See cases cited in n.7 of court's opinion.
67. Id. at 959-60, citing, La Reau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 979 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied 414 U.S. 878 (1973).
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tial interest in having its women guards perform frisk searches on male
inmates.68 It notes that if women are not allowed to perform such tasks
their utility and thus their job opportunities would be significantly di-
minished, contrary to the state's important interest in providing equal
opportunity for women.
Although the Seventh Circuit should be commended for adopting
an intermediate approach to religious freedom cases, i.e., recognizing
that a prisoner doesn't totally relinquish constitutional rights upon his
incarceration, the application of its standard is questionable. The court
in a rather cursory fashion asserts the state's interest in avoiding illegal
sex discrimination as a justification for the religious interference al-
leged here. Although the state obviously does have a substantial inter-
est in avoiding sex discrimination in the employment of guards, and a
total prohibition against women performing searches would limit their
job opportunities, the prisoner seeks only to limit such functions when
sincere religious objection is voiced. The facts indicated that a male
guard was present who easily could and in fact in this particular case
did perform the search.69 Thus it is questionable as to whether the pris-
oner indeed is asking the state to violate its goal of sexual equality by
simply seeking this very narrow and limited exception. In other words,
how significant is the state's interest in having its women guards per-
form frisk searches over the sincere religious objection of male inmates
when in fact male guards are available? Viewed in this light the sub-
stantiality of the state's interest is clearly diminished.
In the second prisoner religious freedom case decided two weeks
after Madyun, Childs v. Duckworth,7° the Seventh Circuit utilized a
somewhat different standard for reviewing such cases. Although the
prisoner's religious claim-the right to practice Satanism-was more
bizarre and the state justifications much more critical, the interesting
part of the case is its discussion of the proper standard of review.
Whereas the earlier Madyun decision uses an intermediate approach,
7'
the Seventh Circuit in this case states the issue as whether the restric-
tion imposed on religious beliefs was "necessary for the operational
security of the prison."'72 It specifically states that prison restrictions
68. 704 F.2d at 960.
69. Id at 956.
70. 705 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1983).
71. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
72. 705 F.2d at 920. Note that the Seventh Circuit does begin its discussion by recognizing
the less protected status of religious freedom in the prison context, requiring that competing inter-
ests be mutually accommodated. Id. at 920-21. Later, in justifying some of the restrictions the
court finds that the authorities "reasonably" refused to accommodate the plaintiff's requests. Id
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must be carefully scrutinized "to ascertain the extent to which they are
necessary to affectuate the legitimate policies and goals of the correc-
tions system." 73 The continued use of the term "necessary" following
the lengthy discussion and adoption of a lesser standard two weeks pre-
viously is unfortunate. Although it is perhaps true that regardless of
the semantics the judges in fact engage in a balancing of interests, the
use of such terms as "necessity" vs. "intermediate scrutiny" have been
given legal significance by our courts and thus should be employed
cautiously. Had the challenges in the Madyun decision been tested by
the standard articulated in the subsequent Childs decision, the plaintiff
perhaps would have had a greater chance to succeed, i.e., it would have
been difficult to show the "necessity" of interfering with the religious
freedoms of the prisoner in that case.
In Childs on the other hand, the Seventh Circuit had little diffi-
culty justifying the state's refusal to accommodate the prisoner's re-
quest. As to his desire to have organized religious services, the court
reasoned that the plaintiff's refusal to provide the name of a sponsor as
well as information concerning the proposed activities of the group
presented a potential security threat to the institution and thus was jus-
tifiable. 74 There were further findings that Childs was the only inmate
making requests for satanic meetings and that the authorities doubted
the sincerity of his professed beliefs. 75 The prison was justified in
prohibiting Childs' use of candles and incense in his cell based on the
manifest fire hazard posed by such objects and the fact that incense can
be used to mask the odor of illegal substances. The court proceeded to
uphold other prohibitions by prison authorities as both necessary and
reasonable for the security of the institution.76
at 921. The ultimate conclusion, however, was that the prohibitions were "reasonable and neces-
sary" for the security of the institution, thus suggesting a stricter analysis. Id. at 923.
73. Id. at 920.
74. Id at 921.
75. Note that contrary to the district court, the Seventh Circuit correctly avoided the difficult
question of determining whether Satanism, more specifically Child's belief in Satanism, was a
religion. The district court failed to heed Justice Burger's cautionary note in Thomas that courts
should not use their own perceptions as to belief or practice and that "religious beliefs need not be
acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment
protection." Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714
(1981).
76. 705 F.2d at 922. The court upheld the denial of Child's order of a crystal ball because
such could be used as a weapon, as well as his desire to borrow books for group study since he was
permitted to order and in fact purchase titles for his own use. Id at 921-22. As to the latter, the
Seventh Circuit found no constitutional violation for refusing his request to order books for other
inmates.
CIVIL LIBERTIES
II. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
Several cases decided by the Seventh Circuit this term dealt with
due process challenges. While some of the decisions raise the question
of vague and fundamentally unfair enactments, most concern the prob-
lem of identifying property or liberty interests which would trigger pro-
cedural due process safeguards. Several cases also discuss the
relevance of the existence of state remedies as affecting due process
challenges, thus continuing the debate begun by the Supreme Court in
Parratt v. Taylor.
77
A. Vagueness and Fundamental Fairness Challenges under the Due
Process Clause
The Seventh Circuit confronted several due process challenges to
drug paraphernalia laws. In the significant case of Village of Hoffman
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,78 the Supreme Court upheld a
facial challenge to a drug paraphernalia law. The Court suggested sev-
eral criteria to be used in evaluating vagueness challenges: (1) the law
must provide adequate notice of what is prohibited such as to preclude
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement; 79 (2) a scienter requirement
may mitigate any vagueness as to what conduct is proscribed; 80 (3) a
court should not assume that the government would fail to clarify fur-
ther the scope of the ordinance through a consistent enforcement policy
or the adoption of further guidelines;8' (4) a law should be found
facially unconstitutional for vagueness only if it is "vague in all of its
applications" so that no standard of conduct is specified at all.
82
Applying these basic standards the Seventh Circuit upheld several
drug paraphernalia laws that were patterned on the Model Act drafted
by the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Depart-
ment of Justice. 83 The court also applied the four criteria to uphold
Indiana's drug paraphernalia statute, finding the latter capable of con-
stitutional enforcement. 84 Again the challenge was a facial one and the
Seventh Circuit found that since the law was capable of constitutional
application and since it could not assume that the Indiana legislature
77. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
78. 455 U.S. 489, rehearing denied 456 U.S. 950 (1982).
79. Id. at 498.
80. Id. at 499.
81. Id. at 502.
82. Id at 497.
83. Camille Corp. v. Phares, 705 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1983); Levas v. Village of Antioch, 684
F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1982).
84. Nova Records, Inc. v. Sendak, 706 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1983).
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would not clarify the scope of the law through additional guidelines or
that clarification would not be provided by the pattern of enforcement,
it rejected the appellant's claims as without merit. 85
The latter decision was authored by Judge Pell who had dissented
from an earlier case invalidating a somewhat similar drug parapherna-
lia statute. In Record Head Corp. v. Sachen,86 the majority found the
West Ellis Drug Paraphernalia Ordinance unconstitutionally vague.
The law was concerned primarily with the delivery of drug parapher-
nalia to minors and the court noted that, unlike Hoffman Estates, indi-
viduals as well as businesses were subject to criminal liability.87 The
majority found that the ordinance failed to give adequate notice of
what conduct was proscribed and its ambiguity failed to protect against
arbitrary enforcement. 88 It read the ordinance as containing no mean-
ingful scienter requirement, unlike the Model Act type of provision up-
held in earlier rulings. 89 Further, since the law was criminal legislation
not restricted to economic or business activity, a more searching exami-
nation than utilized in Hoffman Estates was required. 90 The ordinance
failed to meet this standard since the terminology in the provision satis-
fied neither the fair notice nor the consistent enforcement branches of
the test for unconstitutional vagueness.9'
The assurance of fundamental fairness embodied in the due pro-
cess clause also triggered much litigation in the employment context.
In the case of Ciechon v. City of Chicago,92 for example, the court con-
ceded that the procedures used by the city in discharging an employee
were facially neutral. However, it recognized that even if procedures
themselves are legitimate, it violates the due process clause to employ
such procedures vindictively or maliciously as to a particular individ-
ual. In this case the city misused its otherwise legitimate disciplinary
procedures in a single-minded effort to discharge the plaintiff, a mem-
ber of a paramedic team, following the death of a patient. The record
indicates that the city was responding to pressure from the media as
well as a vengeance seeking family, and that adverse publicity tainted
the hearing. 93 The investigation of the charges against the plaintiff was
85. Id. at 792.
86. 682 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1982).
87. Id. at 676.
88. Id at 677-78.
89. Id. at 677.
90. Id. at 676.
91. Id. at 678.
92. 686 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1982).
93. Id. at 516.
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incomplete and biased, indicating the city's failure to assess the inci-
dent fairly. The record showed irregularities in the administrative pro-
cedures employed 94 and the testimony at the hearing illustrated the
improper motives with which the city conducted the proceedings.
95
The Seventh Circuit thus adopted a broader notion that the due process
clause assures not only facially complete procedures, but requires the
court to look further to determine whether the procedures have been
properly utilized in a particular case.
96
In two other cases the Seventh Circuit, while upholding the gov-
ernment's position, reiterated the general principle that professional
qualifying tests and standards must bear a rational relationship to the
skills necessary for the job in order to withstand a due process chal-
lenge.97 In Schanuel v. Anderson,98 the court upheld an Illinois statu-
tory provision prohibiting licensed private detectives and detective
agencies from employing individuals who have been convicted of felo-
nies or crimes of moral turpitude unless ten years have elapsed since
the time of prison release.99 Applying the rational basis standard, the
court concluded that the legislative judgment embodied in the Illinois
provision was not unreasonable, i.e., since detective agency employees
perform potentially sensitive tasks, it was rational to suppose that the
public trust might be undermined by assigning such tasks to ex-offend-
ers. Stressing that only classifications "patently arbitrary and totally
lacking in rational justification" are prohibited, the court upheld the
provision.10o
In Dilulio v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the City of
North Lake 01 the court relied upon this same principle regarding em-
ployment standards to uphold a challenged promotional examination
used by a police department. The court found that the defendants suf-
ficiently established a rational relation to job performance to justify
summary judgment in their favor. 10 2 Since the plaintiffs failed to raise
94. Id. at 518-22.
95. Id. at 520.
96. Note also the decision in United Church of the Medical Center v. Medical Center Com-
mission, 689 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1982) in which the Seventh Circuit found that due process was
violated because the trier of fact had a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the litigation. Al-
though this case involved a facial challenge to a statute, the court stated the general principle that
the due process clause guarantees a disinterested decision-maker. Id. at 699.
97. Thompson v. Schmidt, 601 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1979) is generally cited as authority for this
principle.
98. 708 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1983).
99. Id. at 320.
100. Id at 319, quoting from, Rasulis v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 1006, 1010 (7th Cir. 1974).
101. 682 F.2d 666 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982).
102. Id. at 671-72. Note the court stressed the distinction between constitutional due process
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any viable issue as to the rationality of the examination questions as a
basis for gauging an examinee's ability to perform the function of po-
lice sergeants, summary judgment was appropriately granted to the
defendants.
The deferential approach reflected in these two cases also
manifests itself in the Seventh Circuit's rejection of the irrebuttable
presumption component of the due process clause. The Supreme Court
in Cleveland Bd of Educ. v. LaFleur'0 3 had established as a general
proposition that the due process clause assurance of fundamental fair-
ness was offended by any conclusive statutory presumption that was
neither a necessary presumption or universal truth. 104 Subsequent case
law, however, indicated the Supreme Court's disenchantment with the
concept due to its unworkability. For example, Justice Rehnquist rea-
soned in Weinberger v. Sal'P0 5 that the irrebuttable presumption doc-
trine would result in the destruction of countless legislative judgments
and thus was inconsistent with the proper role of the judiciary. 10 6 Ex-
pressing the same concern, the Seventh Circuit rejected irrebuttable
presumption challenges to two enactments.
07
B. Protecting Property and Liberty Interests Under the
Due Process Clause
In several decisions, mainly in the context of employment and ed-
ucation, the Seventh Circuit dealt with procedural due process chal-
lenges. The opinions basically follow the two step analysis set forth in
the Supreme Court decision of Mathews v. Eldridge.10 8 The first part of
the Mathews analysis is to identify a property or liberty interest which
will trigger the procedural safeguards. The Supreme Court in Board of
Regents v. Roth'0 9 and Perry v. Sindermann," suggested that a prop-
challenges to employment requirements and Title VII litigation where the employer must justify
validation studies and choose testing devices having the least discriminatory impact on minority
groups. In contrast, in the due process context courts need not inquire as to whether or not a
particular promotion method is "most efficacious." Id at 670-71. The judicial inquiry is simply to
determine whether a rational basis exists between the requirements and the job function and such
was shown in this particular case. Id. at 672.
103. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
104. Id at 644-45.
105. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
106. Id at 772-73.
107. See Schanuel v. Anderson, 708 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1983); Cozart v. Winfield, 687 F.2d
1058 (7th Cir. 1982).
108. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Court looks to whether there is a protected liberty or property
interest, and, if so, what procedures are required. Id at 333-35.
109. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
110. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
CIVIL LIBERTIES
erty interest can be created through either (1) a statutory entitlement,
(2) the operation of institutional common law, or (3) principles of con-
tract law.
Generally courts look first to state law to determine the existence
of a property interest. I1 ' Thus, in Molgaard v. Caledonia'2 the Seventh
Circuit looked to Wisconsin law to determine whether conditional ap-
proval of a mobile home park permit created a protected property in-
terest. The court held that plaintiffs had only a unilateral expectation
that the plans might be approved because under Wisconsin law actual
approval and conformance to all relevant regulations is first
required. 113
Similarly, in Smith v. Board of Educ. of Urbana School District No.
116 of Champaign County, Illinois't4 the court first examined Illinois
law. Finding no tenure rights in coaching positions and thus no prop-
erty rights, the court rejected the due process claims of two terminated
athletic coaches."t 5 Continuing the Roth analysis, the court examined
the employment contracts and found that they did not guarantee em-
ployment as coaches for an indefinite period of time, but rather were
drafted on a one year basis."t 6 It further rejected any claim of an oral
contract by the School Board to employ plaintiffs indefinitely as
coaches, noting that under Illinois law an oral promise of permanent
employment given in exchange for a promise to work is unenforce-
able. 17 Thus neither Illinois law relating to teachers' tenure nor the
more general contract law created any viable property interest.1 8 Al-
l 11. This was suggested by the Court in Roth, 408 U.S. at 577-78.
112. 696 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1982).
113. See also Turnquist v. Elliot, 706 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1983), in which plaintiff sought a
higher wage rate pursuant to the Illinois University Civil Service System Act. The Act gave the
University Civil Service Merit Board the power to pay the prevailing rate of wages in such classifi-
cations as it chose. The court read the statute as making the exercise of such power discretionary.
Plaintiff was mistaken in his belief that the statute required payment of the prevailing rate to jobs
which were comparable. Thus at best he had only a unilateral expectation of being paid the
prevailing rate and no enforceable property right.
114. 708 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1983).
115. Id. at 261.
116. Id. at 263.
117. Id.
118. A similar analysis of state law appears in Lyznicki v. Board of Educ., School Dist. 167,
Cook County, Ill., 707 F.2d 949 (7th Cir. 1983). The coun determined that plaintiff could not base
his claim for continued employment as a high school principal on either a contract, in that he had
only a yearly contract, or on the Illinois School Code. The latter was rather ambiguous in that it
did provide procedural protection for an administrator demoted or reduced in rank to a lower
position, while not providing lateral transfers to positions of similar rank and equal salary. In this
case the principal was demoted in rank, but no salary reduction was ordered. Despite the un-
clarity in the statutory language, the court concluded that the dominant impression conveyed by
the history of the provision appeared to be the protection of salary rather than office. In any
event, the court found that the procedures attached did not make the employment anything other
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though recognizing a third source of property rights, i.e., "reasonable
expectation of re-employment,""11 9 the court found that here the plain-
tiffs' misreading of the Illinois School Code, their misunderstanding of
Illinois contract law, and the fact that they had simply been rehired in
the past did not trigger any reasonable expectation. 20
Finally the court rejected plaintiffs' claim that the Board's state-
ment that "a change in coaches would be good for the school's athletic
program" was so damaging to their reputations or stigmatizing as to
trigger the right to a name-clearing hearing.' 2' The Seventh Circuit
distinguished earlier cases in which state employees had been severely
damaged through serious accusations of dishonesty, immorality, intoxi-
cation, etc. thus triggering the need for due process safeguards. 22
The court's somewhat narrow focus on state law in Molgaard and
Smith should be compared with the analysis in Vail v. Board of Educ. of
Paris Union School Dist No. 95 123 In Vail the plaintiff, induced by the
School Board's oral promise that he would be employed for a two-year
period, left another job, relocated his family, and took a salary cut. His
written contract was only for one year, and at the conclusion of that
year he was informed that his contract would not be extended. Relying
on the implied contract doctrine, suggested by the Supreme Court as
another means of establishing a protected property interest, 124 the Sev-
enth Circuit found due process violations.
The Seventh Circuit as well as the district court rejected defend-
ant's claims that Illinois law failed to recognize such implied contracts
or that such were unenforceable as exceeding the power of the Board or
as violating the Illinois Statute of Frauds. 25 Perhaps most significant,
than "employment at will" and thus created no fourteenth amendment property right. The court
concluded, in dicta, that even a state provision granting some notice or hearing does not necessar-
ily change the essential character of the employment relationship so as to convert it into a form of
tenure employment protected as a property right under the due process clause. Id. at 952.
119. 708 F.2d at 264.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 265. The Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, rehearing denieg 425 U.S.
985 (1976), held that due process was triggered where changes in employment status are accompa-
nied by damage to reputation (even though the employee has no property interest in continued
employment standing alone nor a liberty interest in his reputation, without more). It is the combi-
nation of stigma to reputation and failure to rehire which rises to the level of a protected liberty
interest.
122. See e.g., Endicott v. Huddleston, 644 F.2d 1208 (7th Cir. 1980); Austin v. Board of Educ.
of Georgetown, 562 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1977).
123. 706 F.2d 1435 (1983).
124. Id. at 1437-38, citing, Justice Stewart's language in Perry v. Sindermanr. that property
interests "are not limited by a few rigid technical forms," but rather denote a broad range of
interests encompassing mutually explicit understandings. 408 U.S. at 601.
125. 706 F.2d at 1439-40.
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the court reasoned that even assuming the contract would be unen-
forceable under Illinois law, the establishment of a protected property
interest under federal law would not be precluded. The Seventh Cir-
cuit stressed that while a substantive property interest might have its
source in state law, the Supreme Court has instructed that federal con-
stitutional law determines whether an interest rises to the level of a
legitimate claim of entitlement protected by the due process clause.'
26
Thus legitimate and reasonable reliance on a promise from the state
can be the source of property rights protected under the due process
clause and the civil rights statutes, even where state law fails to provide
a remedy. Here the actions of the Board worked to deny plaintiffs
legitimate expectations of continued employment and thus created a
viable due process claim.
27
The same refusal to be bound by state law is reflected in the case
of Reed v. Village of Shorewoodl28 in which the plaintiff claimed that
defendant tried on numerous occasions to deprive him of his liquor
license. While the Illinois Liquor Control Act reads that a liquor li-
cense "shall be purely a personal privilege. . and shall not constitute
property .. . ,,,t29 the term "property" under Illinois law need not
mean the same thing as "property" under the due process clause.
1 30
Rather, the court should look behind labels to determine whether the
license here was property in a functional sense, i.e., whether the "prop-
erty is. . .securely and durably yours under state. . . law, as distinct
from what you hold subject to so many conditions as to make your
interest meager, transitory, or uncertain."'1'3 Since under Illinois law
the license was held securely for a one-year period and could be re-
voked only for cause after notice and a hearing subject to judicial re-
view, plaintiff indeed had a protected property interest under the
fourteenth amendment. 132
A third case looking beyond state law to establish a property right
126. Id at 1440, citing, Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978).
See also Winkler v. DeKalb, 648 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1981); Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neigh-
borhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 447-48 (2d Cir. 1980).
127. Note this decision will be further discussed in the section dealing with Parratt v. Taylor,
infra pps. 46 through 67.
128. 704 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1983).
129. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 43, 119 (1981).
130. 704 F.2d at 948.
131. Id.
132. The court also concluded that although the defendants were never successful in actually
revoking the license, their actions in bringing baseless prosecutions, harassing customers and em-
ployees, etc. which ultimately forced the plaintiffs to give up their license, deprived plaintiffs of a
property interest. Id. at 949.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
was Martin v. Helstad 3 3 The University of Wisconsin Law School was
sued by an applicant after it revoked an earlier acceptance letter.
While recognizing that plaintiff had no property interest under Wiscon-
sin law, the court applied the Roth principle that "mutually explicit
understandings" also create an enforceable property interest. 134 The
understanding based on an offer and acceptance was, however, clouded
by the alleged procurement of the acceptance through the applicant's
fraud, i.e., he had lied in response to the question on the application
concerning past criminal convictions. The Seventh Circuit recognized
that refusal to find a property interest would permit the law school to
make a determination as to whether or not an applicant had lied with-
out granting a hearing.
The court avoided the problem by simply assuming the existence
of a property interest and then concluding, after applying the factors in
Mathews v. Eldridge,135 that the opportunity to submit written materials
to the law school prior to its reconsideration of the applicant's admis-
sion was all the process that was due under the circumstances. 136 Since
the case was before the Seventh Circuit on denial of preliminary in-
junction and since the court recognized at least colorable academic
freedom questions, it found that the district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in denying preliminary injunctive relief.
137
In several cases this term the Seventh Circuit dealt with the prob-
lem of defining liberty interests under the due process clause. In the
case of Johnson v. Bre/fe138 the court struck the defendants' practice of
automatically assigning criminal defendants unfit to stand trial to a
highly restrictive mental health center. Since Illinois law creates a right
to be provided with services "in the least restrictive environment,"
133. 699 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1983).
134. Id. at 389-90.
135. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976): (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous
deprivation through the procedure used and the probable value of substitute procedures; and
(3) the government's interest.
136. 699 F.2d at 391. In another case applying the Mathews factors, Lister v. Hoover, 706 F.2d
796 (7th Cir. 1983), the court affirmed the district court's holding that the due process clause did
not require the University of Wisconsin to give written reasons for its refusal to classify a student
as a state resident for tuition purposes. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment, adopting its opinion. Note, however, the dissent of Judge Swygert applying the same
three factors but concluding that the majority had under-estimated the importance of the student's
interest in paying in-state tuition, while overstating the government's interest in avoiding the ad-
ministrative burden of providing a statement of reasons. Id. at 798-99 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
137. 699 F.2d at 395-99 (Coffey, J., concurring). Note the concurrence would specifically find
that a property interest cannot be acquired on the basis of fraudulent information and that the
right of a university to make its own admissions decisions was a vital part of academic freedom
that supercedes the interest of any potential student enrollee.
138. 701 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir. 1983).
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plaintiff was found to have a protected liberty interest, triggering the
protection of the federal due process clause. 139 The court emphasized
that it was not recognizing a federal right to be treated in the least
restrictive environment; rather it was relying on the state-created enti-
tlement to impose minimum procedural safeguards.'4°
In addition to the procedural violations, the court also found sub-
stantive due process problems with the restrictions placed on the plain-
tiffs' movement in and around the facility and grounds, i.e., plaintiffs
were confined indoors except for rare occasions and were locked in
their rooms while the staff personnel had their meals. The court relied
on the Supreme Court decision in Youngberg v. Romeo' 4t as establish-
ing freedom of bodily movement as a core liberty interest protected by
the due process clause from arbitrary government action. Relying on
Youngberg, the court proceeded to balance plaintiffs' interests against
the relevant state interests in securing a safe facility in which treatment
could be administered. 42 The court applied the Youngberg principle
that government decisions to restrict movement must be based on pro-
fessional judgment. 43 Since the practice at the facility of confining
prisoners indoors was not in accord with the facility's own stated policy
and no other justification was given by the defendants as to why they
violated their own policy, there was at least some doubt that even the
minimum requirement of professional judgment was satisfied. '"
Similar issues were raised in Lojuk v. Quandt, 14 a suit by a volun-
tarily committed but incompetent patient at a Veterans Administration
Medical Center who was subjected to electro-shock therapy (electro-
convulsive therapy or ECT) without his consent and against the objec-
tion of his family. Having rejected plaintiff's eighth amendment
claim, 146 the court found that compulsory treatment implicates due
139. Id. at 1207.
140. Id The court also found violation of plaintiff's federal constitutional right of access to
the courts in that the defendant's telephone policy unreasonably restricted communication with
counsel. Id. at 1207-08. The court rejected, however, plaintiffs assertion that they were entitled to
a law library at the facility, finding that the right of access can be satisfied in ways other than the
provision of a law library, i.e., through adequate assistance of counsel. Id. at 1208.
141. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
142. 701 F.2d at 1208-09.
143. Id. at 1209.
144. Id. The court did, however, uphold the practice of locking the plaintiffs in their room
while the staff ate, as being the result of a professional judgment based on a need to maintain
internal security. Id. at 1210.
145. 706 F.2d 1456 (7th Cir. 1983).
146. The court noted that plaintiff was not asserting that ECT was administered as punish-
ment and that it was reluctant to extend the eighth amendment to cases involving plaintiffs who
"voluntarily" place themselves in the custody of the government. Id at 1464-65.
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process concerns since it is a highly intrusive and controversial form of
treatment with several adverse effects.1
47
The district court had concluded that plaintiffs allegations did not
state a claim of constitutional dimension, and thus the record was in-
complete as to "what process was due." The plaintiff argued that an
incompetent patient is entitled to the appointment of a guardian to con-
sent to ECT on his behalf, while the defendants argued that at most a
staff psychiatrist exercising independent professional judgment should
be the one prescribing the treatment. 48 Due to the limited record, the
Seventh Circuit felt unable to define precisely the scope of the interest
or the minimum procedures required. 149 In Mills v. Rogers5 ° the
Supreme Court assumed the right of involuntarily committed mental
patients to refuse treatment with anti-psychotic drugs. However, it de-
clined to identify the scope of the right in light of the possibility that
governing state law provided broader protection. Here, neither rele-
vant state nor federal statutes that would further define the liberty in-
terests were presented by the parties. However, since due process
requires that at minimum a staff psychiatrist should exercise independ-
ent professional judgment in prescribing the treatment and since the
record failed to indicate that even this minimal protection was pro-
vided, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the
case.'15
In a third "liberty" case, Brookhart v. Illinois State Bd of Educ.,152
the Seventh Circuit found that plaintiffs had a protected interest in re-
ceiving a high school diploma. The interest was rooted in state law as
well as the federally recognized right to be free of stigma and damage
to reputation. 53 The state unconstitutionally interferred with this in-
terest by requiring a minimum competency test as a condition for re-
ceiving a diploma without providing meaningful notice for special
147. Id. at 1465.
148. Id at 1467.
149. Id.
150. 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
151. 706 F.2d 1468 (7th Cir. 1983), citing the Supreme Court decision in Youngberg v. Romeo
discussed supra note 139, in which the Court held that involuntarily committed mentally retarded
individuals were entitled to minimally adequate or reasonable training in light of their liberty
interests in safety and freedom. The Court defined "reasonable" to require at least that the deci-
sion of a professional not be a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice
or standards. Thus if plaintiff in the case could have proven that defendant's decision to adminis-
ter ECT departed from accepted professional practice, a claim would be stated under even the
most restrictive reading of the due process clause.
152. 697 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1983).
153. Id at 185, citing, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) which holds that a school suspension
implicated a protected liberty interest under the due process clause.
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education children to enable them to prepare for the test. At least as to
special education children, imposing this prerequisite without adequate
notice was held to be fundamentally unfair in a substantive due process
sense and also violative of the procedural balancing test imposed by
Mathews.1
54
In a final "liberty" case, Lossman v. Pekarske,155 the plaintiff was
denied custody of his children due to allegations of child abuse. The
hearing which was ultimately held resulted in a determination that the
children should continue at least temporarily in the custody of a foster
home. 156 Plaintiff alleged that the defendants removed his children
without good cause and that they violated Wisconsin statutes which
require a social worker who takes a child into custody to "immediately
attempt to notify the parent."'157 Since the district court disposed of the
case on summary judgment, the Seventh Circuit was required to accept
as true plaintifis claim that there was delay in notifying him.
While conceding that the liberty clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment protects custody of one's children, 58 the court affirmed the dis-
trict court ruling that there had been no denial of such a right. First it
held that the post-deprivation hearing sufficiently protected plaintiffs
liberty interest since there were allegations that the children's safety
was threatened. 159 The court reasoned that the defendants' alleged fail-
ure to give notice and a pre-deprivation hearing did not "injure" plain-
tiff since the later hearing established that the removal of the children
was justified. 160 The court held that any anxiety the plaintiff felt con-
cerning the whereabouts of the children due to the state's violation of
the notice provision, did not support a constitutional claim: "peace of
mind is not liberty."'161 Applying the tort concept that a plaintiff can-
not withstand summary judgment if he has sustained no actual in-
jury, 162 the court affirmed the district court ruling.
154. 697 F.2d at 185-87.
155. 707 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1983).
156. Note that a hearing a month later resulted in the return of the children to their father for
a six month probationary period, after which legal custody was restored. Id at 290.
157. Id at 289-90. WIs. STAT. § 48.19(2).
158. 707 F.2d at 289-90.
159. Relying in part on the decision in Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510 (7th Cir.), cert. denied
459 U.S. 1069 (1982), the court concluded that where the state has a procedure for a prompt,
adversary post-deprivation hearing in a child custody matter and the hearing establishes that the
state officers acted prudently in removing the children without a prior hearing, any claim that the
failure to hold a pre-deprivation hearing was a denial of due process is extinguished. 707 F.2d at
292.
160. 707 F.2d at 291.
161. Id. at 292.
162. Id.
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This analysis fails to recognize the due process clause as protecting
individuals against arbitrary, capricious official action. 163 The court er-
roneously relied on Carey v. Piohus'64 for the principle that damages
cannot be awarded in a suit alleging denial of due process unless the
claimed hearing would have prevented the deprivation. Although Ca-
rey held that compensatory damages for procedural due process viola-
tions were not available absent proof of injury, it did not decide that
federal courts could dismiss due process claims where a subsequent
hearing upholds the government's initial action. In fact, the Court in
Carey specifically established that even without proof of injury, an ini-
tial failure to provide due process gives rise to a cause of action for
declaratory relief as well as nominal damages. 65 Further, the finding
that procedural due process was violated would support a claim for
attorneys' fees. 166
Equating the question of whether compensatory damages are
available in a civil rights case with the question of whether summary
judgment can be granted to the defendant based on failure to allege a
cause of action is clearly an unwarranted extension of the Carey deci-
sion. The court confuses liability and remedy. Lossman reflects the
growing reluctance of many federal courts to provide a forum for liti-
gating certain federal claims. 167 This attitude is evidenced in the con-
cluding statement in Lossman, that the district court's intervention
would have exceeded the proper limits of the federal judiciary. 168
C Due Process and the Existence of State Remedies
Another example of the federal judiciary's reluctance to hear civil
rights litigation is found in the Supreme Court's decision in Parratt v.
Taylor 69 and its progeny. In Parratt the Court held that a claim for
negligent interference with the loss of property was not actionable in
federal court where the state provides adequate post-deprivation reme-
dies. 170 At least three factors were important in that case: (1) there was
no established state policy which caused the deprivation;' 71 (2) there
163. See cases discussed, supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
164. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
165. Id. at 266-67.
166. Attorneys' fees are awarded to the prevailing party in § 1983 suits based on the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
167. See Parratt discussion, infra pp. 325-37.
168. 707 F.2d at 292.
169. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
170. Id at 538.
171. Id. at 543.
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was no practical way of having a pre-deprivation hearing; 172 and (3) an
adequate tort remedy did exist under state law whereby the prisoner
could be compensated for the lost property. 173 The majority opinion,
however, left much ambiguity as to the precise scope of its decision. It
announced at the outset that its holding would be of "assistance to
courts confronting such a fact situation. . . which allege facts that are
commonly thought to state a claim for a common-law tort normally
dealt with by state courts . . . . 174 Nothing in this language appears
to limit its analysis to negligent deprivations of property. Thus several
questions have remained regarding the proper interpretation and scope
of the decision. Is it limited to negligent deprivations of constitutional
rights? Does it apply to claims regarding liberty deprivations? What
impact, if any, does it have on substantive as opposed to procedural
due process claims?
As to the first issue, it has been argued that an intentional depriva-
tion of a constitutional right is significantly different from a negligent
violation. Providing a remedy for the former deters future abuses of
power by persons acting under color of state law whereas punishing the
latter fails to serve such a goal. 175 Justice Blackmun in his concurrence
in Parratt stressed that the impracticality rationale, i.e., the impossibil-
ity of providing pre-deprivation hearings for negligent acts, does not
apply to intentional acts by state employees.
176
As to the second issue, whether a distinction can be drawn be-
tween constitutional claims of loss of property vs. claims that liberty
interests are implicated, the Supreme Court in its recent interpretations
of § 1983 has refused to draw distinctions between personal rights and
property rights. 177 However, there are other indications that the nature
of the constitutional claim should be significant. For example, in the
172. Id.
173. Id at 544.
174. 451 U.S. at 533-34. The vagueness of this statement and its destructive potential has been
noted by several commentators. See, e.g., Friedman, Parratt v. Taylor. Opening and Closing the
Door on Section 1983, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 545 (1982); Kirby, Demoting 14th Amendment
Claims to State Torts, 68 A.B.A.J. 166 (1982).
175. The importance of this deterrence function was noted in the recent decision of City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 268 (1981). See also Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d
565, 568 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978) (the court stressed that no legislative
enactment can deter future inadvertance; thus providing relief for negligent as opposed to inten-
tional actions would not serve the goals of § 1983).
176. 451 U.S. 527, 546 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
177. Lynch v. Household Finance, 405 U.S. 538, rehearing denied 406 U.S. 910 (1972), estab-
lished that claims of either property or liberty are actionable under § 1983.
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Seventh Circuit decision of Bonner v. Coughlin,178 which was relied
upon by the Parratt majority, Judge Stevens held that where the state
was ready to provide a prisoner with complete compensation for his
property loss, it had fulfilled its constitutional duty, leaving no federal
claim to be litigated. 179 However, Judge Stevens stressed that the ques-
tion turned on the underlying constitutional claim, rather than on the
remedy, since exhaustion of state remedies is not required under
§ 1983.180 Where state officials interfere with substantial liberty inter-
ests protected by the Constitution, it is difficult to see how anything the
state could subsequently do would save the deprivation from being un-
constitutional. Since it cannot cure the constitutional deprivation, in
the sense of returning or replacing lost property, and since it is well
settled that § 1983 provides a supplementary remedy,' 8 ' the existence
of a state remedy should be irrelevant where important liberty interests
are asserted.
A somewhat related question concerns the application of Parratt
to substantive due process as opposed to procedural due process claims.
Where plaintiffs are attacking an established state procedure and are
urging the addition of further procedural safeguards, the Mathews
analysis would appear to include in part a discussion of state remedies.
Thus in the Supreme Court decision of Ingraham v. W4hite 182 the Court,
in considering the nature of the right implicated and the risk of errone-
ous deprivation, pointed to the availability of state remedies to rectify
abuses of corporal punishment. 183 Its conclusion that a pre-paddling
hearing was not required was based in part on the existence of state
remedies that already provided some degree of protection to the chal-
lenged interest. 8 4 The Court stressed in Ingraham that it was dealing
only with procedural due process allegations and it specifically refused
to reach any substantive due process claims. 85 This distinction is re-
178. 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975), mod&6ed 545 F.2d 565 (1976) (en banc), cert. denied 435
U.S. 932 (1978).
179. Id at 1319-20.
180. Id. at 1319. He reasoned that the mandates of procedural due process are fulfilled
through the provision of an adequate state procedure, i.e., "it seems to us that... the existence of
an adequate state remedy. . . avoids the conclusion that there has been any constitutional depri-
vation of property without due process of law." Id
181. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Justifications for this supplemental remedy have
been cogently presented by several authorities. See e.g., Friedman, supra note 170, 573-76;
Neuborne, The Myth ofParity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
182. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
183. Id at 682.
184. Id at 675-77.
185. Id at 659 n.12. This distinction was noted in Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir.
1980), holding that a minor's substantive due process claims arising from the infliction of discipli-
nary corporal punishment were actionable under § 1983.
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flected in Justice Blackmun's concurrence in which he argued that
". there are certain governmental actions that, even if undertaken
with a full panoply of procedural protection, are, in and of themselves,
antithetical to fundamental notions of due process."' 86 Such actions
should give rise to a federal court remedy.
The Seventh Circuit this term struggled with these questions in
several decisions reflecting a division on the court as to the meaning of
Parralt. It is apparent that at least some members of the panel wish to
adopt an expansionist approach, while others seek to limit Parratt to
negligent deprivations of property. Unfortunately, the decisions fail to
provide a definitive position on the issues.
In Flower Cab Co. v. Petitte,187 the district court had granted a
preliminary injunction compelling the Commissioner of Consumer
Services in Chicago to assign taxi cab licenses to the plaintiffs. Al-
though plaintiffs had complied with the Chicago Municipal Code, the
defendant Commissioner had refused to act due to a proposed ordi-
nance before the City Council which would prohibit assignments of
licenses. 88 The district court concluded that the plaintiffs would be
able to prove at trial that the Commissioner's refusal violated the four-
teenth amendment by depriving plaintiffs of a property right without
due process of law, i.e., defendant had acted arbitrarily, in violation of
the ordinance, and without giving the plaintiffs notice or an opportu-
nity for a hearing. 89 This rationale apparently encompassed both sub-
stantive due process claims-based on the arbitrariness of government
action-as well as procedural due process claims-the denial of notice
and the opportunity for a hearing.
The Seventh Circuit granted the defendant's motion for a stay
pending appeal. It assumed without deciding that the taxicab license in
Chicago was a property interest within the meaning of the due process
clause and that a refusal to allow the assignment of a property right
based on municipal law was a sufficient deprivation to activate the
clause. 19 It concluded, however, that the defendant's refusal- even if
it was a deliberate refusal--to comply with the ministerial duty of
transferring property rights did not give rise to a claim under the Con-
stitution. 9 Since the state provided a clear mandamus remedy, the
186. 451 U.S. 545 (1981).
187. 685 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1982).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 193.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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federal court was not a proper forum in which to litigate the claims.
The court relied on Parratt for the proposition that "not every act
of a state officer that deprives a person of his property rights violates
the due process clause, at least where there are adequate post-depriva-
tion remedies under state law."' 92 It also stressed that as in Parratt, the
loss here was not the result of some established state procedure but was
rather an attack on one official's conduct. It reasoned that the scope of
§ 1983 should not encompass every deliberate failure by a state or local
officer to perform ministerial duties necessary to the full enjoyment of
property rights.' 93 Concerns of federalism predominated the discus-
sion, the court noting that, "a probably baseless federal injunction in-
terfering with the operation of municipal government is a serious
affront to the theory and practice of federalism."
1 94
The court did state, however, that it was ruling based on an incom-
plete record and that the case was being litigated only with regard to
preliminary injunction. Further, here the deprivation of property was
not of a serious magnitude. It was simply a delay in the assignment of
some taxicab licenses pending action by the City Council on a proposal
to make such licenses unassignable. Thus, there was still time to chal-
lenge the validity of the ordinance if indeed the council passed it. 19 5
Nonetheless, the majority did expand Parratt in that it applied its anal-
ysis to deliberate, intentional conduct on the part of government offi-
cials. While it may be that the actions were not sufficiently grievious to
violate the due process clause, 196 the court here adopts the more troub-
lesome conclusion that the existence of a state remedy negates a cause
of action under § 1983.197
192. Id
193. Id. at 193-94.
194. Id. at 194.
195. Id
196. This principle was expressed in an earlier Supreme Court decision: "Section 1983 im-
poses liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of
care arising out of tort law. Remedy for the latter type of injury must be sought in state court
under traditional tort-law principles." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979).
Lower courts have relied on Parratt to hold that the misuse of legal procedure must be so
egregious as to subject the aggrieved individual to a deprivation of constitutional dimensions. See
Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1333-34 (10th Cir. 1981); Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263 (5th
Cir. 1981); Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 459 U.S.
989 (1982); Hull v. City of Duncanville, 678 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1982).
197. Note earlier decisions in this circuit had clearly held that the intentional taking of prop-
erty by government officials was actionable under § 1983. Flood v. Margis, 461 F.2d 253 (7th Cir.
1972) (holding that federal courts have jurisdiction to consider a claim of denial of due process
based on an arbitrary refusal to renew a license); Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868, 873 (7th
Cir. 1981), citing Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 545 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc), (suggesting
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In another case, Scudder v. Town of Greendale, Ind,198 the court
cited Parratt for the general principle that the federal judiciary should
take care not to expand constitutional rights through § 1983 because
such would both overburden federal courts, diluting their ability to de-
fend more significant rights, while at the same time displacing state
law-making authority.199 This reference to Parratt, however, was gra-
tuitous in light of the court's actual reasoning. In Scudder the plaintiff
challenged the Board of Trustees' denial of a permit he sought to con-
struct houses on certain pieces of real estate. The Board of Trustees
acted pursuant to a local ordinance which specifically prohibits the
erection of buildings on lots which do not front a street. Further, plain-
tiff did not allege the invalidity of the ordinance nor did he recite any
logical reasoning to support his allegations that the ordinance was ap-
plied or enforced in an unconstitutional manner.2°° Thus the dismissal
for failure to state a claim for relief under § 1983 was founded on the
lack of any allegations supporting the constitutional claims-not on the
existence of state remedies. 20' While the majority stated that federal
district courts should not serve as "zoning appeals boards," and that
federal courts should be wary of reviewing zoning decisions,20 2 the key
thrust of the opinion is that the plaintiff failed to make any allegations
of arbitrary or discriminatory action which give rise to a constitutional
claim. Presumably had such allegations been made, the existence of a
zoning appeal body would have been irrelevant.
20 3
that an intentional taking of a state prisoner's property by a prison employee is actionable under
§ 1983).
It may be that applying the analysis of Mathews, discussed supra note 106, the court has
concluded that a post-deprivation hearing sufficiently satisfies due process. Thus plaintiff has no
due process claim in any court--state or federal. However, the court's analysis does not appear to
rely on this theory.
198. 704 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1983).
199. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 554 n.13 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring), quoting, Whit-
man, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 25 (1980).
200. The law is well settled that enforcement of an otherwise valid zoning ordinance violates
the Constitution only if: (1) the decision of the body is arbitrary; or (2) the ordinance is applied or
enforced with a discriminatory intent or purpose. 704 F.2d 999, 1002 (citations omitted).
201. Note that the district court had dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust state reme-
dies, a conclusion which could no longer support the judgment in light of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), making it clear
that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a condition precedent to bringing suit in
federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
202. Scudder v. Town of Greendale, Ind., 704 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1983).
203. This same principle is reflected in Barbian v. Panagis, 694 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1982), in
which plaintiffs challenged defendant's decision to grant a trucking company a permanent vari-
ance from a municipal noise ordinance in violation of their property rights. Plaintiffs claimed that
the noise from the traffic disrupted their sleep, increased the danger of physical injury to all resi-
dents and had a debilitating emotional and physical effect on them personally. While the court
stated that § 1983 does not provide plaintiffs a federal forum in which to contest the merits of a
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The Seventh Circuit's analysis in the more troublesome Flower
Cab Co. opinion was distinguished and somewhat limited by the hold-
ing in the subsequent case of Evans v. City of Chicago.20 4 In this suit
plaintiffs were challenging the City's practice of paying tort judgments
of $1,000 or less as soon as the judgment holders presented proper doc-
uments, while delaying the payment of larger judgments.20 5 Under an
Illinois statute 206 cities are required to pay tort judgments during the
fiscal year in which the judgment becomes final, unless the city com-
plies with two contingencies enumerated in the statute, neither of which
was relied upon here. The defendants argued, however, that under the
Parratt analysis due process was satisfied via a judicial procedure avail-
able in state court to compel compliance with the Illinois law.207
The Seventh Circuit gave three reasons for rejecting this defense:
(1) Whereas Parratt concerned a tortious loss of property resulting
from a random and unauthorized act, here the city systematically de-
prived property owners of their state-created right to immediate pay-
ment.20 8 (2) The existence of post-deprivation remedies within a state
system does not cure the unconstitutional nature of a state official's in-
tentional, as opposed to merely negligent, act that deprives a person of
property. 209 (3) The speculative nature of the state court remedy to
challenge a city's failure to pay judgments makes Parratt inapplica-
ble.210 The court distinguished Flower Cab Co. as having preceded the
subsequent Supreme Court decision in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co.,2 1 which held Parratt inapplicable to established government pro-
cedures alleged to violate due process. Further it noted the tentative
nature in which the claims in Flower Cab Co. arose, i.e., the context of a
stay pending appeal.21 2
Of course, the difficult question raised by Flower Cab and Evans is
whether Parratt should ever be extended to intentional acts.213 Several
local administrative decision, it recognized that an administrative determination may be set aside
if it is arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 480. The court did not dismiss the case based on the
existence of state remedies where the administrative decision could be challenged; rather it made a
finding based on the record that the decision was not arbitrary and capricious, and thus gave rise
to no viable due process claim. Id. at 482.
204. 689 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1982).
205. The court noted delays of up to 47 months for payment of larger judgments. Id. at 1290.
206. Id. at 1299.
207. Id. at 1297.
208. Id, citing, Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
209. 689 F.2d at 1298, citing, Blackmun's concurrence in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 545-46.
210. 689 F.2d at 1298.
211. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
212. 689 F.2d at 1299 n.15.
213. The court's attempt to distinguish Flower Cab Co. fails to address this issue. Id.
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cases in the Seventh Circuit and elsewhere have flatly rejected this ex-
tension.21 4 Those which have applied Parratt to intentional depriva-
tions of rights have reasoned that the underlying principle in Parratt is
that due process is not violated when no practical way exists to provide
a pre-deprivation hearing. This same rationale, it is argued, applies
whether the deprivation is intentional or negligent, provided meaning-
ful prior review is impractical.
21 5
This reasoning is reflected in a recent Fourth Circuit opinion. 216
The court concludes that procedural due process is not violated, ac-
cording to Parratt, if the state provides a post facto remedy for an in-
jury inflicted by an official who was not acting pursuant to an
established policy and was not amenable to prior control.217 Thus Par-
rait would not affect the right to a § 1983 remedy where (1) the offi-
cially inflicted injury is done pursuant to an established procedure; or
(2) the official act violates a substantive constitutional right such as the
right to vote; or (3) the official act is sufficiently egregious to amount to
a violation of the requirement of substantive due process. 21 8 Aside
from these circumstances, the Fourth Circuit held "once it is assumed
that a post-deprivation remedy can cure an unintentional but negligent
act causing injury, inflicted by a state agent which is unamenable to
prior review, then that principle applies as well to random and unau-
thorized intentional acts. ' 219 Since the case involved the destruction of
property in a non-routine shake-down search, due process is not vio-
lated provided the state assures adequate post-deprivation relief.
220
214. Weiss v. Lehman, 676 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1982); Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d
868, 873 (7th Cir. 1981); Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp. 605, 615 (D. Mass. 1982); Howse v.
DeBerry Correctional Institute, 537 F. Supp. 1177, 1180-81 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); Peters v. Township
of Hopewell, 534 F. Supp. 1324, 1333-34 (D.N.J. 1982); Tarkowski v. Hoogasian, 532 F. Supp.
791, 794-95 (N.D. I11. 1982); Parker v. Rockefeller, 521 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (N.D. W. Va. 1981).
215. Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d 1220, 1222-23 (4th Cir. 1983); Engbloom v. Carey, 677 F.2d
957, 965 (2d Cir. 1982); Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1981),
aff'd on other grounds, Kush v. Rutledge, 103 S. Ct. 1483 (1983); Gilday v. Boone, 657 F.2d 1, 2
n.1 (1st Cir. 1981); Waterstraat v. Central State Hospital, 533 F. Supp. 274 (W.D. Va. 1982);
Sheppard v. Moore, 514 F. Supp. 1372 (M.D.N.C. 1981).
216. Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir. 1983).
217. Id at 1222 n.2.
218. Id. (citations omitted).
219. Id at 1223.
220. Note, however, the Fourth Circuit reversed the case on the issue of whether the defend-
ant's conduct constitutes an unreasonable search of the plaintiffs property. The court reasoned
that if defendant was unable to establish that the search was permissibly motivated and conducted
in a reasonable manner, plaintiff might have a viable claim under the fourth amendment. It then
held that Parratt would not affect such a right, since the right violated is now a substantive right to
privacy and not simply a right to procedural due process. Thus the case would then fit into the
second exception recognized by this court. Id. at 1224-25.
The Tenth Circuit has similarly held that the crucial question is whether the state provides an
adequate remedy for the alleged deprivation of property, rather than whether the act was inten-
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The Fourth Circuit's cautious and limited approach to the Parratt
question is unfortunately not reflected in the opinions of the Seventh
Circuit. While Evans appeared to mark the demise of the expansionist
approach to Parratt, the Seventh Circuit's 1983 decisions indicate the
continuing debate. In Wolf-Lilie v. Sonquist,22 t the court again upheld
the application of Parratt to an intentional deprivation of property in-
terests, without trying to distinguish or even mentioning Evans. The
case involved plaintiffs challenge to the untimely execution of a writ of
restitution in violation of Wisconsin law. The plaintiff alleged a perva-
sive pattern or practice of executing stale writs of restitution on the part
of the defendant, but the court held, contrary to the district court, that
in light of Wisconsin's common law tort procedures, plaintiff was not
deprived of her property without due process of law.222 This conclusion
appears in clear violation of Logan's holding that Parrall is not applica-
ble where an established procedure as opposed to a random isolated
incident of abuse, is at issue. 223 The court instead relied on Parratt for
the general principle that federal courts must consider the adequacy
and availability of remedies under state law before concluding that a
deprivation of life, liberty, or property violates due process of law. It
held that Wisconsin "has done all that the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires" to guarantee plaintiff due process of law.224
The court does, however, recognize one clear limitation to Parratt,
i.e., that plaintiffs substantive fourth amendment claims are not af-
fected by the availability of state remedies. Parratt is limited to viola-
tions of procedural due process: "Federal and state courts in effect
have concurrent jurisdiction over torts based on substantive constitu-
tional guarantees. ' 225
A final case discussing the Parrat analysis is Vail v. Board of Educ.
tional or negligent. Thus in Coleman v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 1347 (10th Cir. 1982), the court rea-
soned that the initial seizure of property during an arrest would not give rise to a cause of action
under § 1983 since it would have been impractical for the state to hold a hearing to determine
ownership prior to seizing the potential evidence from the defendant. The court noted that while
the seizure of money was intentional, there was not time for a pre-deprivation hearing since the
defendant was trying to eat the evidence at the time of arrest. The court stressed the unique
nature of these facts, rejecting the general rule that a post-deprivation remedy is adequate for all
intentional deprivations. 697 F.2d at 1349 n.3. In fact in the companion case of Coleman v.
Turpen, 697 F.2d 1341 (10th Cir. 1983), the court held that the state's post-arrest retention of the
property until the defendant's execution did raise a cause of action under § 1983. Id. at 1344.
221. 699 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1983).
222. Id. at 870-71.
223. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
224. 699 F.2d at 871.
225. Id at 872. Note that presumably federal courts also have concurrent jurisdiction over
procedural due process claims.
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of Paris Union School District No. 9926 which involves an athletic di-
rector-football coach who was terminated without a hearing despite an
implied contract of employment for a two year period. Having found a
viable property interest, the court affirmed the district court's award of
damages for the unlawful termination.227 Judge Wood, who three
months earlier authored the Wolf-Li/lie opinion, summarily rejected
any application of Parratt, finding that the latter was limited to cases
involving a tortious loss of property where a pre-deprivation hearing
would be meaningless. 228 He cited the subsequent Supreme Court de-
cision in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. 229 as indicating the Supreme
Court's refusal to expand Parratt.230 His opinion appears to signal the
Seventh Circuit's adoption of this narrow approach, but a lengthy dis-
cussion of Parratt found in Judge Eschbach's concurrence and Judge
Posner's dissent reflects the continuing debate on the issue.
Favoring a limited reading, Judge Eschbach's concurring opinion
in Vail argues that Parratt decided only the following: (1) that due
process did not require a pre-deprivation hearing because such would
not be meaningful in the case of negligent deprivations, and in fact
would be practically impossible, 231 and (2) that the post-deprivation
remedy available in state court afforded due process of law, in that it
would provide the plaintiff a meaningful opportunity to be heard re-
garding his claim. 232 Here, on the other hand, a pre-deprivation hear-
ing was feasible and in fact would have provided Vail a meaningful
opportunity to guard against the risk of a wrongful or erroneous deci-
sion.233 The deprivation occurred as a result of an intentionally estab-
lished state procedure of voting on continuing contracts and making
decisions without providing individuals with a reason for the decision
or a meaningful opportunity to be heard.234 Thus the plaintiff had a
clear right to litigate his claims in federal court.
In dissent, Judge Posner begins by framing the issue as whether
breaches of public employment contracts are constitutional torts which
226. 706 F.2d 1435 (7th Cir. 1983), discussed earlier regarding the question of whether a prop-
erty right was created. See supra notes 121-125, and accompanying text.
227. 706 F.2d at 1438.
228. Judge Wood noted that this factor distinguished Wolf-Lilie without explaining why a
pre-deprivation hearing in that case would be "meaningless" prior to execution of the writs. Id at
1440-41.
229. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
230. 706 F.2d at 1441.
231. Id. at 1447 (Eschbach, J., concurring).
232. Id.
233. As Judge Eschbach explained, had Vail been discharged following a hearing and tried to
bring a 1983 action, then relief would have been properly denied based on Parralt. Id at 1448.
234. Id. at 1448-49.
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can be litigated in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.235 The thrust
of his entire decision rests on federalism concerns and a reluctance to
constitutionalize common law torts. His reasoning proceeds as follows.
First, Posner argues that a breach of contract is simply not a viable
property interest. 236 He distinguishes earlier case precedent, such as
Perry v. Sindermann, as involving a tenure question.237 He then argues
that even if Illinois law created some type of property interest, the in-
terest included only a claim for damages, not a right to sue for rein-
statement: ". . . since the right Vail was allegedly deprived of is just a
right to a particular remedy--damages-he cannot complain that he
has been deprived of that right unless the state fails to provide him with
the remedy.' ' 238 Posner thus argues that there is no cause of action
under § 1983 since the state of Illinois provides a remedy in its courts
for breaches of contract with public school employees, and this was the
only property right created on their behalf. He relies on Parrall to sup-
port his conclusion that the existence of a state remedy negates a cause
of action under § 1983.239
This argument misconstrues the scope of the due process clause.
Vail is arguing that a viable property interest was created and he is
therefore entitled by federal law to a hearing before such interest can
be affected. The question of what remedy Illinois makes available to
plaintiffs in state court in a breach of contract suit is simply irrelevant
to the question of whether, having created a property interest, the state
can constitutionally deprive a citizen of that interest without providing
a hearing. The latter is a question of federal law and should be decided
in federal court.
24 °
235. Id at 1450 (Posner, J., dissenting).
236. Id
237. Id. at 1451. Posner's narrow reading of the Sindermann case is unwarranted because the
Supreme Court did not in any way rely upon tenure as a basis for finding a protected property
interest. Indeed, Sindermann was not contending that he had any express contract for continued
employment but only de facto tenure. 408 U.S. 593, 600 (1972).
238. 706 F.2d at 1453 (Posner, J., dissenting). The analysis is reminiscent of Justice Rehn-
quist's reasoning in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, rehearing deniea 417 U.S. 977 (1974), that
state law which creates a property interest can also circumscribe the scope or extent of that inter-
est. A broad reading of Arnett would do away with due process guarantees in that the state could
always create property interests and simultaneously divest those interests of any procedural safe-
guards. See 416 U.S. at 177-78 (White, J., concurring).
239. 706 F.2d at 1454.
240. The court in fact reached this conclusion, finding that Illinois law regarding the enforce-
ability of plaintiff's contract would not preclude a finding of a protected property interest under
federal law. See supra, notes 123-124 and accompanying text. Ironically Judge Posner himself
argued this principle in Reed v. Village of Shorewood, discussed supra, notes 126-130 and accom-
panying text. There he specifically states that the term "property" under Illinois law does not
mean the same thing as "property" in the due process clause.
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Posner relies on Parratt a second time in arguing that even if a
broader property interest was created by the state, due process was not
violated through the state's failure to provide a pre-deprivation hear-
ing. Parratt, he argues, stands for the general principle that common
law remedies may in some cases provide all the process that is due.
24
1
He concedes the conffict between this broad reading of Parratt and the
earlier landmark decision in Monroe v. Pape2 42 in which the Supreme
Court first established that a civil rights case, there a police brutality
suit, was actionable under § 1983 regardless of what tort remedies the
victim might have against the police under state law in a state court.
243
He argues, however, that simple breaches of contract should fall more
on the Parratt side as opposed to the much more egregious violations
complained of in Monroe, where more than simply the denial of due
process in its original sense of proper procedure was at stake.
244
Although Posner may be correct that this is the direction in which
the Supreme Court is moving, it is doubtful that it has yet provided a
basis for the expansion that Posner suggests here. As Judge Eschbach
cogently noted, "Writing, as I am, on the shores of Lake Michigan
rather than the banks of the Potomac, I am not free to make that deci-
sion."' 24 - In short, Posner's major concern is that it trivializes the Con-
stitution to permit government employees, such as the football coach
here, to litigate a contract claim against a school board in a federal
district court. The most basic response to Posner's concern is that the
Supreme Court has held that once the state creates a property interest
241. 706 F.2d at 1454 (Posner, J., dissenting). He cites Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510 (7th
Cir. 1982), discussed in last year's survey, Bodensteiner and Levinson, Civil Liberties: Current
Developments in the Seventh Circuit Recognizing First Amendment, Procedural Due Process, Em-
ployment Discrimination and the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 59 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 403, 420-
26 (1983), as well as Flower Cab Co. and Wolf-Lillie, discussed, supra notes 221-225 and accompa-
nying text, to support his conclusion that Parratt should be read to always require federal courts to
consider the adequacy and availability of remedies under state law before concluding that a depri-
vation of life, liberty or property violates due process. Note that this statement comports with the
general requirement under the Mathews analysis that the court examine the risk of erroneous
deprivation in determining whether a procedural due process violation has occurred. See supra
note 182 and accompanying text. Contrary to Judge Posner, this reading of Parrait would not
conflict with Monroe, because the plaintiff has obtained a federal court ruling under § 1983 on the
due process question. While one might then disagree with the court as to how it has balanced the
Mathews factors, one could not accuse the federal court of abdicating its responsibility of provid-
ing a federal forum for the adjudication of federal rights.
242. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
243. Id at 183.
244. 706 F.2d at 1455 (Posner, J., dissenting). Contrast this with the recent Sixth Circuit hold-
ing that the application of Parratt outside the narrow prison rights context would be inconsistent
with Monroe and the more recent Supreme Court holding in Patsy v. Board of Regents of State of
Florida, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), reaffirming the no-exhaustion principle under § 1983. See Wilker-
son v. Johnson, 699 F.2d 325, 329 (6th Cir. 1983).
245. 706 F.2d at 1445.
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either through state law, through contract or through the creation of
reasonable expectations, it must provide a pre-deprivation hearing
before that property interest can be taken away.246 If the state provides
such a hearing, even if it then decides against the plaintiff, the case will
never be litigated in a federal court but the individual would have to
pursue his contract claim in state court. The Constitution thus only
comes into play where the state violates clear Supreme Court precedent
indicating the need to have a pre-deprivation hearing. Posner's conclu-
sion that the Vail opinion is "another step on the road whose terminus
is the displacement of the whole of state law into the federal courts"
247
is surely unwarranted once this basic principle of due process is
understood.
Read together, the Seventh Circuit decisions on the Parrat issue
fail to establish any logical, coherent position. The members of the
court are clearly divided on whether Parratt should be applied to inten-
tional deprivations of property,248 and while Wolf-Lilie appeared to
reject application of Parratt to substantive due process claims, 249 other
decisions seem to ignore this distinction.250 Further the decisions con-
flict as to the precedential value of Logan which rejected the applica-
tion of Parratt where established state procedures are challenged. 251
The confusion in the Seventh Circuit indicates the compelling need for
Supreme Court guidance on these issues.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION: APPLYING THE MINIMAL RATIONALITY
STANDARD
Most of the equal protection challenges raised in the Seventh Cir-
cuit this term were rather summarily disposed of using the minimal
rationality test.252 The Supreme Court has generally held that in cases
246. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
247. 706 F.2d at 1456 (Posner, J., dissenting).
248. See supra notes 229-242 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
250. See discussion of Flower Cab Co., supra, pp. 485-86.
251. While the court in Evans, supra note 206, and in Vail, supra note 226, relies on Logan as
having limited Parratt, in Wolf-Lillie the case is ignored despite plaintiff's allegation of a "perva-
sive practice" of property deprivations. See supra notes 220-232 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., Schanuel v. Anderson, 708 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1983), upholding as rational an
Illinois statute which makes ex-felons ineligible for employment with private detective and secur-
ity guard agencies for a period of ten years following discharge from sentence; Cozart v. Winfield,
687 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir. 1982), upholding Evanston's "Terminated Employees" regulation which
allocates general assistance funds, imposing a thirty-day waiting period on employees who quit or
are fired from their jobs; Georges v. Carney, discussed, supra notes 31-47 and accompanying text,
upholding the alleged discrimination between publicly initiated and privately initiated questions
with regard to ballot access in an election.
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which do not involve either a discrete and insular minority or a funda-
mental right, it suffices that the legislative scheme rationally furthers a
legitimate state purpose or interest.25 3 Most of the Seventh Circuit de-
cisions relied on the principle that legislative enactments must be sus-
tained provided "any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify them. '254 Thus in the case of Lowrie v. Goldenhersh,255 the court
upheld Illinois' five-year reciprocity rule as applied to attorneys wish-
ing to practice in the state without taking the Illinois state bar exam.
The court held that the state's concern for a bar applicant's character
and fitness meets the minimum standard of the "conceivable rational
basis test," even though the rule was not the least restrictive means and
perhaps not the best way to insure character and fitness.
256
There were, however, two decisions in which the Seventh Circuit
found that legislative classifications failed to meet even this minimal
standard.257 The decisions are significant as perhaps beginning to
mark a trend toward strengthening the anti-discrimination principle
embodied in the equal protection clause. The same growing reluctance
to apply a totally deferential standard is also reflected in a few recent
Supreme Court decisions.258 In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Com-
pany,259 the majority struck, on procedural due process grounds, an Illi-
nois statute cutting off discrimination claims due to conduct outside the
control of a plaintiff. Four members of the Court, however, found that
the law also violated even the lowest level of permissible equal protec-
tion scrutiny.260 Justice Blackmun asserted that a statute must have
some objective basis in order to be sustained, and that this particular
law created arbitrary and invidious distinctions.
261
253. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Lindsley v. Natu-
ral Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
254. 691 F.2d at 302. This principle stems from the Supreme Court's analysis in Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
255. 716 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1983).
256. Id. at 12, citing, Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 487-90 (1955).
257. See infra notes 263-267 and accompanying text.
258. This trend was first suggested in dissenting opinions. For example, in Schweiker v. Wil-
son, 450 U.S. 221 (1981), a vigorous dissent argued that where there is no indication of legislative
purpose, the Supreme Court should impose a "fair and substantial relationship" standard. The
dissent urged that the Court be more skeptical of post-hoc justifications about legislative purpose,
unsupported by legislative history. The fair and substantial relationship standard would test the
plausability of the tendered purpose and preserve equal protection review as something more than
"a mere tautological recognition of the fact that Congress did what it intended to do." Id. at 244-
45 (Powell, J., dissenting).
259. 455 U.S. 1148 (1982).
260. Id at 1160 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
261. Id at 1161 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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In Zobel v. Williams,262 the Supreme Court struck on equal protec-
tion grounds an Alaska dividend distribution plan which created dis-
tinctions between citizens based on the duration of their residence
within the state. Although the Court could have dealt with the measure
as one implicating the right to travel and thus justifying stricter review,
the majority instead chose to apply traditional equal protection analy-
sis, concluding that the distinctions created by the law failed to ration-
ally serve any valid state interest.263 Although the distribution plan
arguably could have been justified as compensating citizens for their
prior contribution to the state, the majority applied a stricter review in
concluding that the requirement failed even traditional equal protec-
tion analysis.2
64
This same stricter approach is reflected in the Seventh Circuit case
of Evans v. City of Chicago,265 finding no rational basis for the city's
practice of paying smaller judgments first, leaving those with judg-
ments in excess of $1,000 to wait inordinately long periods of time for
payment. The court rejected the city's justification for its practice as an
attempt to reduce litigation and interest costs by encouraging quick set-
tlements for $1,000 or less without interest in a large number of nui-
sance cases.266 The justification was not convincing because the city's
practice, which included the immediate payment of fully litigated
claims resulting in judgments of $1,000 or less, failed to reduce interest
costs since interest accumulated on the sum of the unpaid larger judg-
ments. 267 The court could discern no rational basis for the challenged
classification.
268
In the second case, Ciechon v. City of Chicago,269 the court found
the city's discharge of one paramedic, while not in any way disciplining
a co-paramedic involved in the same incident, as an arbitrary and irra-
tional treatment of similarly situated persons. 270 Finding that the city
did not have even a rational basis for its disparate treatment of the
262. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
263. Id at 63.
264. See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), in which the majority, while failing to find
either a fundamental right or a suspect classification, applied an intermediate standard, i.e., re-
quiring the law to further some substantial goal of the state.
265. 689 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1982).
266. Id. at 1299.
267. Id
268. Id at 1300, citing, Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
269. 686 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1982).
270. Id The court used the equal protection clause in the same way the due process clause is
sometimes used, i.e., to protect against arbitrary government conduct. Id at 517. See also supra
notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
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paramedics, it affirmed the judgment of the district court. 27
1
Aside from these minimal rationality equal protection cases, the
Seventh Circuit dealt with a rather interesting discrimination problem
in Madyun v. Franzen.272 A prisoner challenged the Illinois Depart-
ment of Corrections regulations which subject female prisoners to frisk
searches by female guards only, while male prisoners are subjected to
frisk searches by male and female guards. Plaintiff claimed that male
prisoners should be searched by only male guards, just as female pris-
oners are only subjected to searches by female guards. Although first
recognizing that incarceration changes to a degree the application of
constitutional principles, 273 the court concluded that applying even
non-prisoner doctrine, there was no merit to plaintiffs equal protection
claim.
The court applied the analysis in Craig v. Boren requiring that a
gender-based distinction "serve important governmental objectives and
• . . be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.
' 274
The important objective was to eliminate what might otherwise be a
substantial impediment to the utilization of women as prison guards.
275
The differentiation was justified in that there was no similar indication
that males had suffered a lack of opportunity to serve as prison guards
because of their preclusion from frisk searching female inmates. Thus
in order to equalize opportunities for women to serve as guards in male
prisons, the gender-based distinction was drawn.
276
Although the court's conclusion may be correct, some of its analy-
sis is troublesome. The court focuses on the distinction between male
and female guards in arguing that the preference for women guards is
permissible. 277 If plaintiff were a male guard seeking equal job oppor-
tunities, this analysis might be more appropriate. Rather plaintiffs
claim is that male prisoners should be afforded "equal dignity and re-
spect as that afforded female inmates. ' 278 While conceding that male
271. Id at 524. See also Kuhn v. Vergiels, 558 F. Supp. 24 (D. Nev. 1982), upholding a pre-
liminary injunction enjoining the defendants from enforcing a durational residency requirement
for eligibility in a scholarship program as wholly unreasonable and arbitrary, citing, Zobel as
authority; Osterndorf v. Turner, 426 So. 2d 539 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1982) relying heavily on Zobel to
strike a home owner's tax exemption statute based on residence in the state, although ultimately
deciding the case on state constitutional grounds; Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1981),
finding no rational justification for the disparate treatment imposed on pre-trial detainees.
272. 704 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1983), discussed, supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
273. Id. at 958.
274. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
275. 704 F.2d at 960.
276. Id at 962.
277. Id.
278. Id at 961.
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and female inmates must receive substantially equal facilities and con-
ditions while in prison,279 the court found that a prisoner has no right
to be searched only by a member of his or her own sex. 280 Although
the court's conclusions may be correct within the prison context, the
court states that this is not controlling. It reasons that if women were
not allowed to perform these limited searches---or were limited to do-
ing so only on female inmates-the utility of women prison guards
would be significantly diminished and job opportunities curtailed. 281 If
this were substantiated in the record, it might indeed justify the neces-
sity of this discrimination.
Although the Supreme Court, as noted by the Seventh Circuit, has
upheld various types of benign discrimination based on attempts to
ameliorate the economic plight of females, the Supreme Court's most
recent decision has urged very careful scrutiny of such legislation. In
Mississippi Universi for Women v. Hogan282 the state's exclusion of
males from the university's nursing school was held to violate the equal
protection clause. Although the state asserted that the female-only pol-
icy was based on a desire to maximize job opportunities for women, the
majority rejected this analysis and reaffirmed the following basic prin-
ciples: (1) laws which discriminate against males rather than females
should be subjected to the same standard of review;283 (2) the defend-
ants carry the burden of showing an "exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion" for any classification; 284 (3) care must be taken in ascertaining
whether the statutory objective reflects archaic and stereotypic no-
tions;285 and (4) as to the means used in achieving a statutory objective,
gender should never be used as a proxy for a more germane basis of
classification. 286 Applying these principles in Hogan, the majority con-
cluded that the asserted state's interest in having an affirmative action
program for females could not be justified in the realm of nursing
where there is no showing that females have suffered a disadvantage.
279. Id. at 962 (citations omitted).
280. Id Note that the court in an earlier portion of its opinion rejects plaintiff's claim that the
limited frisk searches by female guards violated first amendment privacy rights, or fourth amend-
ment rights of male inmates. Id at 956-57. The Seventh Circuit recently reached this conclusion
in Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 461 U.S. 907 (1983).
281. 704 F.2d at 962.
282. 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982).
283. Id at 3336-37. Thus the Court rejected the suggestion made by Justice Rehnquist in the
earlier decision of Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), that men do not require the
"special solicitude of the courts" and thus a lesser standard of review might be permissible. Id. at
476.
284. 102 S. Ct. at 3336.
285. Id
286. Id at 3337, citing, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198.
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Further, female-only schools tend to perpetuate the stereotypic view of
nursing as an exclusively woman's job.
287
Although in this case the asserted government interests are cer-
tainly stronger and are based on findings of past denial of opportunity
for females, the question of means is still problematic, i.e. does the goal
of equal job opportunity for women as prison guards truly require that
male prisoners be subjected to frisk searches by female guards whereas
female prisoners are not subjected to the same treatment.288 The real
question is whether the state's goal of providing equal job opportunity
for female guards would truly be obfuscated by granting isolated, and
no doubt infrequent requests by male prisoners to be frisk searched by
males only. This question is never adequately dealt with by the court.
IV. STATUTORY RIGHTS
A. Title VII Employment Discrimination
While the court decided several cases raising issues under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,289 none of them is of great signifi-
cance. 290 What might have been the court's most important decision,
287. Id. at 3339.
288. An interesting analogy can be drawn to the customer preference defense which is raised
in Title VII litigation. (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1976), permits employers to make employment
decisions on the basis of "religion, sex or national origin in those certain instances where religion,
sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise.") Generally customer preference has been
rejected as a justification for discrimination. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273,
1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981); Diaz v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). But if a female customer preference for females only were respected,
the same treatment would undoubtedly have to be afforded male customers.
289. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
290. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, there are three other decisions worth noting.
In E.E.O.C. v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1982), the court concluded that
federal district courts have jurisdiction, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), to hear actions brought
by the EEOC seeking to enforce conciliatory agreements entered into by the parties after a timely
charge has been filed with the EEOC. The district court had dismissed the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. E.E.O.C. v. Liberty Trucking Co., 528 F. Supp. 610 (W.D. Wis. 1981). Com-
pare, E.E.O.C. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 714 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1983); Gamewell Mfg., Inc. v. HVAC
Supply, Inc., 715 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1983) (federal law, rather than state law, governs rescission
issue raised in effort to avoid a federal court settlement on the basis of unilateral mistake). In
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Colbert, 692 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982), the court held that the district court
abused its discretion in denying costs under Rule 54(d), FED. R. Civ. P., to a defendant who
prevailed in a Title VII action. The lower court used the standard for determining whether to
award attorney fees to a defendant who prevails in a Title VII action rather than the Rule 54(d)
standard under which "the prevailing party is prima facie entitled to costs and the losing party
must overcome that presumption." Id. at 490. The Seventh Circuit made it clear that Rule 54(d)
applies to Title VII actions and "the district court's discretion was confined to special circum-
stances almost wholly related to some fault by the prevailing party (absent here), and it is insuffi-
cient that the losing plaintiff had a reasonable basis for her case." Id. at 491. In Sanders v.
General Services Admin., 707 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1983), the trial court, after denying the defend-
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EEO. C v. Josyn Mfg. and Supply Co., 2 9 1 was effectively overruled by
a subsequent Supreme Court decision in Newport News Shipbuilding
and Dry Dock Co. v. EE. 0. C.292 The issue in these cases is whether
Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,293 "re-
quires that an employer who voluntarily insures male and female em-
ployees against the cost of hospital care for their dependents when they
are injured or become sick also insure male employees against the cost
of hospital care for their wives when they become pregnant. ' 294 The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, passed in 1978, clearly overrules the de-
cision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert2 95 and requires that employers
with a health insurance plan provide female employees with hospitali-
zation benefits for pregnancy related conditions to the same extent as
the plan covers other medical conditions. While female employees
hospitalized because of pregnancy had the same benefits as when they
or male employees were hospitalized because of illness or injury, the
employers' plans in these cases did not provide the spouses of male
employees with the same benefits as the spouses of female employees
because of restrictions on benefits when their hospitalization was due to
pregnancy.
The Seventh Circuit, with a dissent by Judge Swygert, approved
the employer's plan, reasoning that "Congress intended to do [no] more
than protect working women and those financially dependent upon
them when it enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act."'296 However,
the Supreme Court found that the employer's plan in Newport News
discriminated against male employees on the basis of sex. The Court
rejected the argument that Title VII only applies to discrimination in
employment.
A two-step analysis demonstrates the fallacy in this contention. The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act has now made clear that, for all Title
VII purposes, discrimination based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its
ant's motion for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b), FED. R. Civ. P., at the close of the plain-
tiff's case, later granted the motion upon the defendant's request for reconsideration after the
defendant had presented three witnesses. During a break in the trial, between the presentation of
the plaintiff's and defendant's cases, it appears that the trial judge had an opportunity to review
notes and a transcript of the plaintiffs testimony and concluded that her race and sex was not a
factor in the denial of a promotion at GSA. Given the circumstances of the trial and unforeseen
scheduling problems, the Seventh Circuit agreed that the trial judge could appropriately recon-
sider his ruling on the Rule 41(b) motion.
291. 706 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1983).
292. 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983).
293. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981).
294. 706 F.2d at 1471.
295. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
296. 706 F.2d at 1475.
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face, discrimination because of her sex. And since the sex of the
spouse is always the opposite of the sex of the employee, it follows
inexorably that discrimination against female spouses in the provi-
sion of fringe benefits is also discrimination against male
employees.
297
As pointed out by the Court, the decision in Newport News does not
necessarily require that an employer's medical insurance plan treat
pregnancies of male employees' wives the same as it treats pregnancies
of female employees. 298 Rather, it requires that the pregnancy related
hospitalization of an employee's spouse be treated the same as the hos-
pitalization of spouses due to injury or illness.
Other decisions address the standard and burden of proof in Title
VII cases. The proof scheme for disparate treatment cases, articulated
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,299 was interpreted and applied in
a number of cases. Under this standard a Title VII plaintiff makes a
prima facie claim of employment discrimination by showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, af-
ter his rejection, the position remained open and the employer con-
tinued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications. 3°
°
After a plaintiff proves a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the em-
ployer "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection [or the employee's discharge]." 30 If the employer
articulates such a reason, the plaintiff must show that the reason is in
fact a pretext. Throughout, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier
of fact that the employer discriminated remains with the plaintiff.30 2
In DeLesstine v. Fort Wayne State Hosp. and Training Center30 3
the defendants argued that the plaintiff must "prove that his position
was not filled by 'a member of the protected minority.'"304 Because
the plaintiff was replaced by a female, a member of a group protected
under Title VII, the defendant argued that the plaintiff was precluded
from proving a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This argu-
ment was summarily rejected as defying the "logic, purpose and lan-
297. 103 S. Ct. at 2631.
298. Id at n.25.
299. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
300. Id at 802.
301. Id.
302. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
303. 682 F.2d 130 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ackerman v. DeLesstine, 103 S. Ct. 378
(1982).
304. Id. at 132.
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guage of Title VII."305 In affirming the lower court's finding of
discrimination, the Seventh Circuit discussed the standard of review.30 6
It applied the clearly erroneous standard to the lower court's "findings
of subsidiary facts encompassing the parties' conduct," but held that
the "ultimate fact of discrimination, namely whether defendants' con-
duct constitutes a violation of Title VII, involves both a finding of fact
and a conclusion of law." 30 7 As a result, the court of appeals concluded
it could make "an independent examination of the ultimate fact of
discrimination." 308
A district court finding of racial discrimination in refusing to hire
the plaintiff was reversed as clearly erroneous in Lee v. National Can
Corp.30 9 According to the court of appeals, the "record in this case
lends no credence to the district court's finding that [the plaintiff] was
qualified to work as a journeyman machinist."3 10 By failing to prove
his qualifications, the plaintiff thus failed to establish a prima facie case
of racial discrimination. The Seventh Circuit went on to hold that even
if the plaintiff had established a prima facie case, he would have failed
in his ultimate burden because the reason articulated by the defendant
for refusing to hire him, falsification of a job application, was not
pretextual. 311
Plaintiffs failed to establish "pretext" in two other cases. In Soria
v. Ozinga Bros., Inc.,312 the lower court found that the plaintiff had
been discharged because of "careless and unsafe attitudes, noncoopera-
tion with management, and lack of responsibility toward his job.
313
305. Id.
306. While affirming the lower court's finding of discrimination, the court of appeals did note
an error in the application of the McDonnell Douglas standard. The lower court found that the
defendants had not met their burden "of establishing sufficient non-discriminatory reasons for
terminating plaintiffs employment," and therefore concluded that the defendants' stated reason
was a pretext. Id. at 136-37 n. 10. The court of appeals held that defendants had met their burden
by articulating a legitimate reason for the plaintiff's discharge sufficient to raise a genuine issue of
fact. However, there was no reversible error because the court of appeals agreed that the plaintiff
had met his burden by showing that the articulated reason was a pretext. Id at 137 n.10.
307. Id. at 133.
308. Id. The court dealt with the standard of review in another case, Wattleton v. Intern.
Broth. of Boiler Makers, Etc., 686 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1982), where it upheld the lower court's
determination that a seniority system was not bona fide. Based on lower court findings, which
were not clearly erroneous, that the "Blacksmiths negotiated and maintained their seniority sys-
tem for the ilegal purpose, and with the intent and effect, of discriminating against Negroes be-
cause of their race," id. at 593, the only possible conclusion is that the seniority system is not bona
fide within the meaning of Title VII.
309. 699 F.2d 932 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 104 S. Ct. 148 (1983).
310. Id. at 936.
311. Id at 937.
312. 704 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1983).
313. Id at 994.
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These reasons were sufficiently clear and specific and were not proved
to be a pretext. 314 The employer in Waters v. Furnco Construction
Corp.315 successfully defended a discrimination in hiring charge by in-
dicating it had not hired two of the plaintiffs because of the "need to
obtain workers known from experience to be sufficiently qualified."
'316
Two cases involved procedural matters which arise in relation to
charges to be filed with the EEOC. In Pastrana v. Federal Mogul
Corp.3 17 the issue was whether the plaintiff had filed with the state
deferral agency in Illinois within the required 180 days, thereby trigger-
ing the 300-day period for filing with the EEOC.31 8 Here the plaintiff
filed a timely charge with the state agency but did not include a claim
of discrimination based on national origin. The formal charge, pre-
pared by an intake officer, alleged only physical handicap discrimina-
tion and it was not clear who was responsible for the omission of a
national origin charge. Because the plaintiff had completed a charge
with the state agency within the 180 days, and subsequently filed with
the EEOC within 300 days, the Seventh Circuit reversed the lower
court's dismissal and found that the equities favored the plaintiff. Re-
lying on a Ninth Circuit decision,319 the court held that "failure to sat-
isfy state filing requirements will not necessarily bar a federal Title VII
314. While the court of appeals did hold that the district court erred in ignoring the plaintiffs
statistical evidence, it found the error was insignificant because the plaintiffs evidence was "so
incomplete that it could not have assisted in the establishment of a discriminatory motive." Id at
999. The plaintiffs expert did not properly define a "relevant labor market" for the defendant's
hiring and admitted that he was not aware of the defendant's hiring procedures. The plaintiff's
effort in Soria to establish a disparate impact on the basis of statistics also failed. The usefulness
of the statistics was severely impaired by the small sample size, id. at 995, and did not accurately
reflect the company's overall disciplinary practices because the statistics ignored the unrecorded
instances of discipline which were recalled by company management during depositions. Further,
the statistics failed to properly categorize the nature of the accidents, the severity of the discipline
administered and the previous history of the drivers involved. Id. at 996.
315. 688 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1982).
316. Id at 40. The case of the third plaintiff was remanded for further proceedings because
the evidence established that he was known to the job superintendent to be experienced and
highly qualified. Statistics supplied the basis for reversing the lower court's judgment for the
defendant in a disproportionate impact case. Beavers v. International Ass'n of Bridge and Struc-
tural Iron Workers, Local Union No. 1, 681 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1982). The defendant's practice of
refusing to add new members to a union shown to be predominantly non-minority while granting
temporary work permits on an ad hoc basis to meet labor needs, although neutral on its face, had
a discriminatory impact on skilled Hispanic ironworkers who represent 9.6% of the applicant pool.
This discriminatory impact was never explained by the union.
317. 683 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1982).
318. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976) charges must be filed with the EEOC within 180
days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurs, except in those situations where a
charge is first filed with a state or local agency. In those cases, the charging party has 300 days in
which to file with the EEOC.
319. Saulsbury v. Wismer and Becker, Inc., 644 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1980).
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suit if the equities favor the claimant. ' 320 The court also noted that
actual review or consideration by the state agency is not required to
trigger the longer period under Title VII.321
A technical defect in the plaintiffs charge filed with the EEOC was
not grounds for dismissal of the lawsuit in Maxey v. Thompson.322 The
plaintiff named only the Illinois Department of Revenue in his EEOC
charge, but named several individuals, including the director of the de-
partment, in his complaint filed in federal court. The Seventh Circuit
ruled that the plaintiff should have been allowed to amend his com-
plaint to add the department and that such amendment would relate
back to the original filing date under Rule 15(C), 323 thus satisfying the
requirement that suit be filed within 90 days after receipt of the "right
to sue" letter. Relation back was appropriate because the defendant
added by the amendment, the Illinois Department of Revenue, was put
on notice by the EEOC charge that it might be sued.
324
B. Age Discrimination In Employment Act
Discrimination in employment on the basis of age is generally pro-
hibited by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).325 A
number of decisions this term involve interpretations of this Act. 326 A
plaintiff's burden of proof in an action under the ADEA is discussed in
Golomb v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America.327 Here the court approved
the McDonnell Dougla 28 burden of proof formula for use in cases
under the ADEA. In addition, the court made it clear "that a success-
ful claimant in an ADEA action need not prove that age was the sole
determining factor for the defendant-employer's action, but rather that
320. 683 F.2d at 240.
321. Id. at 239.
322. 680 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1982).
323. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
324. 680 F.2d at 526. Under the same rationale the plaintiff was allowed to amend his com-
plaint under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976), to include
the Illinois Department of Revenue as a defendant.
325. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
326. Another case, Desris v. City of Kenosha, Wisconsin, 687 F.2d 1117 (7th Cir. 1982), chal-
lenged a city ordinance, which required certain firefighters to retire at age 60, on the grounds that
it violated plaintiffs' right to equal protection. City firefighters who participated in another pen-
sion plan did not face mandatory retirement until age 65. The court rejected the equal protection
claim because it determined the plaintiffs were not similarly situated with firefighters belonging to
the other pension plan. In a gratuitous ruling, the court also determined that a rational basis exists
for the disparity in age of mandatory retirement. The court avoided the merits in a case brought
under the ADEA, Locascio v. Teletype Corp., 694 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1982), by affirming an invol-
untary dismissal under Rule 41(b), FED. R. CIv. P., for failure of the plaintiffs to prosecute their
action in a timely fashion.
327. 688 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1982).
328. 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see supra notes 299-301 and accompanying text.
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age was a determining factor.329
The court was faced with a mandatory retirement age of 55 for
firefighters in Orzel v. City Of Wauwatosa Fire Dept. 330 The primary
issue in the case was the city's challenge to the magistrate's conclusion
that age 55 is not a valid bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
for the job of firefighter. 33' The city raised several arguments in trying
to establish the BFOQ exception. First it argued that because federal
firefighters are generally required by statute to retire at age 55, Con-
gress could not have intended to prohibit state and municipal employ-
ers from adopting age 55 as the mandatory retirement age for local
firefighters. This was rejected because, unlike the city scheme, the fed-
eral retirement provision allows for individualized determinations of
fitness in exceptional cases. 332 More importantly, the court noted that
the federal retirement age for firefighters was "for a wholly different
group of employees, operating under different working conditions and
performing significantly different job functions." 333  Since the
mandatory retirement age of 55 for federal firefighters does not auto-
matically establish the validity of the city's BFOQ defense, the city
must present objective and credible evidence establishing that its com-
pulsory retirement rule qualifies as a BFOQ under the statute. 334 There
was nothing in the record indicating that tasks performed by the local
firefighters in Wauwatosa are substantially identical to those performed
by federal firefighting personnel.
Next the city argued that the magistrate had failed to give suffi-
cient deference to the judgment of the state legislature which passed the
mandatory retirement age. Here the court noted that the statute does
not require local municipalities to adopt age 55 as the mandatory re-
tirement age; rather, it simply sets age 55 as a "normal retirement
date. ' 335 The court refused to give the statute the deference urged by
the city because it would have established a statutory presumption of
validity. This, the court concluded, would effectively shift the burden
329. 688 F.2d at 550.
330. 697 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1983).
331. A statute of limitations defense which questioned whether the plaintiff had filed a timely
charge with the appropriate federal and state agencies was found to be waived because the city did
not raise it in its answer. Id. at 747 n.8.
332. ld. at 749.
333. Id. Here the court relied extensively on Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 675 F.2d 842 (6th Cir.
1982) (the mandatory retirement age for commercial airline pilots does not establish the same age
as a valid BFOQ for non-commercial pilots). See also E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 242
n.17 (1983); E.E.O.C. v. County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1983).
334. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976).
335. 697 F.2d at 750-51.
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of refuting an employer's BFOQ defense to the employee, contrary to
"the settled law of both this and other circuits that it is the employer-
not the employee-who has the burden of establishing a BFOQ de-
fense. ' 336 Such a shift in the burden based on a statutory presumption
would have placed state and local governmental employers in a much
better position than private employers under the ADEA.
Concerning the employer's burden, the court approved the magis-
trate's approach which required the city, in order to prevail on its
BFOQ defense, "to demonstrate either that all or substantially all per-
sons over age 55 would be unable to safely and effectively perform
firefighting duties, or that at least some employees over age 55 possess a
disqualifying trait that cannot practicably be ascertained by means
other than automatic exclusion on the basis of age. ' 337 While recogniz-
ing that public safety is a legitimate municipal goal, the court held that
this does not relieve an employer from the burden of justifying the par-
ticular age limitation which it adopts. The city simply failed to meet its
burden; its argument was substantially undercut by the fact that it had
raised the mandatory retirement age from 55 to 60 while the litigation
was in progress.338 Finally, the court noted that "economic factors can-
not be the basis for a BFOQ, since precisely those considerations were
among the targets of the ADEA. ' '339
The court in Orzel also faced several questions concerning the
award of damages. First, the court indicated that the magistrate had
not abused his discretion in deducting amounts received from unem-
ployment compensation and retirement pension benefits.340 Second,
the court rejected the employer's argument that the plaintiff had failed
to mitigate damages; while noting that his efforts were "less than vigor-
ous," the court agreed with the magistrate that the plaintiff did not vio-
late his duty to mitigate. 341 Third, the court agreed with the magistrate
that the city's conditional offer to reinstate the plaintiff, which required
336. Id at 751.
337. Id at 754. This requirement is consistent with recent EEOC regulations, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1625.6(b). In addition, the court found its ruling consistent with its earlier decision in Hodgson
v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). That
case upheld Greyhound's policy of refusing to consider employment applications from persons
over 35 years of age and relied heavily on the importance of safety in transporting passengers and
the inability of individualized testing to achieve those safety goals. See also E.E.O.C. v. County of
Los Angeles, 706 F.2d at 1042-43.
338. 697 F.2d at 755.
339. Id See also E.E.O.C. v. County of Los Angeles 706 F.2d at 1042.
340. 697 F.2d at 756. Contra Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 81-8' (3d Cir. 1983)
(back pay award under Title VII).
341. 697 F.2d at 756-57. The plaintiff had secured one temporary part-time job and applied
for another full-time position during a two-year period.
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that he take and pass a physical exam arranged by the city, did not
terminate his entitlement to back pay because rejection of the condi-
tional offer was not unreasonable.
3 42
Finally, the court approved an award of liquidated damages based
on the conclusion that the city had committed a willful violation of the
ADEA.343 In approving this award, the court utilized its test from an
earlier case, i.e., an ADEA plaintiff "must show that the defendant's
actions were knowing and voluntary and that he knew or reasonably
should have known that those actions violated the ADEA." 344 Based
on letters from both counsel for the plaintiff and the city attorney as
well as the rulings in other cases, the court found that the magistrate's
conclusion that the "City knew or reasonably should have known of
the requirements of the ADEA and that the City knew or reasonably
should have known that its termination of Orzel was inconsistent with
those requirements," was not clearly erroneous.
345
In Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp.346 the Seventh Circuit joined five
other circuits in holding that neither punitive damages nor damages for
pain and suffering are available under the ADEA. The question
whether the defendant had sufficient employees to qualify as an "em-
ployer" was at issue in Zimmerman v. North American Signal Co. 347 In
upholding the lower court's dismissal of the action, the Seventh Circuit
held that persons who are no more than directors of a corporation or
unpaid, inactive officers are not to be considered employees. 348 It also
held that the classification of persons as employees in the medical plan
is not binding under the ADEA 349 and rejected the plaintifi's argument
that persons who worked at some point during a week should be
counted as having worked "each working day" of a week.350 The
plaintiff in Posey v. Skyline Corp.3 5 1 was dismissed for failure to file a
342. Id. at 757.
343. Liquidated damages awarded under 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976) effectively double the
plaintiff's recovery of back pay and benefits.
344. Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 156 (7th Cir. 1981).
345. 697 F.2d at 759.
346. 682 F.2d 684 (7th Cir. 1982).
347. 704 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1983). Under the Act, an employer is defined as "a person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working day in
each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." 29 U.S.C.
§ 630(b) (1976). Another recent case, E.E.O.C. v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1983),
considered the question whether a person was an employee, and therefore covered by the ADEA,
or an independent contractor not covered by the Act.
348. 704 F.2d at 352.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 352-54; see 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976).
351. 702 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1983).
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timely charge of age discrimination with the EEOC. While agreeing
with its conclusion in an earlier decision 352 that the 180-day period for
filing a charge can be tolled by an employer's failure to post a conspic-
uous notice of ADEA rights, the plaintiffs affidavit indicating he had
never seen such a notice was not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of
fact under Rule 56.
353
The final ADEA case, E.E. 0. C. v. County of Calumet,354 rejected
the defendant's argument that the extension of the ADEA to state and
local employers is unconstitutional. 355 The defendant also argued that
the plaintiff, a deputy clerk forced to retire at age 65 by a county per-
sonnel rule, had waived her rights under the ADEA as part of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement between her union and the county. In
rejecting this argument, the court held that the collective bargaining
agreement did not clearly relinquish the rights of employees under the
ADEA356 and, even if the agreement had represented a clear waiver of
the rights, it would not be enforceable because a majority of employees
in any bargaining unit cannot waive the individual rights provided by
the ADEA. Here the court noted that such rights "are not to be left to
the control of individual unions, institutions which have, on occasion,
shown a sensitivity to the rights of the majority of the union member-
ship and an insensitivity to the rights of the minority." 357 Because
younger workers invariably outnumber those of retirement age and the
interests of younger and older workers frequently conflict, the court
concluded that majority rule would serve to frustrate the fundamental
purpose of the Act.
358
C. Employment Discrimination-§ 1981
The appropriate standard and burden of proof was at issue in a
352. Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology, 581 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denie4 450
U.S. 959 (1981). See also Vance v. Whirlpool Corp., 716 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 2678 (1984). Cf., Kazanzas v. Wait Disney World Co., 704 F.2d 1527 (1 1th Cir. 1983);
Greene v. Whirlpool Corp., 708 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1983).
353. FED. R. Civ. P.
354. 686 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir. 1982).
355. Id at 1251-53. The court held that application of the ADEA to state and local govern-
ments constitutes a proper exercise of Congress' power under section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The validity of the 1974 amendment extending coverage of the ADEA to state and local
governments was subsequently established in E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), where
the Court held Congress acted within the scope of its power under the commerce clause and did
not infringe upon states' rights under the tenth amendment.
356. 686 F.2d at 1254-55.
357. Id at 1256.
358. Id.
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case brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1866359 challenging the de-
nial of a promotion on the grounds that it was racially discriminatory.
In Mason v. Continental Illinois National Bank360 the plaintiff applied
for a position as transmission supervisor of the communications section
of the bank's international services division. The position was subse-
quently filled by a white woman who formerly worked for the bank.
Although there was no indication that the plaintiff was not qualified for
the position, the white woman was selected because, according to the
bank, she was the best qualified candidate. The court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant and this was affirmed.
While noting that the McDonnell Douglas36' format is generally
applicable to actions brought under section 1981, the court questioned
its use "in a case involving appointment or promotion to a position for
which there are several candidates. ' 362 In contrast to the situation
where an employer is attempting to fill a job opening requiring only
routine mechanical skills,363 when filling a managerial position an em-
ployer "will naturally be looking for the best qualified applicant rather
than a minimally qualified one.' ' 364 In such comparative evaluation
cases, the court suggested that rigid application of McDonnell Douglas
is not appropriate because the presumption underlying the formula
does not exist when trying to find the best qualified person to fill a
position.3
65
Nevertheless, after raising questions about the applicability of Mc-
Donnell Douglas, the court went ahead and applied the test. So long as
the person hired was not less qualified than the plaintiff and there was
evidence indicating she was preferred for reasons having nothing to do
with her race, the bank met its burden of articulating a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason and the plaintiff failed to prove it was a pretext.
Even though this raises questions of motive, the court found that sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendants was appropriate. Even after
extensive pre-trial discovery, the plaintiff presented no evidence indi-
cating that racial animus played a role in the decision; instead, she re-
359. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
360. 704 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1983).
361. See supra notes 299-301 and accompanying text.
362. 704 F.2d at 364. Because disparate treatment cases require a showing of intent, the deci-
sion in General Building Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982), holding that
proof of discriminatory intent is required under § 1981, should not affect this case.
363. In this situation the court suggests that the positions are normally filled on a first-come
first-serve basis from a pool of qualified applicants. 704 F.2d at 365.
364. Id.
365. The court found support for this in Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979).
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lied on conclusory assertions of discrimination.366 Therefore, the case
demonstrates that a plaintiff is not insulated from summary judgment,
even after establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, if
the employer articulates a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. The
determination of whether or not the articulated reason is a pretext may,
in some cases, be made on a motion for summary judgment.
367
D. Discrimination on the Basis of Handicap---§ 504
Two cases raise questions under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.368 The plaintiff in Jones v. Illinois Dept. of Rehabilitation Serv-
ices369 claimed that the Illinois Institute of Technology (IT) violated
his rights under § 504 by failing to provide him with the services of a
sign language interpreter required for him to participate in and benefit
from his class in mechanical engineering. The court quickly agreed
with the district court judge's conclusion that § 504 and implementing
regulations require either IIT or the Illinois Department of Rehabilita-
tion Services to provide the plaintiff with interpreter services. The state
agency had already concluded that the plaintiff was eligible for voca-
tional rehabilitation services and provided him with financial assist-
ance for tuition, room and board, and books. Relying primarily on
federal regulations, 370 the court placed the primary financial responsi-
bility for supplying an interpreter on the state agency which receives
federal funds specifically for vocational rehabilitation and training,
rather than on the university which does not receive federal funds
earmarked for that purpose. This construction of the regulations
avoided what the court perceived as a difficult question if the primary
burden had been placed upon the colleges and universities by federal
regulations without providing funds to meet the burden.
371
In another case, Brookhart v. Illinois State Bd of Educ.,372 several
handicapped elementary and secondary school students challenged a
Peoria School District requirement that they pass a minimal compe-
tency test before receiving a high school diploma. After concluding
366. 704 F.2d at 366-67.
367. As pointed out by Judge Cudahy in a concurring opinion, summary judgment would not
have been appropriate here if the plaintiff had "presented evidence of facts which could be proved
at trial to establish that the legitimate non-discriminatory reason articulated by the employer for
its decision was pretextual." Id. at 367. The plaintiff made no assertions which, if proved, would
have established that the reasons were pretextual.
368. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
369. 689 F.2d 724 (7th Cir. 1982).
370. 34 C.F.R. § 104.41-47; 34 C.F.R. § 104.51-54.
371. 689 F.2d at 729.
372. 697 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1983). See also supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
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that the denial of diplomas to such children, who have received the
special education and related services required by the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act 373 but are unable to achieve the educa-
tional level necessary to pass a minimal competency test, does not con-
stitute a denial of a "free appropriate public education, ' 374 the court
addressed the plaintiffs' claim under § 504. Here the court noted that
minimal competency testing is not discriminatory solely because handi-
capped students might not be capable of attaining a level of compe-
tence sufficient to pass the test. However, the court did indicate that the
format or environment might have to be modified to enable handi-
capped students to disclose the degree of learning they actually pos-
sess.375 The court avoided the question whether either § 504 or the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act requires that the test be
validated to determine whether it is suited to the purposes for which it
is being used with respect to the handicapped. 376
. Housing Discrimination-Fair Housing Act and § 1982
Discrimination in housing based on race can be challenged under
both the Civil Rights Act of 1866377 and the Fair Housing Act. 378 Both
of these acts were utilized by the plaintiffs in Phillips v. Hunter Trails
Community A4s'n,379 an action by a black couple claiming they were
denied the opportunity to purchase a $675,000 home in the Hunter
Trails subdivision because of the actions of the Community Associa-
tion and an individual who had purchased the Association's right of
first refusal on any proposed sale. After learning of the proposed sale
to the plaintiffs, the officers and directors of the Community Associa-
tion held a meeting and decided to block the sale to plaintiffs by selling
the right of first refusal to the individual defendant who then exercised
the option by agreeing to pay the same price to the sellers. The trial
court issued an immediate injunction and, after trial, awarded both
compensatory and punitive damages as well as attorney fees and costs.
On appeal the defendant association argued that the plaintiffs had not
proved discriminatory intent as required under § 1982. Referring to
373. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976).
374. Under 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1), handicapped children are entitled to a "free appropriate pub-
lic education." See Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
375. 697 F.2d at 184.
376. Id The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on procedural due process grounds. See
supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
377. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976).
378. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976).
379. 685 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1982).
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General Building Contractors Ass'n Inc. v. Pennsylvania,380 the court as-
sumed that intent was also required under § 1982 but concluded that
the evidence was sufficient to uphold the lower court's finding of dis-
crimination.38t The lower court found direct evidence of racial animus
on the part of the Association and rejected its economic defense based
on a need to protect property values in the subdivision.
Although not necessary after affirming the judgment for the plain-
tiffs on the basis of § 1982, the court went on to consider the proof
required under the Fair Housing Act. Because this was not a case
where the plaintiffs argued that facially neutral policies had a disparate
impact on racial minorities, the four factors discussed in Metropolitan
Housing Devel. Corp. v. Arlington Heights3 82 are not relevant. In cases
such as this where the plaintiffs charge discrminatory intent, rather
than facially neutral actions, they can make out a prima facie case
under the Fair Housing Act by showing they are black, they applied for
and were qualified to buy the house, they were rejected, and the house
remained on the market. 383 The court held that the plaintiffs had
clearly made the required showing and that the burden then shifted to
the defendant to articulate nonracial reasons for its actions. Since the
Association did not succeed in meeting its burden, the plaintiffs were
entitled to judgment under the Fair Housing Act as well as § 1982.
Each plaintiff wasawarded $25,000 in compensatory damages for
humiliation and embarrassment, based on the testimony and demeanor
of the plaintiffs. On appeal, the court found that this was not an ade-
quate basis for "an award that is more than twice as much as any other
victim of housing discrimination has received for intangible injuries,
judging from the parties' submissions and our own research. ' 384 The
court noted that it was not appropriate to consider the value of the
home, $675,000, in assessing the plaintiffs' intangible injuries nor could
the egregious conduct of the Association be considered because this is
reflected in the award of punitive damages. Therefore, the lower court
was directed to reduce the compensatory damages for intangible inju-
380. 458 U.S. 375 (1982) (intentional discrimination must be demonstrated in an action under
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976)).
381. 685 F.2d at 187-89. In a subsequent case, Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 706 F.2d 204,
213 (7th Cir. 1983), the court noted that it did not have to consider whether discriminatory intent
is required under § 1982. It is not clear why the court did not view this matter as foreclosed by its
decision in Phillips.
382. 558 F.2d 1283, 1290-93 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. deniedsub noma., Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Housing Corp., 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
383. 685 F.2d at 190. See also Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, 610 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir.
1979).
384. 685 F.2d at 190.
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ries to $10,000 for each plaintiff. The award of $50,000 in punitive
damages was upheld under § 1982, even though the Fair Housing Act
restricts punitive damages to $1,000. The Association's claimed abso-
lute immunity from punitive damages was rejected because it was not
raised in the district court.
385
Another housing discrimination case based on § 1982, Clark v.
Universal Builders, Inc.,3 86 was before the court of appeals for the third
time.387 Giving substantial deference to the lower court's findings of
fact after the second trial, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment
for the defendants. Under the test for both theories of liability which
were established in the second appeal, the plaintiffs failed to prove a
prima facie case and, therefore, it was not necessary to reach the ques-
tion whether the defendants could articulate a legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason for their conduct. 388 The plaintiffs in this case and the
class of a thousand black home buyers had purchased newly con-
structed single family dwellings located on the south side of Chicago
under land installment contracts between 1957 and 1969. They
claimed, under the traditional theory, that the defendants violated their
rights by selling to black buyers at higher prices and on less favorable
terms than were available to white buyers. Under the exploitation the-
ory, the plaintiffs claimed that a dual housing market existed in Chi-
385. The immunity argument was based on City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.
247 (1981), holding that punitive damages cannot be awarded against municipalities under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
386. 706 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1983).
387. The lower court's denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss and holding that the plain-
tiffs' "exploitation" theory stated a claim under § 1982 was affirmed in Baker v. F & F Investment,
420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied ub nom., Universal Builders, Inc. v. Clark, 400 U.S. 821
(1970). After a jury trial the lower court then granted the defendants' motion for a directed ver-
dict on the grounds that the plaintiffs could not prove liability under § 1982 without evidence of
discrimination under the traditional theory. This was reversed by the court of appeals because
"the admitted evidence was sufficient to establish aprimafaciecase under section 1982 pursuant to
the exploitation theory of liability and . . . under the so-called traditional theory of discrimina-
tion." Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 334 (7th Cir.), cer. deniea 419 U.S. 1070
(1974). A second trial was held in 1979 and the district judge eventually held that the plaintiffs
had failed to meet their burden of proof under either theory of liability.
388. Under the traditional test the plaintiffs must make
a showing of "treating, in similar circumstances, a member or members of one race dif-
ferent from the manner in which members of another race are treated." That is, a black
prospective buyer of a dwelling demonstrates discriminatory conduct if he proves that an
owner utilizes different pricing policies with respect to blacks and whites similarly
situated.
Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc. 501 F.2d at 336 (citation omitted). Under the exploitation test,
plaintiffs must show that
as a result of racial residential segregation dual housing markets exist and. . . defendant
sellers took advantage of this situation by demanding prices and terms unreasonably in
excess of prices and terms available to white citizens for comparable housing.
Id. at 334.
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cago because of racially based residential segregation and the
defendants exploited this by demanding prices and terms of black buy-
ers which were unreasonably in excess of prices and terms available to
white buyers for comparable housing.
The lower court found that the claim under the traditional theory
failed because the homes sold to buyers in Deerfield were not in fact
comparable to those sold to the black buyers; the court of appeals held
this finding was not clearly erroneous. In addition to finding a lack of
comparability, the lower court concluded the plaintiffs had not demon-
strated discriminatory pricing policies on the part of the defendants.
This finding was also upheld. Similarly, the court of appeals approved
the lower court's decision that any difference in terms of sales between
the white buyers in Deerfield and the black buyers on the south side of
Chicago was not sufficient evidence of discriminatory behavior.
389
Concerning the exploitation theory, the lower court accepted the
plaintiffs' contention "that Chicago suffered from a high degree of ra-
cial residential discrimination and that there was a substantial demand
for housing among black households," 390 but rejected the contention
that this phenomenon enabled the defendants to exploit black buyers.
The primary defect here was the plaintiffs' inability to demonstrate suf-
ficient market dominance on the part of the defendants to exploit the
plaintiffs through non-competitive pricing. In other words, the court
found that the defendants were not capable of maintaining prices
above levels dictated by competition.
39'
The final housing case, Washington v. Sherwin Real Estate, Inc.,
392
dealt primarily with the lower court's order allowing the plaintiffs'
counsel to withdraw on the day of trial and directing the plaintiffs to
proceed pro se without a continuance. 393 On appeal it was determined
that the lower court had not abused its discretion in light of the totality
of the circumstances. 394 On the merits, the lower court finding, that the
plaintiffs were denied an apartment because of Mr. Washington's bel-
ligerent conduct at the rental office, was not clearly erroneous. There
was conflicting evidence on this point and the lower court found the
389. 706 F.2d at 207-10.
390. Id at 211.
391. Id at 211-12. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) (1976). Id. at 212.
392. 694 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1982).
393. Counsel withdrew because of a breakdown in communications with his clients and the
plaintiffs did not object to his withdrawal. Id. at 1087-88. The court then directed the plaintiffs to
proceed pro se and they did not request a continuance until halfway through the trial. Id at 1088-
89.
394. Id. at 1089.
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defendants' evidence more credible. 395
F Attorneys' Fees
Before considering the cases decided this term by the Seventh Cir-
cuit, it is important to understand the most recent decision of the
Supreme Court interpreting the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976.396 In Hensley v. Eckerhart,397 the Court had to determine
the proper standard for setting a fee award where a plaintiff has
achieved only limited success in the litigation.398 Plaintiffs who "suc-
ceed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the
benefit the parties sought in bringing suit" are considered prevailing
parties for § 1988 purposes. 399 The difficult inquiry relates to the
amount of fees to be awarded. Here the Court approved, as "the most
useful starting point," multiplying the number of hours reasonably ex-
pended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.4°° Where a plain-
tiff prevails, but on less than all of the claims for relief, the Court held
that two questions must be addressed: "First, did the plaintiff fail to
prevail on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he suc-
ceeded? Second, did the plaintiff achieve a level of success that makes
the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee
award." 4 1 Where a plaintiff, in one lawsuit, raises different claims for
relief which are based on different facts and legal theories, work on one
claim is generally unrelated to work on another claim. Therefore, fees
395. It is interesting to note that even though the defendants successfully contended they de-
nied the plaintiffs an apartment because of their belief that "they would be undesirable tenants on
the basis of Mr. Washington's rude and belligerant behavior in the real estate office," Id. at 1090,
the defendants did rent an apartment to the plaintiffs after the litigation was filed and the lower
court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from renting the townhouse to
any one other than the plaintiffs during the pendency of the suit. Apparently the plaintiffs were
not so undesirable that the defendants were willing to allow the townhouse to stand empty for a
period of time.
396. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
397. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
398. In summarizing three approaches taken to this issue by different circuits, the Court cited
Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d 577, 579-81 (7th Cir. 1980), as an example of cases holding that
"plaintiffs should not recover fees for any work on unsuccessful claims," and Sherkow v. Wiscon-
sin, 630 F.2d 498, 504-05 (7th Cir. 1980), as an example of cases holding that plaintiffs "generally
should receive a fee based on hours spent on all nonfrivolous claims." 103 S. Ct. at 1938 n.5.
Under the third approach, "recovery of a fee for hours spent on unsuccessful claims depends upon
the relationship of those hours expended to the success achieved." Id. at 1938-39 n.5.
399. This formulation from Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (Ist Cir. 1978), was
quoted with approval in Hensley, 103 S. Ct. at 1939. A Seventh Circuit case, Busche v. Burkee,
649 F.2d 509, 521 (7th cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1982), was also cited in support of this
formulation. 103 S. Ct. at 1939 n.8.
400. 103 S. Ct. at 1939.
401. Id at 1940.
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would not be awarded for services on the unsuccessful claim.40 2 A more
common situation is where the plaintiff asserts claims for relief which
involve a common core of facts or related legal theories. In this situa-
tion counsel's time is devoted to the litigation as a whole, with alloca-
tion to particular claims very difficult. Here the Court directs the trial
courts to "focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the
plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litiga-
tion."'40 3 As recognized by the Court, this focus on the results achieved
does not lend itself to a precise rule or formula for determining the
amount of fees. In making this equitable judgment, the district court
has the discretion to identify specific hours which should be eliminated
or simply reduce the award to account for the limited success. The
district court should, however, in exercising this discretion provide "a




The Court concluded its holding with the following summary:
We hold that the extent of a plaintiffs success is a crucial factor in
determining the proper amount of an award of attorney's fees under
42 USC § 1988. Where the plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim
which is distinct in all respects from his successful claims, the hours
spent on the unsuccessful claim should be excluded in considering
the amount of a reasonable fee. Where a lawsuit consists of related
claims, a plaintiff who has won substantial relief should not have his
attorney's fee reduced simply because the district court did not adopt
each contention raised. But where the plaintiff achieved only limited
success, the district court should award only that amount of fees that
is reasonable in relation to the results obtained.405
The Court remanded the case to give the district court an opportunity
to apply these standards.
The determination of the proper amount of fees to be awarded was
considered by the Seventh Circuit in several cases.4° 6 Three cases, de-
cided without the benefit of Hensley, involved plaintiffs who prevailed
but not on all of their claims. Using the Hensley categories, two of
these cases presented related claims involving a common core of facts
and related legal theories. All of the plaintiffs claims in Lenard v.
402. Id
403. Id.
404. Id. at 1941.
405. Id at 1943.
406. While the district court has much discretion in determining the amount of an award, the
failure to articulate reasons to explain and support the determination can be grounds for reversal.
Freeman v. Franzen, 695 F.2d 485, 494 (7th Cir. 1982). See also Jones v. Illinois Dept. of Rehabil-
itation Services, 689 F.2d 724, 731 (7th Cir. 1982) (reasons evident from the trial court's discussion
of the fact that the plaintiff prevailed on only one claim).
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,4rgento407 arose out of an arrest and subsequent events at the police
station and a hospital. In separate counts, the plaintiff claimed an ille-
gal beating, a conspiracy, malicious prosecution and obstruction of jus-
tice. The jury awarded substantial damages, finding in favor of the
plaintiff on the two conspiracy charges and the malicious prosecution
charge. On appeal, the court affirmed the jury on only one of the con-
spiracy charges, reversing the findings favorable to the plaintiff on the
malicious prosecution and obstruction of justice claims. After conclud-
ing that the plaintiff should be awarded fees "only for the preparation
and presentation of claims on which [he] has prevailed," the case was
remanded for the trial court to carefully review the time sheets and
assess the appropriate fee.4° 8 The other case, Jones v. Illinois Dept. of
Rehabilitation Services,4° involved a plaintiff who asserted claims
under separate provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.410 Be-
cause the trial court rejected his claim under Title I on the grounds that
there is no private right of action, the court of appeals held that "it was
not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to take that into account in
determining the amount of a reasonable fee."
'411
This ruling in Jones is suspect because the Court of Appeals held it
did not have to address the Title I issue since the plaintiff "obtained all
the relief he sought through his section 504 claim". 4 12 If this is true,
then the plaintiff was apparently seeking the same relief under both
parts of the Act. Under Hensley, this seems to be a situation where the
plaintiff "won substantial relief [and] should not have his . . . fee re-
duced simply because the district court did not adopt each contention
raised. ' 413 Contrast this with the third case raising Hensley issues,
Johnson v. Breje,414 where the plaintiffs failed on two of their constitu-
tional claims-a right to a law library and the right to release from
their rooms during staff meals. Disagreeing with the lower court's de-
termination that the attorneys' work on successful and unsuccessful
claims could not be segregated, the case was remanded for an appropri-
ate reduction in the fee award.
4 1 5
Three cases address the appropriateness of using a multiplier in
407. 699 F.2d 874 (7th Cir.), cert. deniec 104 S. Ct. 69 (1983).
408. Id at 899.
409. 689 F.2d 724 (7th Cir. 1983).
410. He asserted claims under both Title I of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-50, and § 504, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
411. 689 F.2d at 731.
412. Id. at 730 n.7.
413. 103 S. Ct. at 1943.
414. 701 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir. 1983). See supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text.
415. Id. at 1211-12.
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determining the amount of fees to be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff.
After a settlement with several of the defendants on the merits, the
plaintiff in Strama v. Peterson4 6 filed a request for fees seeking $80.00
per hour for lead counsel and application of a multiplier of 1.5 for all
attorneys. The lower court granted the requested fees but rejected the
multiplier and instead increased the rate of lead counsel from $80 to
$125 per hour. The increased rate was justified by the results obtained,
the high quality of representation, the ability of counsel for the plaintiff
and the fact that the fee arrangement was contingent. Relying on two
earlier cases dealing with the use of a multiplier,417 the Seventh Circuit
concluded it would be improper to award lead counsel a bonus beyond
the usual billing rate. In support of its ruling, the court noted that the
issues were relatively simple and few; counsel's time was spread over a
three year period, he was not precluded from accepting other cases, the
contingent nature of the fee alone does not justify the use of a multi-
plier and the fact that the rate requested, although relatively modest,
was the same for all activities including out-of-court time.418
In another case, In re Illinois Congressional Districts Reapportion-
ment Cases,419 the lower court multiplied the "lodestar 420 rate by three
to arrive at a total award of $384,645.00. The case involved the reap-
portionment of congressional districts in Illinois, and the trial court jus-
tified the adoption of a multiplier by referring to the "magnitude and
complexity of the case; the advancement of the public interest in the
result by ensuring fair representation; the excellent quality of work
done by plaintiff's lawyers; and the persuasiveness of plaintiffs
plan."'42' After indicating that the use of a multiplier is left to the
sound discretion of the trial court, the court of appeals concluded that
although it was not an abuse of discretion to utilize a multiplier, the
multiplier of three was excessive and reduced it to 20 percent.
In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals first determined
that the trial judge had properly considered the following factors in
determining that a multiplier was appropriate: the contingent fee ar-
rangement, the magnitude and complexity of the case, the excellent
416. 689 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1982).
417. Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Electric, Inc., 603 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denieag 454
U.S. 1060 (1981); Bonner v. Coughlin, 657 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1981).
418. 689 F.2d at 665. Strama was cited by the court in support of its reversal of a 1.5 multi-
plier applied by the lower court in Johnson v. Brelje, 701 F.2d at 1211-12. The court indicated its
reluctance to approve a multiplier based solely on "results achieved." Id. at 1212.
419. 704 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1983).
420. This is determined by multiplying the number of hours by a reasonable hourly rate.
421. 704 F.2d at 382. After this article went to press, the Supreme Court limited the use of a
multiplier in Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1547-50 (1984).
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quality of the attorneys' work, the public interest served by the attor-
neys for the plaintiff in assuring fair representation for the public, and
the fact that the plaintiff's attorneys were to some extent precluded
from taking other employment because of this case. Nevertheless the
court found that a multiplier of three was simply excessive. This reduc-
tion was justified in part by the fact that the case was very brief, thus
reducing the risk; however, the court gives the impression that a multi-
plier of three is never appropriate, particularly when the base rates are
as high as $165.00 per hour.
Cases involving an award of attorney fees frequently raise a ques-
tion of whether a prevailing plaintiff should be compensated for time
spent in pre-litigation administrative proceedings. In Ciechon v. City of
Chicago422 the plaintiff, a career paramedic, challenged her discharge
from the Chicago Fire Department. Prior to initiating litigation, her
attorney represented her in the disciplinary proceedings before the city
personnel board. Relying on the reasoning in New York Gaslight Club,
Inc. v. Care,4 23 and Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc.,424 the court concluded
that the 1976 Fees Act 425 should be interpreted the same as the fee
provision under Title VII.426 Noting that the fee provisions in Title VII
and § 1988 are similar in purpose and design and that vigorous repre-
sentation at administrative proceedings should be encouraged, the
court of appeals indicated the lower court had not abused its discretion
in awarding fees for counsel's time spent at the administrative
hearing.42
7
Another common issue, particularly in litigation which takes sev-
eral years, is whether the court should use the prevailing hourly rates at
the time the services were rendered or the normally inflated current
rate at the time fees are actually awarded. The court, in Gautreaux v.
Chicago Housing Authority,428 approved the use of current rates for
over 3,000 hours of work between 1965 and 1980. It noted that counsel
had received no fees during an intensely inflationary period, the
number of hours claimed was conservative, the attorney claiming fees
stands as a "surrogate for the teams of volunteer lawyers" who worked
on the case but did not claim fees and the defendant had the use of the
422. 686 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1982). See supra notes 92-96 and 269-71 and accompanying text.
423. 447 U.S. 54 (1980).
424. 670 F.2d 760, 765-67 (7th Cir. 1982).
425. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
426. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976).
427. 686 F.2d at 525.
428. 690 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1982).
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money until the time of decision.429
A number of decisions involve questions of plaintiffs' entitlement
to fees under the 1976 Fees Act.430 The defendant in Gautreaux argued
that § 1988 did not apply because the case was not pending on the ef-
fective date of the Act, October 19, 1976. 43 ' Although the trial court
first found intentional racial discrimination by the defendant and en-
tered a remedial order in 1969, the history of the litigation clearly sug-
gests it was still pending, for purposes of awarding attorney fees,
subsequent to October 1976. Several factors in the prolonged Gau-
treaux litigation were found significant. The housing authority's re-
sponse to court orders was found to range from "lethargic to obdurate."
There were ongoing disputes about the propriety and the efficacy of the
relief granted early in the litigation. The pendency of this case after the
effective date of the Act was clearly not the result of "thinly-disguised
attempts to generate an issue solely in order to come within the pen-
dency rule. '432 Here the plaintiffs had put unremitting pressure on the
housing authority for twelve years and did not seek fees until the litiga-
tion was drawing to a close; the court remarked that there might not
have been time to pause for litigation of the fee issue.
The court also noted that in cases such as this, where broad equita-
ble relief is sought to remedy constitutional violations, the liability
phase is only a preliminary hurdle with the most extensive efforts de-
voted to the remedial stage "where the parties struggle, often for years,
over the scope and details of injunctive relief'. 433 Once it was con-
cluded that the case was pending on the relevant date, the court had no
problem approving the fee award covering the entire period of
429. Id at 612-13. Although counsel had not kept complete and standardized time records
contemporaneous with the activities, this was not a problem because the defendant did not chal-
lenge the number of hours claimed nor could counsel have foreseen the potential for recovering
fees prior to the passage of the Act in 1976. Id at 612-13 n.28. Compare this with Voca v.
Playboy Hotel of Chicago, Inc., 686 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1982), in which the court affirmed a denial
of fees based, in part, on counsel's inadequate fee schedule. The schedule lacked a sufficient
description of the work performed, the identity of the persons who performed it, and the normal
billing rates; most disturbing, the attorney sought compensation for two court appearances which
were never made. Id. at 608.
430. The lower court's denial of fees to prevailing defendants was affirmed in Clark v. Univer-
sal Builders, Inc., 706 F.2d 204, 213 (7th Cir. 1983), based on the standard established in Chris-
tiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
431. On a related issue, the court held that the plaintiffs' request for fees was timely because,
"[a]bsent a fixed time limitation, the only constraint on when the plaintiffs file for attorneys' fees
under Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules is laches," and such a claim must demonstrate both undue
delay and prejudice. 690 F.2d at 612.
432. Id at 608.
433. Id at 610.
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litigation.434
A plaintiff, who prevailed through a favorable settlement in an ac-
tion brought under § 1983,435 was denied fees because the court charac-
terized the litigation as "functionally a habeas corpus suit and nothing
but a habeas corpus sUit."' 436 The plaintiff alleged a violation of his
civil rights in a prison disciplinary proceeding and a consent decree
restored his good time and expunged the disciplinary proceeding from
his record, but did not provide damages. Although agreeing that the
plaintiff prevailed, the court found that the primary relief provided by
the consent decree-the restoration of good time-was beyond the
court's power in a § 1983 action. While expungement has been ordered
in an action under § 1983, it was sought in this case only as a "predi-
cate for getting good time restored" and thereby reducing the time of
imprisonment. 437 Therefore, a § 1983 plaintiff who prevails by way of
settlement can be denied an award of fees where the relief obtained in
the settlement is beyond the scope of what the court could have ordered
under § 1983. Presumably this ruling is limited to the rather unusual
situation where the only relief obtained by settlement is beyond the
scope of § 1983.438
In several cases defendants argued that "special circumstances"
dictated that fee requests either be denied or substantially reduced. In
Gautreaux the court reaffirmed its position that fee awards should not
be reduced simply because they are to be paid to nonprofit organiza-
tions which provide the legal representation for prevailing plaintiffs.
439
The court also reiterated its position that the ability of a defendant to
pay a fee award is not a special circumstance justifying denial of an
434. Referring to its earlier decision in Crosby v. Bowling, 683 F.2d 1068, 1072 (7th Cir. 1982),
holding that a defendant has the burden of demonstrating the existence of special circumstances
which would make an award of fees unjust, the court pointed out that the housing authority had
not argued that such special circumstances exist. 690 F.2d at 610-11.
435. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
436. Larsen v. Sielaff, 702 F.2d 116, 118 (7th Cir. 1983).
437. Id. at 118.
438. In a somewhat analogous situation one defendant, the Illinois Institute of Technology,
had filed a cross claim against the other defendant, the Illinois Department of Rehabilitation
Services, arguing that the state agency has the primary responsibility for providing the plaintiff
with the services of a sign language interpreter. Jones v. Illinois Dept. of Rehabilitation Services,
689 F.2d 724 (7th Cir. 1982). Even though the court agreed with the lower court's conclusion that
the primary burden of providing the interpreter services belonged to the state agency, the institute
could not be considered a prevailing party for attorney fee purposes because its cross claim was
simply a method of presenting a defense against the plaintiffs claim and it did not have a viable
claim against the state agency. Id. at 733. Fees were sought in this case under the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1976), but the court indicated that fee awards under this section
"are governed by the same considerations controlling in § 1988 actions." Id. at 730 n.8.
439. 690 F.2d at 613. This holding is consistent with the subsequent decision in Blum v. Sten-
son, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1545-47 (1984).
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
award.440 The court seemed to give conflicting messages on the ques-
tion whether the size of a damage award can be treated as a special
circumstance considered in awarding attorney fees. In Lenard v.
Argento"4 the court indicated it should not be considered, whereas in
Strama v. Peterson,442 the court stated that usually fees should not be
awarded "greatly in excess of a client's recovery."' 443 While acknowl-
edging that precedential value of a decision can be considered, the
court expressed a concern that large fee awards based on relatively mi-
nor injury would encourage suits which do not further either the cli-
ent's or the public's interest.4 "
Related to the question of whether the size of a damage award
should be considered is the "bright prospects" rule. Under this rule,
fees are not awarded in cases likely to involve substantial monetary,
rather than injunctive, relief because contingent fee arrangements at-
tract competent counsel to handle such cases. In Sanchez v.
Schwartz" 5 the court refused to adopt this rule.
The relationship between a contingent fee contract and an award
of fees under § 1988 was considered in two cases. First, in Sanchez v.
Schwartz the court held that a contingent fee contract should not serve
"as an automatic ceiling on the amount of a statutory award."'446 Later,
in Lenard v. Argento, the court considered a contract which provided
that any fees awarded under § 1988 "shall be applied and credited, up
to and including, but not to exceed the stated percentage of the amount
recovered on the claim. . . -447 After citing Sanchez, the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that the lower court had properly reconsidered the disputed
provision of the fee agreement and agreed that "it was the intention of
Lenard and his attorneys that any award under § 1988 would be
440. Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 899-900 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 104 S. Ct. 69 (1983);
Gautreaux, 690 F.2d at 613.
441. 699 F.2d at 899.
442. 689 F.2d 661, 665-66 (7th Cir. 1982).
443. Id. at 665, quoting, Mirabal v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 576 F.2d 729, 730 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
444. 689 F.2d at 666.
445. 688 F.2d 503, 505 (7th Cir. 1982).
446. Id.
447. 699 F.2d 874, 897 n.21 (7th Cir. 1983). The percentages in the contract were 331/3% for
trial, 40% for trial and appeal, and 50% for trial, appeal, and retrial. The lower court first awarded
$180,500 in fees and then, on the defendants' motion to reconsider, reduced it to one-third of the
judgment, or $120,000. Subsequently, on the plaintiffs motion to reconsider, the court found that
the fee agreement was ambiguous and therefore permitted the use of extrinsic evidence to inter-
pret the contract. After considering the affidavits of the plaintiff and his counsel, the court inter-
preted the agreement as a credit provision and not a limit on fees; the original order of $180,500
was then reinstated.
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credited to any fees owing under the contingent contract." 448 Any fees
awarded beyond those provided by the contract would go to the attor-
neys. The court approved the use of extrinsic evidence to assist in ar-
riving at an interpretation of the contract which would reflect the
intention of the parties.
Problems frequently arise in fee litigation, both in allocating fault
and fees, where there are multiple defendants. This is particularly diffi-
cult where, as in Crosby v. Bowling,449 there are both state and federal
defendants450 and the state defendants contend they were administer-
ing the program in accordance with federal mandates. The plaintiffs in
Crosby challenged federal and state regulations governing the Work
Incentive (WIN) program established under Title IV of the Social Se-
curity Act.451 Although the lower court granted the plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment, finding certain provisions of the regulations in
conflict with the federal statute, the defendants argued that the plain-
tiffs had not prevailed because they had not vindicated an important
congressional policy. Rather, the defendants argued, they merely
proved a technical inconsistency between the statute and regulations.
This argument was based in large part on a subsequent amendment to
the federal statute under which the sanction found invalid in this litiga-
tion would be permissible. Here the court of appeals found that the
amendment to the statute reflected a change in the law rather than sim-
ply a clarification of prior law.452 The court also rejected the state de-
fendants' argument that the plaintiffs, if they prevailed, did so only as
to the federal defendants because the state had no choice but to con-
form to the federally mandated standards. In rejecting this argument
the court noted that the state had actively participated in all phases of
the litigation, opposing the plaintiffs' position. Also, the state contin-
ued to enforce the federal regulations even after they had been declared
invalid by a federal district court in another jurisdiction.
453
The state defendants also used the federal coercion argument in
448. Id. at 900. Cf. Cooper v. Singer, 719 F.2d 1496, 1506-07 (10th Cir. 1983) (If the client's
§ 1988 fee award "is less than the amount owed to the attorney under the contingent fee agree-
ment, then the lawyer will be expected to reduce his fee to the amount awarded by the courts; if
the fee award is greater than the amount. . . under the agreement, then the attorney shall be
entitled to the full amount of the fee award."); Sullivan v. Crown Paper Bd. Co., Inc., 719 F.2d 667
(3d Cir. 1983).
449. 683 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1982).
450. As noted by the court in Crosby, the circuit has not yet established a rule on the question
of federal liability under § 1988. Id at 1075.
451. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-44 (1976).
452. 683 F.2d at 1071.
453. Id at 1072.
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claiming a special circumstance which militates against an award of
fees. Because the record indicates that the state defendants willingly
acquiesced in the application of the challenged provision, the court
concluded the state was not the victim of coercion. 454 Finally, the state
defendants argued that the fee should be reduced to reflect their limited
role in enforcing the federal regulations. The record indicates that the
lower court took this into account in determining the amount of the
award, which was approximately sixty percent of the amount requested
by counsel for the plaintiff. Therefore, the court of appeals concluded
that the lower court "gave due consideration to the degrees of liability
attributable to the two classes of defendants. ' 455 The message for state
defendants, in actions challenging regulations which govern joint state-
federal programs, is that they cannot sit back and willingly enforce reg-
ulations, vigorously oppose the plaintiffs' position in court and then
seek to place the entire blame on the federal defendants. However,
even in those circumstances some sort of apportionment reflecting the
relative fault seems appropriate.
V. ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS
A. Jurisdiction, Abstention and Right to Proceed in Federal Court
A question of subject matter jurisdiction arose in the context of a
constitutional challenge to a rule of the Illinois Supreme Court gov-
erning the admission of lawyers, licensed in another jurisdiction, to the
bar of Illinois without taking the Illinois bar examination. After he was
denied admission by the Illinois Supreme Court because he did not
meet the requirement for practice in the state of his license, the plaintiff
in Lowrie v. Goldenhersh456 challenged the constitutionality of the state
rule in federal court. The district court upheld the rule and on appeal,
before addressing the merits of the constitutional issue, the Seventh
Circuit considered whether the complaint presented a substantial fed-
454. Id. at 1073. Here the court noted that the state could have gone through an administra-
tive hearing if the federal authorities threatened to terminate funding or could have brought a
declaratory judgment action seeking a determination of the validity of the federal regulations. In
rejecting the federal coercion argument, the court relied in part on Supreme Court of Virginia v.
Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980), and the Court's language sug-
gesting that "fees can properly be taxed against those whose role is limited to enforcement of
regulations that they had no role in promulgating." 683 F.2d at 1073. The court also noted the
total lack of evidence in the record to indicate that the state defendants had even considered how
they might avoid the alleged coercion. Id.
455. Id. at 1075.
456. 716 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1983). This case was decided before the decision in District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983), and then the opinion was revised
in part and reissued to reflect the Supreme Court decision.
CIVIL LIBERTIES
eral question sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction. Here the
question was whether the complaint presented a constitutional attack
on the Illinois Supreme Court Rule or simply sought review of that
court's denial of the plaintiff's application. The court of appeals con-
cluded there was subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff was
attacking the constitutionality of the rule.
457
Several cases raised "case or controversy" questions. In Jones v.
Illinois Department of Rehabilitation Services458 the plaintiff sought an
order requiring the defendants to provide him with the services of a
sign language interpreter to enable him to effectively participate in and
benefit from his classes at the Illinois Institute of Technology (lIT).
The lower court entered an injunction requiring the Illinois Depart-
ment of Rehabilitation Services to provide such interpreter services and
the state agency appealed from this judgment. On appeal the plaintiff
argued for the first time, that the case was moot because he had gradu-
ated from the IIT prior to oral argument.
In rejecting the mootness claim the court first noted that the ques-
tion is capable of repetition as to the named plaintiff because in a
highly technical profession it is possible that he may decide to return to
graduate school.459 Second, the court found it capable of repetition be-
cause of the other hearing impaired students attending lIT who are also
clients of the state agency. Here the court pointed to the fact that there
was one deaf student enrolled at IIT and another one who had been
accepted for the following school year. In addition, the court took judi-
cial notice of the substantial number of deaf individuals approaching
the age of college or professional education. Based on this the court
concluded that "the situation presented by this case is reasonably cer-
tain to occur at IIT and at other colleges and universities in Illinois and
other states. ' 460 The court's willingness to look to persons other than
457. Id, at 406-08. This issue is also considered in Feldman, 103 S. Ct. at 1314-17; Dasher v.
Supreme Court of Texas, 650 F.2d 711, 716 (5th Cir.), reversed on other grounds, 658 F.2d 1045
(5th Cir. 1981); Brown v. Board of Bar Examiners of State of Nevada, 623 F.2d 605, 609 (9th Cir.
1980); Doe v. Pringle, 550 F.2d 596, 597 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 431 U.S. 916 (1977). In
Feldman the Court stated:
United States District Courts, therefore, have subject matter jurisdiction over general
challenges to state bar rules, promulgated by state courts in non-judicial proceedings,
which do not require review of a final state court judgment in a particular case. They do
not have jurisdiction, however, over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases
arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court's
action was unconstitutional.
103 S. Ct. at 1317.
458. 689 F.2d 724 (7th Cir. 1982). See supra notes 369-71 and accompanying text.
459. The court arrived at this conclusion even though the plaintiff disclaimed any current
intent to attend graduate school. Id. at 728.
460. Id
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the named plaintiff in a non-class suit when applying the "capable of
repetition" exception to the mootness doctrine is quite significant.
While it is clear that members of a class can supply the controversy,
even after a named plaintifs claim has become moot, looking to other
persons in a case not brought as a class action is somewhat unique.
In a subsequent non-class case, Corgain v. Miller,46 1 the court used
the fact that others might be in the same position as the named plain-
tiffs to support a finding that the challenge to the adequacy of the
prison library was moot. The implication seems to be that others might
be at the facility long enough to complete a challenge to the library
system before it becomes moot.
462
The plaintiffs' standing to challenge Indiana's drug paraphernalia
statute was summarily considered in Nova Records, Inc. v. Sendak.
463
None of named plaintiffs had been arrested or prosecuted under the
statute, but two other arrests had been made. The plaintiffs operate
retail businesses in Indiana and displayed and offered for sale some
items which might be covered by the statute. In order to avoid arrest
and seizure of such articles from their businesses, the plaintiffs brought
an action challenging the statute both facially and as applied. Citing
Steffel v. Thompson,464 the Court of Appeals concluded the plaintiffs
have standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge to the statute on its
face because "the potential application of the statute poses a sufficient
risk to the plaintiffs."' 465 However, because none of the plaintiffs had
been arrested or subjected to prosecution under the statute, the court
decided there was no case or controversy regarding application of the
statute to the plaintiffs.
466
Four cases, in federal court on the basis of federal questions, con-
sidered whether pendent jurisdiction over state law claims was appro-
priate. All four reaffirmed the familiar notion that the federal court
can dismiss the pendent state claims when the federal claims are dis-
posed of prior to trial. 46 7 However, in Lyznicki it was appropriate for
the court to decide the pendent claim on the merits because, although
the due process claim had been dismissed, a first amendment claim had
461. 708 F.2d 1241 (7th Cir. 1983).
462. Id. at 1246. The court also indicated "there is no reasonable expectation [the named
plaintiffs] will be subjected to the allegedly inadequate library system. . again." Id.
463. 706 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1983).
464. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
465. 706 F.2d at 786 (emphasis in original).
466. Id
467. Lyznicki v. Board of Education, School District 167, Cook County, 707 F.2d 949, 953
(7th Cir. 1983); Cook v. Weber, 698 F.2d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 1983); Bowers v. Devito, 686 F.2d 616,
619 (7th Cir. 1982); Goldschmidt v. Patchett, 686 F.2d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 1982).
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gone to trial.468
Abstention issues were presented in several cases decided this
term. The most extensive discussion is found in Evans v. City of Chi-
cago469 where the court considered both Younger470 and Burfora 71 ab-
stention. Plaintiffs in Evans brought a class action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, raising constitutional challenges to the city's practices of delay-
ing payment of tort judgments and paying tort judgments of $1,000 and
less before paying larger judgments; the suit also challenged certain Il-
linois statutes which authorize the city's practices. The Younger argu-
ment was based on the fact that a class action had been filed in an
Illinois state court raising similar questions concerning the city's prac-
tice of delaying payment of tort judgments. A class settlement was
eventually approved by the state court. In concluding that Younger did
not require dismissal of the federal action, the Seventh Circuit noted
several factors in support of its decision: application of Younger is
most appropriate when the federal judiciary is injected into state initi-
ated adjudication pending in state court; where Younger has been ap-
plied to situations involving state court proceedings not initiated by the
state, the relief requested in federal court would operate directly
against a state court; the state court settlement did not resolve nor com-
pletely obviate the federal court constitutional challenges; and the
named plaintiffs in federal court had not actively participated in the
state litigation.472
Similarly, in rejecting the defendants' abstension argument based
on Burford, the court cited several factors: the state statutes, which ap-
ply only to the City of Chicago, do not require the city to adopt the
challenged practices; the challenged statutes are not particularly com-
plex nor do they form a part of a complex statutory scheme; the state
did not create a special agency or judicial system to deal with the issue
nor otherwise indicate that the matter requires specialized expertise;
and the litigation affects federal as well as state court judgments.
473
More generally, the court noted that abstension is not required "merely
because resolution of a federal question may invalidate a state statute
or overturn a state policy. '474
468. 707 F.2d at 953.
469. 689 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1982). See also supra, notes 204-15 and 265-68 and accompany-
ing text.
470. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
471. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
472. 689 F.2d at 1294-95.
473. Id. at 1295-96.
474. Id at 1295. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 380 n.5 (1978).
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Younger abstention was raised, for the first time on appeal, in
United Church of the Medical Center v. Medical Center Commission.475
In this case the plaintiff raised due process challenges to proceedings
before the commission without first exhausting those administrative
proceedings. The court rejected the defendants' exhaustion argument,
relying on Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents.4 76 In the context of the
ruling on exhaustion, the court also rejected an argument, based on
Younger abstention, as elaborated in Middlesex County Ethics Commis-
sion v. Garden State Bar Association,477 that the case should be dis-
missed because of the pending administrative proceedings. 478 The court
concluded that Middlesex did not require dismissal because the state
administrative proceedings were defective and, therefore, would not
have presented an adequate opportunity to raise the federal constitu-
tional questions.
479
Another type of abstention, based on Railroad Commission v. Pull-
man Co.,4 80 was raised in Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove,481 which
involved a constitutional challenge to a village ordinance prohibiting
the possession of handguns within its borders. Because the plaintiff
raised both state and federal constitutional issues, an amicus brief ar-
gued that the district court should have abstained under Pullman in
order to give a state court an opportunity to construe the relevant state
constitutional provision. Relying on the notion that federal courts are
reluctant to abstain when fundamental rights are involved, the court
concluded that abstention was not appropriate in this case. 482 The
court also noted that Pullman abstention is designed to minimize con-
flict between federal and state courts, and there is no such conflict here
because the defendant Village voluntarily removed the case to federal
court.
4 8 3
A plaintiff's right to proceed in federal court with a civil rights
action was questioned in several cases. In Blake v. Katter,484 the plain-
tiff sued two state police officers claiming violation of his constitutional
475. 689 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1982). See supra note 96.
476. 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to
bringing an action under § 1983).
477. 457 U.S. 423, 431-37 (1982).
478. 689 F.2d at 697-98 n.3. This is consistent with the holding in Gibson v. Berryhill, 411
U.S. 564, 577 (1973). The court also noted that the administrative agency could not decide consti-
tutional issues. 689 F.2d at 698 n.3.
479. 689 F.2d at 698 n.3.
480. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
481. 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 104 S. Ct. 194 (1983).
482. 695 F.2d at 265 n.2.
483. Id.
484. 693 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1982).
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rights during his arrest, detention, pretrial proceedings and trial. The
court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that it was barred by the
Indiana two-year statute of limitations for tort actions. On appeal the
Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the case was governed by a five-
year statute of limitations because it involved public officers.48 5 While
agreeing that § 1983 actions are governed by the most appropriate state
limitation period,48 6 the court refused to utilize the general two-year
statute for tort actions in Indiana.
An earlier decision in which the plaintiff claimed race discrimina-
tion under § 198 1, 4 8 7 Movementfor Opportunity and Equality v. General
Motors Corp.,488 invoked the two-year Indiana statute for tort actions
as most analogous. This decision was influenced by the fact that Indi-
ana has a two-year statute of limitations for employers' liability for in-
juries to employees and employment related actions in general. In
Blake it was not necessary to resort to analogies because the five-year
statute expressly covers public officers.
489
Another issue arose in Blake because the named plaintiff died of
natural causes while the case was on appeal. The court rejected the
defendants' argument that the civil rights claims asserted were for "per-
sonal injuries" within the meaning of the Indiana survival statute
490
and, therefore, abated when the named plaintiff died. This argument
was summarily rejected; without explanation the court concluded the
injuries alleged are not "personal injuries" within the meaning of the
survival statute.
49'
In two cases the court held that the alleged misconduct of the de-
485. IND. CODE § 34-1-2-2 (1976) provides in part: "Second. All actions against a sheriff, or
other public officer, or against such officer and his sureties on a public bond, growing out of a
liability incurred by doing an act in an official capacity, or by the omission of an official duty,
within five (5) years."
486. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462.(1975).
487. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
488. 622 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1980).
489. 693 F.2d at 680.
490. IND. CODE § 34-1-1-1 (1976) limits the situations in which actions for personal injuries to
the deceased party survive.
491. 693 F.2d at 683. See also McFadden v. Sanchez, 710 F.2d 907, 910-11 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 39 (1983) (state statute preventing survival of claims for punitive damages not
applicable to § 1983 action). On the merits, the court affirmed the dismissal of the fourth amend-
ment claim, based on an alleged unreasonable delay between arrest and a determination of prob-
able cause, because the arraignment had been continued at Blake's request. The dismissal of his
speedy trial claim under the sixth amendment was reversed as was the dismissal of his claim that
the officers used unnecessary physical force during the arrest. Although this latter claim was as-
serted under the eighth amendment, the court properly treated it as a fourteenth amendment claim
since the eighth amendment does not apply to pretrial detainees. Blake, 693 F.2d at 681-82. A
pleading error was not fatal. Compare, Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 643-45 (7th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam).
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fendants did not give rise to a claim under § 1983. First, in Johnson v.
Miller,492 the plaintiff was arrested twice on the basis of valid state war-
rants, but after preliminary hearings she was promptly discharged be-
cause she was the wrong person. While recognizing that the plaintiff
might have remedies under state law, the court concluded that the of-
ficers' conduct was not actionable under § 1983, stating:
The execution of a warrant by an officer who if he were more careful
might have noticed that the warrant had been issued by mistake is
not the stuff out of which a proper federal case is made. The Fourth
Amendment and § 1983 have higher objects in view than getting ar-
resting officers to backstop the mistakes of their superiors.
493
Here the officers may have been careless, but there was no allegation
that they had obtained a warrant which they knew to be based on a
mistaken identity.
In a subsequent case, Bowers v. DeVio,494 the court held that of-
ficers and physicians of the Illinois Department of Mental Health, and
private physicians associated with a health center under contract with
the state department, are not liable to the estate of a person killed by a
former mental patient released from state custody a year earlier. Even
if the defendants were careless, or reckless, the court concluded "there
is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being mur-
dered by criminals or madmen. '495 Because the complaint alleged only
a failure to protect the deceased from a dangerous madman and be-
cause the state has no duty under the federal constitution to provide
such protection, the failure to protect the deceased cannot be actionable
under § 1983.496
An interesting collateral estoppel issue arose in a case involving
the discharge of a police officer. In Lee v. City of Peoria497 disciplinary
proceedings were initiated against Lee; he was charged with giving
false testimony to the board of commissioners in claiming he had been
home ill on a particular day. Lee's sole defense at the disciplinary pro-
ceedings was that he was in fact home in bed on the date in question;
492. 680 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1982).
493. Id. at 42. A similar reluctance to elevate ministerial errors into constitutional claims is
discussed in relation to the due process materials. See supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
494. 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982).
495. Id at 618.
496. Id The court distinguished the situation where a state puts a person in a position of
danger from private persons and then fails to provide protection. Here the state would be an
active tortfeasor as in the situation where prison personnel are found liable under § 1983 for the
violence of one inmate against another. See, e.g., Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir.
1974). In contrast, the defendants here did not place the deceased in a position of danger; they
simply failed to protect her adequately. 686 F.2d at 618.
497. 685 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1982).
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he made no suggestion that the charge was racially motivated on the
part of the board. It was determined that Lee had given false testimony
and he was discharged immediately. He then filed a complaint in state
court seeking review of the decision, but for the first time he included
an allegation that the discharge was the result of racial discrimination
on the part of the board. In a brief order, the state court simply sus-
tained the decision of the board and there was no further appeal from
this ruling. Subsequently, Lee filed a charge with the EEOC claiming
racial discrimination in his discharge; he received a notice of right to
sue and filed a Title V11 498 action in federal court. The defendants
moved to dismiss, in part on res judicata and collateral estoppel
grounds, and the district court granted the motion.
On appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal based on res
judicata, concluding that Lee could have raised and litigated his racial
discrimination claim as a defense to the discharge proceedings.
499
Under state law, if in fact Lee was discharged solely because of his
race, this would have been a defense to the disciplinary proceedings.
Because he raised this in his complaint seeking judicial review of the
discharge proceedings, the court concluded that "Lee's claim of racial
discrimination was properly before the state court and was necessary to
the state court's determination." 5°° The court noted that its decision is
consistent with the Restatement 501 because, if the second lawsuit were
allowed and the plaintiff was successful, "it would directly undermine
the validity of the state decisions and the city's right to discharge Lee
which the decisions established." 50 2
Both res judicata and collateral estoppel issues were considered in
Crowder v. Lash.50 3 A prison inmate, who was a plaintiff in a successful
class action for equitable relief relating to conditions in a detention unit
of the prison on eighth amendment grounds, brought an individual ac-
tion for damages based in part on conditions in the same unit. Defend-
ants argued that his suit for damages based on the eighth amendment
was barred because it could have been raised in the class action. The
court first noted that the res judicata defense was waived because it was
not timely raised as an affirmative defense. 5°4 Even if it had been prop-
erly raised it would have been rejected because Crowder was not one of
498. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
499. 685 F.2d at 198.
500. Id. at 201.
501. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 22, Comment b (1980).
502. 685 F.2d at 201.
503. 687 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1982).
504. Id. at 1008.
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the original plaintiffs in the former litigation and may not have been
allowed to join as a named plaintiff if he had insisted on including a
damage claim which would have raised new issues.505
The plaintiff in Crowder argued in the lower court that the defend-
ants should be collaterally estopped from relitigating the eighth amend-
ment issue in the damage action. His argument was rejected by the
lower court but the court of appeals reversed and remanded for appli-
cation of the teachings of Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore.506 The record
disclosed "no reason why plaintiff should be prevented from using col-




Questions concerning the liability of an entity for the actions of its
agents and employees were considered in four cases. The plaintiff in
Iskander v. Village of Forest Park508 raised constitutional questions
concerning her arrest and detention, for shoplifting, by a store detective
and a subsequent strip search by the local police department. Named
as defendants were the store detective, police officers, Zayre, Inc., and
the Village of Forest Park. Assuming there was state action for pur-
poses of § 1983,509 the court stated:
Just as a municipal corporation is not vicariously liable upon a the-
ory of respondeat superior for the constitutional torts of its employees,
a private corporation is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for
its employees' deprivations of others' civil rights.510
Therefore, the plaintiff had to show that the store detective was acting
pursuant to an impermissible policy or constitutionally forbidden rule,
procedure, policy or custom of Zayre. Finding that the store's policy
concerning the detaining of shoplifting suspects was entirely legitimate,
the court concluded that Zayre could not be found liable.
Applying the same standard to the Village of Forest Park, the
court decided that the question of its liability for the strip search had to
be submitted to the jury because the plaintiff had presented evidence
that the police department "customarily conducted strip searches in a
505. Id at 1008-09.
506. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
507. 687 F.2d at 1011. The issues raised in this case are discussed in Bodensteiner, Application
of Preclusion Principles to § 1983 Damage Actions After a Successful Class Action for Equitable
Relief 17 VAL. U.L. REV. 347 (1983).
508. 690 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1982).
509. Id. at 128.
510. Id.
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room with a window facing a corridor through which numerous indi-
viduals might be passing at any given time." 5t i Thus there was a tria-
ble issue as to the liability of the village for the strip search, but the trial
court had given erroneous instructions concerning both the standard
for the village's liability as well as the legality of strip searches.
512
In a subsequent action seeking damages from a sheriff in his offi-
cial capacity, Woif-Lihlie v. Sonquist, 51 3 the court further elaborated on
situations in which a municipal entity can be held responsible for the
actions of its officials.514 After noting that a local governmental entity
"will be liable when through the execution of a government's policy or
custom, whether made by its law-makers or by those whose edicts or
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy" 515 the court found
the sheriff could be liable in his official capacity because the evidence
demonstrated a widespread practice of, executing outdated writs. Ap-
parently this practice was known to the sheriff. The court made it clear
that a well-settled practice can constitute a "custom or usage," and this
is sufficient for municipal liability even though the custom has not re-
ceived formal approval through the normal decision-making channels.
"Informal actions, if they reflect a general policy, custom, or pattern of
official conduct which even tacitly encourages conduct depriving citi-
zens of their constitutionally protected rights, may well satisfy the
amorphous standards of § 1983."516
Village responsibility for the alleged harassment of a business by
various city officials was at issue in Reed v. Village of Shorewood
517
511. Id at 129 (emphasis original). Under Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), strip searches
must be reasonable and the test "requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against
the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the
particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the
place in which it is conducted." Id. at 559. See Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263
(7th Cir. 1983) (city policy requiring strip searches of all women arrested and detained in city jails,
regardless of charges or reason to believe they are concealing weapons or contraband, violates the
fourth and fourteenth amendments); Tikalsky v. City of Chicago, 687 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1982)
(woman arrested for disorderly conduct and subjected to a visual strip search; jury award of
$30,000 reinstated). Contra Dufrin v. Spreen, 712 F.2d 1084 (6th Cir. 1983) (visual body cavity
search at county jail, conducted by female attendant, did not violate fourth amendment rights of
female arrested for felonious assault).
512. As to the liability of the village for the actions of the police officers in arresting the plain-
tiff, the court held there could be no liability because the village policy was entirely legitimate.
690 F.2d at 129.
513. 699 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1983). See supra notes 221-25 and accompanying text.
514. Even though the county was not named as a defendant the court noted that an "official
capacity suit [against a governmental official] is merely another form of claim against the govern-
ment entity itself." Therefore, damages can be awarded against a defendant in his official capacity
only if the governmental entity would be liable. Id. at 870.
515. Id
516. Id.
517. 704 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1983). See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
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The plaintiffs claimed that the "interference with their business was a
policy orchestrated at the highest level of government in the Village of
Shorewood." 518 If this allegation can be proved, the village is liable.
Because municipal entities act only through agents, the task on remand
will be to identify those agents whose acts reflect governmental policy.
The acts of such policy makers, -or acts carried out pursuant to their
direction, can trigger municipal liability.
Finally, in Lenard v. Argento5 19 the plaintiff sued several police
officers and the Village of Melrose Park claiming a violation of his con-
stitutional rights as a result of events surrounding his arrest. The alle-
gation relating to the village was that "its policy and custom of failing
to properly screen, hire, train and supervise its police employees en-
couraged and sanctioned the misbehavior complained of [in the com-
plaint]. ' 520 It was further alleged that it was "the policy of the Village
to encourage, sanction and 'cover-up' acts of misconduct by its police
employees."' 521 Regarding the allegation of failure of supervisory offi-
cials to supervise, control or train the offending officers, the court indi-
cated a plaintiff must show that the official "at least implicitly
authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional
conduct of the offending officers. ' 522 Inaction will trigger municipal
liability only if there is a pattern of constitutionally offensive acts along
with a failure to invoke remedial measures and "the supervisor's inac-
tion amounts to deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the of-
fensive acts. ' 523 After careful examination of the transcript, the court
concluded there was insufficient evidence to establish a failure to prop-
erly screen, hire, train and supervise police officials and the department
acted reasonably in its method of investigating complaints about par-
ticular officers. 524
A related issue arose in McBride v. Soos025 where the court had to
determine whether the defendants either caused or participated in the
failure to hold a pre-extradition hearing. The plaintiff, who was ar-
rested in St. Louis, was extradited to Indiana pursuant to an extradition
518. Id. at 953.
519. 699 F.2d 874 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 89 (1983). See supra notes 407-08 and
accompanying text.
520. Id at 885.
521. Id.
522. Id Here the court relied on Hays v. Jefferson County, Ky., 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833 (1982).
523. 699 F.2d at 886, quoting, Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196, 201 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied 449
U.S. 1016 (1980).
524. 699 F.2d at 886.
525. 679 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1982).
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warrant issued by the Governor of Indiana. The defendant officers
were assigned to go to Missouri and pick up the plaintiff; they had been
advised both by their superiors and Missouri authorities that the plain-
tiff had waived extradition. The federal court complaint alleged that
the defendants deprived McBride of due process by extraditing him to
Indiana without complying with all the requirements of Missouri law.
The lower court held that the defendants were personally involved
in the violation of the Missouri statute which requires Missouri author-
ities to hold a judicial hearing before delivering a fugitive to the de-
manding state. On appeal the Seventh Circuit disagreed, commenting
that it is "unreasonable to require the demanding state agents to be
familiar with the procedural safeguards enacted in the asylum state's
extradition statutes and then further require them to ensure that the
statutory safeguards have been followed. '526 Because the Indiana of-
ficers had done all they were statutorily required to do before accepting
custody of McBride, they did not cause nor participate in the alleged




A number of decisions this term considered both absolute and
qualified immunity. Members of the state parole board were granted
an absolute immunity from § 1983 damage actions in United States ex
rel. Powell v. Irving.528 Because members of the parole board perform
an adjudicatory function in reviewing parole applications, the court
concluded that all of the policy reasons supporting an absolute immu-
nity for judges apply as well to parole officials.529 Further, the court
noted that there are sufficient other sanctions, including habeas corpus,
for arbitrary parole denials by state officials. 530 The court did, how-
ever, indicate that the plaintiff could pursue his request for declaratory
relief.
In Goldschmidt v. Patchett5 3 1 the Supreme Court decision ex-
526. Id. at 1227.
527. Id Based on this, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the lower court should have
granted the defendants' motion for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiffs case. Id at
1228.
528. 684 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1982).
529. Id. at 49. The court relied heavily on Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981). See also Evans v. Dillahunty, 711 F.2d 828, 830-31 (8th Cir.
1983).
530. 684 F.2d at 497.
531. 686 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1982).
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tending absolute immunity to prosecuting attorneys 532 was found broad
enough to cover a prosecuting attorney who mailed a letter to the attor-
ney plaintiff threatening to prosecute both him and a newspaper if he
did not stop publishing a particular ad in the paper. Addressing the
plaintiff's argument that Imbler does not apply to investigative activity
by a prosecuting attorney, the court simply noted that the activities in
this case were not investigative and not the sort which could be per-
formed by a layman with the same effectiveness as a letter from the
prosecutor's office. 533 The court characterized the prosecutor's actions
as an exercise of the quasi-judicial function and therefore absolutely
immune. While recognizing that a prosecutor's decision to prosecute or
not prosecute is protected by absolute immunity, Judge Swygert in dis-
sent argues that a threat to prosecute is not a part of this decision and
cannot be characterized as quasi-judicial conduct. 534 The court did
note that private persons who may have conspired with the prosecutor
could be sued under § 1983 and would not enjoy the immunity of the
prosecutor.5
35
Two types of absolute immunity were asserted by defendants in
Reed v. Village of Shorewood.5 36 One defendant asserted an absolute
immunity in the exercise of his "judicial" responsibilities as a liquor
control commissioner; he argued that he was acting in a judicial capac-
ity when passing on renewal and revocation questions presented by the
licensing proceeding before the commission. Relying in part on Butz v.
Economou,5 37 the court examined the role and function of a commis-
sioner and concluded he acts like a "first-line adjudicator," like a trial
judge. Therefore, he was granted an absolute immunity from damage
suits when acting on the revocation or renewal of liquor licenses.538
The next question was whether the members of the Village Board
of Trustees enjoy an absolute immunity in the exercise of their legisla-
tive responsibilities. They had reduced the number of Class A liquor
licenses in the village from four to three. The primary question here
was whether the absolute immunity of legislators applies to local
lawmakers. Citing cases from several other circuits, the court rather
532. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
533. Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608-09 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 415 U.S.
917 (1974), supports the argument that prosecutors do not enjoy an absolute immunity when the
challenged activities are investigative.
534. 686 F.2d at 586 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
535. Id. at 585.
536. 704 F.2d 943 (7th Cit. 1983).
537. 438 U.S. 478, 513-14 (1978).
538. 704 F.2d at 951-52. The court also noted that it would make no difference that the de-
fendant was a local rather than state judicial officer. Id. at 952.
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summarily concluded they were correct in granting local legislative of-
ficials an absolute immunity.5 39 This was done even though the court
recognized that there may be fewer safeguards against arbitrary legisla-
tive action at the local level than either the state or federal level.
The two cases dealing with qualified immunity do not require ex-
tensive discussion. In Jaworski v. Schmid5 40 the question was whether
the administrator of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections, who en-
joys a qualified immunity, could assert it as a defense when a state
statute indemnifies him for any damage liability incurred as a result of
the good faith execution of his duties. The plaintiff claimed the de-
fendant had violated his due process rights in rescinding the plaintiff's
parole. 54' Relying on prior decisions holding that questions of immu-
nity under § 1983 are governed by federal law, the court easily con-
cluded that the defendant's qualified immunity is not affected by the
state indemnification provision.542 The other case, Johnson v. Brefe,5 43
presented constitutional issues concerning the commitment of criminal
defendants found unfit to stand trial and assigned to the Chester
Mental Health Center. The plaintiffs' claims for damages were de-
feated by the defendants' qualified immunity because the rights as-
serted by the plaintiffs were not clearly established when the
defendants acted. The closest question related to the telephone policy,
limiting calls to two per week, which was found to illegally restrict ac-
cess to the courts. Although noting that a constitutional right of mean-
ingful access to the courts had been clearly established, the court
indicated it was aware of no prior cases which had relied on this right
to hold invalid a regulation of a mental health facility.544
An important question concerning the qualified immunity defense
539. Id. at 952-53.
540. 684 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1015 (1983).
541. The court did not mention United States ex rel. Powell v. Irving, supra note 528, even
though this case also involved parole. The cases were decided on the same date and Judge Bauer
sat on both panels.
542. 684 F.2d at 500-01.
543. 701 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir. 1983). See supra notes 138-44 and 414-15 and accompanying text.
544. Id. at 1210-11. While the restrictive policy was held invalid in this case, the court did
indicate that it might be constitutional under other circumstances if based on a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. Thus the court concluded that reasonable persons could not have known that
the telephone policy violated clearly established rights of the plaintiffs. In an earlier case discuss-
ing the "clearly established" part of the qualified immunity standard, the court stated:
It is clear that in order to apply this first prong of the qualified immunity test an appel-
late court must rely on the district court's findings of fact as to: (i) when the violation
was committed; (2) whether a given official knew or reasonably should have known
about the right at the time the violation was committed; and (3) whether a given official
knew or reasonably should have known that his conduct violated the constitutional
rights at issue.
Owen v. Lash, 682 F.2d 648, 656 (7th Cir. 1982).
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relates to the allocation of the burden of proof. In Gomez v. Toledo45
the Supreme Court made it clear that a qualified immunity is an affirm-
ative defense which must be pleaded by the defendant. However, the
Court left open the question of who must prove the defense. While two
earlier Seventh Circuit decisions546 seem to hold that the defendant has
to both plead and prove the defense, the court in Crowder v. Lash
547
indicated the law is still unsettled in the circuit.548 The court did, how-
ever, recognize that most other circuits have placed the burden of proof
on the defendant. 549 The burden of proof was discussed in Crowder in
the context of applying the recent Supreme Court decision in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald.550 After indicating that Harlow had revised the qualified im-
munity standard by attempting to eliminate the subjective factor,551 the
court noted that a qualified immunity defense would ordinarily fail if
the constitutional right in question was clearly established when the
challenged conduct took place. However, it indicated that "extraordi-
nary circumstances may exist under which an official may be able to
prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal
standard. ' 552 Here again the burden of proof seems to be placed on the
defendant.
While there is certainly a need to clarify the burden of proof issue
in this circuit, the decision in Harlow seems to have resolved the matter.
No doubt a qualified immunity is an affirmative defense which must be
pleaded by the defendant. Once it is pleaded, the trial court will have
to make a determination of whether the law was "clearly established"
at the time the challenged conduct took place. This objective standard
presents a legal question which generally will not require proof of facts.
Facts become relevant only where a defendant attempts to show "ex-
traordinary circumstances" indicating he neither knew nor should have
545. 446 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1980).
546. Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365, 367 (7th Cir. 1980), writ of certiorari dismissed
as improvidently granted, 456 U.S. 604 (1982); Chavis v. Roe, 643 F.2d 1281, 1288 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 907 (1981).
547. 687 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1982).
548. Id at 1002. The basis for concluding that the law was unsettled, despite the two cases
cited earlier, see supra note 546, was the decision in Johnson v. Miller, 680 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1982),
in which the court indicated that absent an allegation of knowing or intentional constitutional
deprivation, a plaintiffs complaint fails to state a cause of action under § 1983.
549. 687 F.2d at 1003.
550. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). See discussion of this in the review of last term, 59 Cm. KENT L.
REv. 471-72 (1983).
551. The subjective element addresses the question whether the official took the action with
malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury. Wood v. Strick-
land, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975).
552. 687 F.2d at 1007. This aspect of the defense "would turn primarily on objective rather
than subjective factors." Id.
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known of the relevant clearly established law. The Seventh Circuit in
Crowder agrees that this burden of proof is on the defendant. There-
fore, it would seem that all questions concerning the burden of plead-
ing and proof have now been resolved.
C. Damages
The Seventh Circuit dealt with the question of awarding damages
for constitutional torts in two different contexts. In Jones v. Reagan"
3
it considered whether a cause of action can be brought against federal
officials directly under the constitution where no claim is made of in-
jury other than violation of a constitutional right. In other decisions,
55 4
the Seventh Circuit struggled with the question of whether so-called
presumed damages for violation of constitutional rights can be
awarded when suit is brought under § 1983.555 The decisions reflect
much disagreement and quite a bit of confusion as to the value to be
accorded constitutional rights.
In the case of Jones v. Reagan"s6 black noncommissioned officers
in the United States Army Reserve brought suit against their military
superiors alleging that they were transferred to another unit solely be-
cause they were black and the officer commanding the unit wanted it to
be all white. The court refused to find a cause of action despite its
acknowledgement that the fifth amendment protects against racial dis-
crimination and that the Supreme Court in Davis v. Passman557 had
specifically held that a fifth amendment violation can be redressed by
damage actions in federal court.55 8
The Supreme Court in Carlson v. Green"5 9 held that a presumption
was created in favor of an implied right of action unless the defendant
can show "special factors counselling hesitation. 5 60 The "special fac-
tor" relied upon by the Seventh Circuit in Jones was that the plaintiff
alleged no monetary injury.56' The court distinguished the plaintiffs
553. 696 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1983).
554. See infra notes 584-97 and accompanying text.
555. The "presumed damages" concept is analogous to the general damages rule in tort law,
where a court awards compensation without requiring specific proof of injury. See D. Dobbs,
Handbook on the Law oRemedies § 3.2, at 138-39 (1973); C. McCormick, Handbook on the Law
a/Damages § 8 (1935); H. McGregor, Damages 15-20 (13th ed. 1972). The Supreme Court has
recognized the concept of presumed damages as it applies to the dignitary torts of libel and defa-
mation. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 262 (1978).
556. 696 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1982).
557. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
558. Id. at 248-49.
559. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
560. Id at 18.
561. 696 F.2d at 555.
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suit in Davis as one for breach of contract where damages are easily
measured, although the plaintiff there also sought damages for humili-
ation and other intangible injury. It can be similarly argued that the
plaintiffs in Jones suffered humiliation and degradation due to the ra-
cially discriminatory conduct of the defendant; nonetheless the court
reasoned that since plaintiffs sought only punitive damages in their
lawsuit, they must not have suffered any emotional distress or other
compensable injury.
562
Punitive damages were disallowed partially because of the tradi-
tional tort principle that punitives should not be provided absent an
award of compensatory damages. 563 Further, the court reasoned that
an award of punitive damages created a significant potential for
overdeterrence since extensive damages would be awarded against a
military officer who could not be indemnified by the government or by
an insurance policy. 564 Such an award would thus deter officers from
making any kind of transfer of an individual who was of a different
race from his own. The court concluded in a rather sweeping statement
that "damage remedies for constitutional torts are not appropriate and
hence not available, unless expressly authorized by Congress, if no
monetizable injury is alleged. '565
The Supreme Court in the recent case of Chappell v. Wallace566
reached the same conclusion as the Seventh Circuit on the question of
whether military personnel may sue their superiors, but its analysis was
quite different. Factually the cases were very similar in that the plain-
tiffs in Chappell were also alleging racial discrimination. 567 The Court
posed the same question as the Seventh Circuit, i.e., whether "special
factors counselling hesitation" were present so as to preclude a cause of
action directly under the Constitution, but the factors it relied upon
were significantly different from those of the Seventh Circuit. It based
its decision on the need for special regulations in relation to military
discipline and the resulting need for a special and exclusive system of
military justice. 568 Further it noted the explicit constitutional grant of
plenary authority by Congress to control the military and its exercise of
that authority through a comprehensive internal system of justice
which deals with complaints and grievances, such as those presented by
562. Id. at 554.
563. Id (citations omitted).
564. Id.
565. Id. at 555.
566. 103 S. Ct. 2362 (1983).
567. Id. at 2364.
568. Id at 2365.
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the plaintiffs.5 69 In short, the Court concluded that "the unique disci-
plinary structure of the military establishment and Congress' activity in
the field constitute 'special factors' which dictate that it would be inap-
propriate to provide enlisted military personnel a Bivens-type remedy
against their superior officers.
570
Although Chappell affirms that military personnel may not sue
their superiors, the Seventh Circuit's analysis-relying on a lack of
"monetizable" injury-is troublesome. It is doubtful that lack of quan-
tifiable injury is the type of "special factors counselling hesitation"
which the Supreme Court had in mind in its decisions regarding the
implication of a cause of action directly under the constitution. In dis-
posing of the case on a Rule 12(b)(6)1 71 motion for failure to state a
claim, the district court prematurely determined that there were no ac-
tual damages.572 The court of appeals stated that even if there was
some actual injury involved in the case, "it is too trivial to be measura-
ble in damages" and thus does not give rise to a viable claim. 573 Ap-
parently the opinion rests on the assumption that constitutional rights
have no intrinsic value, and therefore, to use the court's terminology;
"no monetizable injury" has been alleged.5 74
The Seventh Circuit supported its conclusion in Jones by citing
Carey v. P/ohus5 75 in which the Supreme Court held that presumed
damages are not permissible under § 1983 when only procedural due
process rights are violated.57 6 However, the Court in Carey specifically
569. Id. at 2366. See also Busch v. Lucas, 104 S. Ct. 367 (1983), in which the Court similarly
focused on an elaborate remedial system that had already been constructed by Congress in deny-
ing a cause of action directly under the constitution. Plaintiff brought an action for an alleged
defamation and retaliatory demotion. Congress in its Civil Service Commission regulations had
already created a very explicit and detailed remedy for such conduct and the Court found that it
would be inappropriate to supplement that regulatory scheme with a new nonstatutory damage
remedy. Id. at 2412-17.
570. 103 S. Ct. at 2367. Note that it was in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), that the Supreme Court first acknowledged its power to
recognize causes of action directly under the constitution.
571. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
572. The court's readiness to dismiss this suit should be contrasted to the general rule that
jurisdiction will not be refused for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement unless it
appears "to a legal certainty" that recovery in the required amount would not occur or that the
party has proceeded in bad faith. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283,
289 (1938). The courts have carefully followed this rule so as not to deprive a plaintiff of a jury
determination of injury. In the area of constitutional torts where the task of measuring injury is so
troublesome, it is especially inappropriate for the court to dismiss before trial.
573. 696 F.2d at 555.
574. Id This approach can be contrasted with an earlier Seventh Circuit decision, Seaton v.
Sky Realty Company, 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974), in which the court held that damages are
presumed to flow from racial discrimination.
575. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
576. Id. at 264.
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noted that cases awarding damages for deprivation of substantive con-
stitutional rights were not affected by its decision. 577 Further, Carey
dealt only with the relief issue-not the existence of a cause of action.
The Seventh Circuit's sweeping statement that a cause of action
for constitutional torts is available only when there is monetizable in-
jury suggests a dangerous precedent. Its conclusion that plaintiff suf-
fered no injury rested perhaps in part on plaintiffs faulty pleading, i.e.,
at oral argument plaintiffs counsel described the suit as one purely for
punitive damages, suggesting an absence of any compensatory type in-
jury.5 78 However, the court's conclusion reflects a much deeper posi-
tion, i.e., that constitutional rights have no intrinsic value and thus
damages should not be presumed to flow from their violation.
The value to be assigned constitutional rights has been the subject
of heated debate both in the courts and among legal scholars since the
Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Carey v. Pophus.5 7 9 The
Seventh Circuit's position is far from clear. In the earlier case of
Konczak v. Tyrrell5 80 the court refused to expand Carey to encompass
substantive constitutional claims.58' Later in Kincaid v. Rusk 82 it held
that plaintiffs in § 1983 actions must demonstrate some compensable
injury in order to recover, even if they allege viable first amendment
claims. Unfortunately, this conflict has not been resolved.
58 3
Justice Stewart, sitting by designation in the Seventh Circuit, au-
577. id. at 265.
578. 696 F.2d at 554.
579. See, e.g., Note, Damage Awardsfor Constitutional Torts.- A Reconsideration After Carey P.
Piphus, 93 HARV. L. REV. 966 (1980); Love, Damages.- .4 Remedy For The Violation of Constitu-
tional Rights, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1242 (1979). The courts are also divided as to which constitu-
tional rights, if any, give rise to viable claims for presumed damages. See, e.g., Basiardanes v. City
of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203, 1220 (5th Cit. 1982) (first amendment violations unaccompanied by
any "real" injury justify an award of only nominal damages); Williams v. Board of Regents of
Univ. Sys., 629 F.2d 993, 1005 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 452 U.S. 926 (1981) (damages must be
proved, rather than presumed in § 1983 actions); Phillips v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 80-2171, slip
op. (D.C. Cir. Jan. 11, 1983) (holding that plaintiff was not entitled to damages for the intrinsic
value of his eighth amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment). But see, Corriz
v. Naranjo, 677 F.2d 892, 897 (10th Cir. 1981) appeal dismissed 103 S. Ct. 5 (1982) (damages are
available for violation of plaintiff's substantive rights, i.e., his liberty interests and bodily integ-
rity); Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 660 F.2d 1267, 1272 (8th Cir. 1981) ("Damages for
emotional harm are to be presumed where there is an infringement of a substantive constitutional
right."); Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220, 1228 (8th Cir. 1981) (substantial compensatory dam-
ages are recoverable for violation of liberty and privacy interests protected by fifth and fourth
amendments); Hodge v. Seiler, 558 F.2d 284, 285 (5th Cir. 1977) (damages may be presumed to
flow from the denial of a constitutional right).
580. 603 F.2d 13 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1016 (1980).
581. Id. at 17. Note, however, the court did not have to reach the issue directly since it found
that claims of actual injuries sufficiently supported the judgment.
582. 670 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1982).
583. Id at 747.
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thored the recent opinion in Owen v. Lash,584 another case seeking
damages for violation of first amendment rights. While overruling the
district court's characterization of the issue as involving simply the de-
nial of procedural due process controlled by Carey, Justice Stewart
failed to answer the more difficult question of whether a plaintiff who
proves a violation of substantive rights can recover damages in the ab-
sence of proof of consequential injury.585 After discussing the conflict-
ing case precedent, he remanded to the district court for a
determination of whether the defendant was qualifiedly immune from
liability for damages-thus obviating the need to address the conse-
quential injury question.
586
In two decisions this term the damage question arose in the con-
text of proper jury instructions. In Freeman v. Franzen87 the defend-
ants challenged jury instructions which included consideration of the
loss of constitutional rights as "an element of damages. ' 588 The jury
was told that in fixing the amount of liability in this prison guard bru-
tality case, it could consider the nature, extent and duration of the in-
jury, general pain and suffering, humiliation, mental distress, and the
violation of the constitutional right. 589 Including the latter as a sepa-
rate and independent element of damages appears to suggest that the
constitutional right has some intrinsic compensable value. The Sev-
enth Circuit reasoned that the jury instruction was included to distin-
guish between a common law action for battery and a violation of civil
rights so as to insure that plaintiff "received full compensation for his
injuries. ' 590 It specified, however, that the instructions would not mis-
lead the jury into awarding damages in the absence of actual injury.
Further, it noted that evidence of actual physical injury to the plaintiff
amply supported the damage award without the use of any presumed
damage concept. 59' It stressed that the primary purpose of § 1983 is to
compensate for injuries, therefore suggesting that had there not been
proof of actual physical injury in the case, the court would not have
approved an award of damages beyond the one dollar nominal amount
584. 682 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1982).
585. Id at 659. Justice Stewart uses the term "consequential injury" to denote that violation
of a substantive constitutional right itself constitutes actual injury. Id. at 657 n.9.
586. Id. at 660.
587. 695 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. deniedsub. nom., Branche v. Freeman, 103 S. Ct. 3553
(1983).
588. Id. at 492.
589. Id. at 492 n.4.
590. Id at 493.
591. Id. at 494.
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permitted in Carey.592 Thus while perhaps a broad reading of the case
might justify the conclusion that constitutional rights violations may
augment a damage award, the court's reasoning suggests that injury to
constitutional rights could not independently support a judgment.
A different conclusion was reached by another Seventh Circuit
panel in Lenard v. Argento.593 There the trial court instructed the jury
that they could award "substantial damages" for civil rights violations
without proof of actual injury. The Seventh Circuit found that it was
error to instruct the jury as to a separate and distinct category of dam-
ages classified as "substantial damages." 594 However, the objection
was to the use of the word "substantial," rather than to the underlying
concept that presumed damages are permissible. In fact, the court held
that in light of the circumstances of that case-alleging a conspiracy to
deprive plaintiff of equal protection of the law by the use of brutal and
excessive force-"it was proper for the jury to consider an award of
damages for these violations in the absence of discernable consequent-
ial injuries. ' 595 The court specified that on remand the plaintiff should
be allowed to argue damages flowing from the nature of the constitu-
tional deprivation, in addition to mental distress, humiliation and other
types of injury that were caused as a result of the violation of civil
rights. 59
6
Since the Supreme Court has refused to review both Freeman and
Lenard, the question of whether a jury can properly be instructed to
award damages for violation of constitutional rights, absent proof of
"actual injury, ' 597 remains confusing. In light of the conflict in the
Seventh Circuit as well as that among the appellate courts, clarification
from the high court is surely needed.
VI. PRISON LITIGATION
While many of the issues which arise in prison litigation are not
592. Id. at 493.
593. 699 F.2d 874 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 104 S. Ct. 69 (1983).
594. Id at 888-89. Use of the phrase "substantial damages" by the district court eleven times,
plus inclusion as a category in the verdict form, was found to have greatly influenced the large
verdict and was thus impermissible. Id. at 889.
595. Id.
596. In support of its position, the court cited a much earlier Seventh Circuit decision holding
that non-punitive damages for the deprivation of intangible rights for which no pecuniary loss can
be proved is permissible under the Civil Rights Act. Hostrop v. Bd. of Junior College Dist. No.
515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 425 U.S. 963 (1976) (citations omitted). The court
also made reference to the recent Tenth Circuit decision in Corriz v. Naranjo, 677 F.2d 892 (10th
Cir.), appeal dismissed 458 U.S. 1123 (1982).
597. See supra notes 585 and 591.
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peculiar to such cases, there are enough matters unique to such litiga-
tion to warrant a separate section. Some issues which arose in the con-
text of prison litigation have already been discussed. 598 The first issue,
which is certainly not unique to prison cases, concerns the trial court's
obligation to appoint counsel for an indigent who cannot pay for repre-
sentation.599 Several cases involve the application of the factors estab-
lished in Maclin v. Freake.6°°
(1) whether the merits of the indigent's claim are colorable; (2) the
ability of the indigent plaintiff to investigate crucial facts; (3) whether
the nature of the evidence indicates that the truth will more likely be
exposed where both sides are represented by counsel; (4) the capabil-
ity of the indigent litigant to present the case; and (5) the complexity
of the legal issues raised by the complaint.
60 1
Application of these factors in Merritt v. Faulkner, led the court to con-
clude that the district court had abused its discretion in denying the
plaintiff's request for appointed counsel. This ruling was heavily influ-
enced by the fact that the plaintiff is functionally blind in both eyes and
the case involves some complex medical practice issues.
In another case, McKeever v. Israel,6°2 the court reversed a refusal
to appoint counsel where the district court failed to exercise its discre-
tion under § 1915(d) because it did not recognize the authority to ap-
point counsel. Here again, application of the Maclin factors led the
court to conclude that it was an abuse of discretion to refuse to appoint
counsel. The critical factor seems to be the plaintiff's performance dur-
ing trial and other proceedings in the trial court. This information was
not necessarily available to the trial judge when the request for counsel
was denied; however, there were repeated requests, including one on
the day of trial.
The trial court's refusal to appoint counsel was upheld in Childs v.
Duckworth60 3 where the trial court made a finding that the plaintiff
"has a fairly clear understanding of what he wants to present here."
6°4
The court noted that the issues in the case, questions concerning the
plaintiff's religious beliefs and his sincerity, were within his knowledge
and Childs demonstrated his ability to articulate his case. The lower
598. See, e.g., supra section I-D relating to the first amendment.
599. These cases do not suggest there is a constitutional right to representation; rather, they
deal with the trial court's exercise of discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982). This section
provides that the court may request an attorney to represent an indigent unable to employ counsel.
600. 650 F.2d 885, 887-89 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
601. Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761, 764 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 104 S. Ct. 434 (1983).
602. 689 F.2d 1315 (7th Cir. 1982).
603. 705 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1983).
604. Id at 922.
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court's refusal to appoint counsel was also upheld in Caruth v.
Pinkney,60 5 but on different grounds than those utilized by the trial
court. In denying appointment of counsel, the lower court referred to
the lack of compensation for appointed lawyers in civil cases, the avail-
ability of pro bono legal services through organizations in cases found
meritorious, and the fact that private attorneys will often accept cases
on a contingent fee basis if there is a potential for recovery. 6°6 While
rejecting these factors, the court of appeals indicated there was no
abuse of discretion in failing to appoint counsel because of questions
about the merits of the plaintiffs claim, the plaintiffs ability to compre-
hend and adequately present his claim and access to a prison library
and law clerk.
60 7
A related issue concerns the function and duties of the trial judge
when a plaintiff is proceeding pro se. This issue arose in Lewis v.
Faulkner° 8 where the defendant filed a "motion to dismiss, or in the
alternative, for summary judgment" and the plaintiff failed to respond.
The lower court dismissed the case, relying heavily on the affidavit sub-
mitted in support of the motion. Because the consequences of failing to
respond would not be evident to the non-lawyer in this situation, the
court took this opportunity to establish a general rule "that a prisoner
who is a plaintiff in a civil case and is not represented by counsel is
entitled to receive notice of the consequences of failing to respond with
affidavits to a motion for summary judgment. ' 60 9 Noting its reluctance
to impose additional duties on the trial judges, the court suggested that
counsel for defendants in prisoner civil rights actions should include
notice to the plaintiffs that "any factual assertion in the movant's affi-
davits will be accepted by the district judge as being true unless the
plaintiff submits his own affidavits or other documentary evidence con-
tradicting the assertion. '610
Prisoners' constitutional right of access to the courts was discussed
in two cases. First, in Corgain v. Mille,-6 1l the court considered the ade-
quacy of the library services available to state prisoners held at the
United States Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois pursuant to contracts
with various states. The lower court found certain deficiencies and the
605. 683 F.2d 1044 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1214 (1983).
606. Id. at 1048.
607. Id. at 1050.
608. 689 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1982).
609. Id at 102. Here the court relied on decisions in two other circuits, Hudson v. Hardy, 412
F.2d 1091, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1968), and Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975).
610. 689 F.2d at 102.
611. 708 F.2d 1241 (7th Cir. 1983).
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defendants were ordered to submit a plan for library services which
would assure meaningful access to the courts. All of the plans were
eventually approved and on appeal inmates from Massachusetts and
Washington contest the adequacy of the plans submitted for their re-
spective states. After noting that an adequate law library is only one of
the acceptable methods of providing access to the courts, the court con-
sidered whether a suitable alternative had been provided here. Both
Massachusetts and Washington had chosen an alternative found ac-
ceptable by the court.
Massachusetts provided a list of eight legal service resources avail-
able to Massachusetts prisoners for criminal and civil proceedings. The
State of Washington had contracts with a law firm and a legal services
organization for the provision of legal services to inmates transferred
out of the state. It was found that these alternatives, at a minimum,
would enable inmates to obtain the citations needed to utilize the
otherwise adequate library system at the prison. Therefore, the plans
were upheld as being facially adequate.
612
In the other case, Jones v. Franzen,613 inmates challenged the pho-
tocopy policy of the state prison in Pontiac. The court rejected this
challenge, holding that the reasonableness of the policy "becomes rele-
vant only after the prisoner has shown that the policy is impeding that
access [to the courts], for if it is unreasonable but not impeding he has
not made out a prima facie case of violation of his constitutional
rights."614 Because the plaintiff had shown neither a substantial likeli-
hood of prevailing at trial nor irreparable injury, the court of appeals
reversed the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
An action for damages, resulting from the wrongful taking of a
typewriter table during a prison shakedown, required the court to ex-
amine the question of exhaustion in light of § 7 of the Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980.615 The district court in Owen v.
KimmelP16 dismissed the § 1983 claim for failure to exhaust, relying on
an earlier Seventh Circuit decision in Secret v. Brieron.617 Subsequent
to the district court decision, the Supreme Court, in Patsy v. Florida
Board of Regents,618 held that exhaustion of administrative remedies is
612. Id. at 1248-51. Inmates were left free to challenge the adequacy of the plans as
implemented.
613. 697 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1983).
614. Id. at 803.
615. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (Supp. V 1981).
616. 693 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1982).
617. 584 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1978).
618. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
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not a prerequisite to filing a § 1983 action. However, the Supreme
Court noted a narrow state and local prisoner exception to the general
rule, an exception contained in § 7 of the Civil Rights of Institutional-
ized Persons Act of 1980.619 Under this Act, exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies may be required if "the Attorney General has certified or
the court determined that [state prison] administrative remedies are in
substantial compliance with minimum acceptable standards promul-
gated under subsection (b)."' 620 If a case falls within the limited
§ 1997e exception to the no exhaustion rule, then the district court must
"continue such case for a period not to exceed ninety days in order to
require exhaustion,"' 62 ' but only if the court believes that such a re-
quirement "would be appropriate and in the interests of justice.
'622
Holding that Secret v. Brierton is no longer controlling, the Seventh
Circuit remanded the case to the district court for a determination of
whether the Indiana State Prison grievance procedures meet the mini-
mum standards under § 1997e(b)(2). 62
3
The eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment was relied upon by inmates in several cases. In Smith v. Fair-
man6 24 the lower court found that the institutional practice of housing
two prison inmates in a single cell violated the eighth amendment and
ordered wide ranging relief, including the elimination of double occu-
pancy cells. Under the decision in Rhodes v. Chapman,625 double cel-
ling by itself does not violate the eighth amendment. The Supreme
Court noted that prison conditions "must not involve the wanton and
unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may they be grossly disproportion-
619. Id at 512.
620. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
621. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(l) (Supp. V 1981).
622. Id
623. Under § 1997e(b)(2), the minimum standards shall provide:
(A) for an advisory role for employees and inmates of any jail, prison, or other correc-
tional institution (at the most decentralized level as is reasonably possible), in formula-
tion, implementation, and operation of the system;
(B) specific maximum time limits for written replies to grievances with reasons thereto
at each decision level within the system;
(C) for priority processing of grievances which are of an emergency nature, including
matters in which delay would subject the grievant to substantial risk of personal injury
or other damages;
(D) for safeguards to avoid reprisals against any grievant or participant in the resolu-
tion of a grievance; and
(E) for independent review of the disposition of grievances, including alleged reprisals,
by a person or other entity not under the direct supervision or direct control of the
institution.
624. 690 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 103 S. Ct. 2125 (1983).
625. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
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ate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment." 626 While
recognizing that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment is a
fluid concept which evolves with the standards of decency in society,
the Court cautioned against judges substituting their subjective views
for those of society and indicated the judgment must be on the basis of
"objective factors to the maximum possible extent. ' 627
Based on its earlier decision in Madun v. Thompson,6 28 the court
in Smith v. Fairman indicated that Rhodes mandates a "totality of the
conditions of confinement" 629 approach to cruel and unusual punish-
ment cases. Reviewing the facts, the court agreed that conditions at the
prison were far from perfect, but determined that the inmates are not
subjected to wanton and unnecessary inflictions of pain because "their
food is good, their cells are clean, and their health is maintained.
'630
While indicating sympathy with the lower court's desire to remedy con-
ditions at the prison, the court held that the district judge found a con-
stitutional violation "largely because prisoners were compelled to
spend long hours in small cells."'63' Recognizing that life in the two
man cell is "unpleasant and regrettable," the court relied on Rhodes in
indicating that such conditions "are part of the penalty that criminal
offenders pay for their offenses against society.
'632
In another eighth amendment case the plaintiff argued that a pen-
alty imposed by a disciplinary committee-fifteen days in segregated
confinement-for failing to submit to a frisk search was so dispropor-
tionate to the severity of the offense as to constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. 633 Referring to its earlier decision in Chapman v. Klein-
diens, 634 the court stated that "courts reviewing the proportionality of
prison disciplinary measures must consider the 'circumstances sur-
rounding the segregation decision,' including, first, the circumstances
surrounding the offense, second, the prisoner's disciplinary record, and
third, the offense for which he originally was incarcerated." 635 Here
the court found that the lower court had properly considered and ap-
626. Id. at 347.
627. Id at 346.
628. 657 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1981).
629. Id. at 874.
630. 690 F.2d at 125.
631. Id.
632. Id. at 126, quoting, Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 347.
633. Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 960-61 (7th Cir. 1983). See supra notes 61-68 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the first amendment issues raised by the plaintiffs refusal to
submit to a frisk search by a female guard.
634. 507 F.2d 1246, 1252 (7th Cir. 1974).
635. 704 F.2d at 961.
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plied each of these factors. The court also indicated that unconstitu-
tional disproportionality of punishment would generally require
punishment far more severe than fifteen days in segregation and usu-
ally punishment for offenses less dangerous than refusal to submit to a
search.63
6
Questions of what procedures are required in prison disciplinary
proceedings arose in several contexts. In McCollum v. Mille6 37 several
inmates, in habeas corpus petitions, challenged the constitutionality of
prison disciplinary proceedings. Three of the cases were remanded for
a determination of whether they could properly be maintained as
habeas corpus cases. 638 The fourth inmate sought added procedural
safeguards, including a more detailed notice of the charges against
him. 639 However, the additional information sought by the inmate
would have tipped him off to the name of the informants against him.
Recognizing that the notice received was so general as to make it diffi-
cult to prepare a defense, the court had to attempt to balance the in-
mate's due process rights against the dangers to the informants which
would result from disclosing their names. The court found the record
insufficient to make a determination of how many and what types of
additional safeguards could be provided, but it did make some sugges-
tions. For example, it might be possible to have the inmate's attorney
review the investigative report; the investigative report could be under
oath and the investigator could appear at the hearing for cross exami-
nation; it might be possible for the discipline committee to interview
some of the informants. The court concluded that the inmate did not
receive the process due under the fifth amendment, but was unable to
ascertain how much more process could have been provided without
jeopardizing the lives, as well as the willingness to inform, of the
636. Id This case can be compared to the eighth amendment claim in Crowder v. Lash, 687
F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1982), where the plaintiff had been sentenced to a seclusion unit, some of it in a
strip cell, for nearly forty-six consecutive months. After a jury verdict for the defendant on the
eighth amendment issue, the appeal centered on the availability of offensive collateral estoppel to
preclude the relitigation of the constitutionality of conditions in the seclusion unit. See supra
notes 503-07 and accompanying text.
637. 695 F.2d 1044 (7th Cir. 1982).
638. Because there was no automatic relationship between the finding of an infraction and the
length of imprisonment and these inmates did not seek release from a particular unit, the court
could not decide on the basis of the record whether or not habeas corpus was appropriate. Id at
1047. This is contrary to the usual situation where an inmate attempts to proceed under § 1983
and the question is whether habeas corpus is the only appropriate remedy. See Preiser v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973).
639. Here habeas corpus was appropriate because it can be utilized to seek release from a




State inmates, who were transferred to federal custody without
procedural safeguards, claimed due process violations in Corgain v.
Miller.6 41 The primary question was whether the inmates were de-
prived of a protected liberty interest, provided by either federal or state
law. Relying on the analysis in Meachum v. Fano,"2 the court held that
"[a] prisoner has no federal liberty interest in remaining within the
state prison system any more than he has such an interest in remaining
at a particular institution within the state system."' "3 The court
pointed out that the disciplinary reasons for a transfer in this case "in-
voke federal constitutional protection only if those reasons are uncon-
stitutional, and then the restriction is substantive, not procedural."'6
44
The question of whether the inmates had a state created liberty interest
was remanded because the lower court did not address the issue and
the record was not adequately developed. 645
The relationship between institutional regulations governing disci-
plinary proceedings and the due process clause was considered in
Caruth v. Pinkney.6 " A prison regulation required that the hearing
before the disciplinary committee be commenced "no more than 72
hours after the commission of the chargeable offense or the discovery of
it.''647 The court held that the failure to comply with a prison regula-
tion does not automatically amount to a constitutional violation. There
must be an independent determination of whether the safeguards pro-
vided by the regulation are also required by the constitution. Here the
court found that due process does not impose such a seventy-two hour
rule.6 8
In a related matter, the court held that a state regulation requiring
consideration of an inmate for a minimum security assignment six
640. 695 F.2d at 1048-49. Defects in the procedures were also found in Crowder v. Lash, 687
F.2d 996, 1005 (7th Cir. 1982), where the inmate was frequently sentenced to continued seclusion
without having an opportunity to explain or deny the charges and, on at least one occasion, was
sentenced to continued seclusion without being present at the "hearing."
641. 708 F.2d 1241 (7th Cir. 1983).
642. 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (no federal liberty interest in the context of disciplinary transfers
from one state institution to another).
643. 708 F.2d at 1252.
644. Id at 1253. An example is a transfer of an inmate in retaliation for the exercise of first
amendment rights. See Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223, 229 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 440 U.S.
916 (1979). Both the stigma attached to a transfer and the possibility of adverse affects on future
conditions of confinement were rejected as federal liberty interests. 708 F.2d at 1253.
645. 708 F.2d at 1254.
646. 683 F.2d 1044 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1214 (1983).
647. Id. at 1052 (emphasis original).
648. Id
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years after admission did not create a protected liberty interest in the
minimum custody status sought by the inmate. The plaintiff was de-
nied reclassification because he had served only two years; the decision
to change the security classification of such inmates was placed solely
within the discretion of the Department of Corrections. Therefore, any
expectations the inmate had in being considered for a lower security
clearance did not rise to the level of a protected interest under the due
process clause.649
An inmate's claim that an unprovoked beating by a prison guard
unconstitutionally deprived him of liberty under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment was sustained in Freeman v. Franzen.
65 0
The court adopted the test set forth in Johnson v. Glick65t for determin-
ing whether a plaintiff establishes a deprivation of liberty under § 1983.
The factors to be considered include the
need for the application of force, the relationship between the need
and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted,
and whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose
of causing harm.
65 2
Based on these factors, the court concluded that the lower court had
not erred in instructing the jury that the plaintiff could recover dam-
ages for a deprivation of liberty without due process.
653
Finally, due process claims were raised in the context of a denial
of parole.654 First the court held that the challenge could be presented
under § 1983, rather than in a habeas corpus proceeding, because while
the relief sought might improve plaintiffs chances of parole, "the ques-
tion of release would still remain within the discretion of the parole
board." 655 In denying parole, the board simply indicated that "parole
at this time would deprecate the seriousness of the crime for which you
649. Kincaid v. Duckworth, 689 F.2d 702, 704-05 (7th Cit. 1982), cert. denied 103 S. Ct. 2126
(1983). The court also rejected an equal protection challenge to the regulation on the grounds that
it treats persons convicted of murder under the old statute differently than those convicted under
the revised version. Id. at 704.
650. 695 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 103 S. Ct. 3553 (1983). See supra notes 587-92
and accompanying text.
651. 481 F.2d 1028 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
652. 695 F.2d at 492, quoting, Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033.
653. 695 F.2d at 492.
654. Walker v. Prisoner Review Board, 694 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1982). In an earlier case,
United States ex rel. Scott v. Illinois Parole and Pardon Board, 669 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1048 (1982), the court held that "Illinois law creates an expectancy of release on
parole which is entitled to due process protection." 694 F.2d at 501.
655. Id See also Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143, 1150 (2nd Cir.), cert. dismissed 434 U.S.
944 (1977). Compare McCollum v. Miller, 695 F.2d 1044 (7th Cir. 1982). See supra notes 638-39
and accompanying text.
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were convicted and promote disrespect for the law. '656 The statement
then recited the crimes which were considered. The court held that this
was a sufficient articulation of the board's reasons for denying
parole. 6
57
The plaintiff also claimed he was denied due process by the
board's refusal to allow him to review the entire record which the
board had considered. Here the court noted that the "relevant inquiry
is whether, after taking into account the inherently flexible nature of
due process, the combination of procedures available to the parole can-
didate is sufficient to minimize the risk that a decision will be based on
incorrect information. ' 658 The board's rule gives parole candidates ac-
cess to all documents which the board considers in denying parole.
While recognizing that due process does not always require compliance
with administrative regulations, 659 the court held that this regulation is
clearly intended to "implement the Board's constitutional obligation to
accord parole candidates due process in connection with denials of pa-
role. ' 660 Therefore, the case was remanded to the lower court to deter-
mine whether the board had in fact considered papers which were not
provided to the plaintiff.661
First amendment issues were considered in several prison cases.
662
Religious freedom was at stake in Childs v. Duckworth663 where an in-
mate challenged the prison's denial of his request for organized reli-
gious services, the prohibition on using candles and incense in his cell,
the refusal of permission to order a crystal ball and refusal of his re-
quest to borrow books through the interlibrary loan system for further
study. The question was whether "the restrictions imposed on the exer-
cise by Childs of his professed beliefs were necessary for the opera-
tional security of the prison." 664 Quoting from Cruz v. Beo,665 the
court indicated that while every religious sect does not have to be pro-
vided identical facilities for worship, an inmate must be provided "a
reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the oppor-
656. 694 F.2d at 501.
657. Id at 502.
658, Id at 503.
659. Compare Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1214
(1983); see supra notes 646-48 and accompanying text.
660. 694 F.2d at 504.
661. Id at 505.
662. One of these cases, Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1983) has already been
discussed above. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (religious claim) and notes 272-81
(equal protection claim).
663. 705 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1983).
664. Id at 920.
665. 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).
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tunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious
precepts.
666
Applying this principle, the court then affirmed the lower court's
denial of relief. The refusal to accomodate Childs' request for group
services was reasonable because he never supplied the "information re-
quired to start any organization, he never obtained a sponsor, and was
secretive about his group's rituals. ' 667 Such a lack of information
presented a security risk. Also, the court noted that Childs was the only
inmate making requests for satanic meetings and the prison authorities
found that Childs was not sincere in his professed beliefs. 668 Concern-
ing the religious articles, the court found that the denial by prison au-
thorities was "a sensible and reasonable precaution for the authorities,
in the interest of prison security and the safety of the inmates and
staff."'669 Also, the limitations on religious articles were based on rules
which "operate in a neutral fashion" and which were not applied to
Childs in a disparate manner.670 Finally the denial of books on inter-
library loan was upheld because it is generally intended only for per-
sonal study rather than group use. It was also noted that the plaintiff
failed to establish that the refusal to lend him the books in any way
related to the practice of his religion.671
The right to correspond with a newspaper reporter and two indi-
viduals whose names were provided by a religious organization was at
issue in Owen v. Lash.672 In the lower court the plaintiff prevailed, but
on procedural due process grounds rather than his first amendment
claim. Because the lower court found that the justifications advanced
by prison officials to support the restrictions on the plaintiff's freedom
to correspond had to be rejected, the court of appeals held that the
plaintiff "had been deprived of the substantive right to correspond se-
cured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. ' 673 Another case,
666. 705 F.2d at 920, quoting, Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322.
667. Id at 921.
668. Id.
669. Id
670. Id. at 922. In dissent, Judge Cudahy points to testimony which suggests that prison au-
thorities may have dealt with satanism differently than other religions. He would have remanded
the case for further development of the record on this point and the appointment of counsel. Id. at
923-924.
67 1. Id. at 922.
672. 682 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1982). For a discussion of the damage issue in this case, see supra
notes 584-86 and accompanying text.
673. Id at 653. As discussed earlier, see supra notes 579-86 and accompanying text, prevailing
on the basis of the first amendment rather than procedural due process grounds could be signifi-
cant when considering the claim for damages.
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Crowder v. Lash,674 involved first amendment claims relating to the
censorship of general correspondence and reading material, interfer-
ence with the free exercise of religion and interference with legal litera-
ture and correspondence regarding legal matters. The lower court had
directed a verdict in favor of the defendants on all first amendment
issues. On appeal, the directed verdict on the plaintiff's general corre-
spondence and reading claim was upheld, but it was reversed insofar as
it related to his right to legal literature and correspondence regarding
legal matters.675 Since the plaintiff was released from the institution by
the time of trial, the only remaining issue was his claim for damages.
Because the defendants claimed a qualified immunity, the issue was
whether the plaintiff's first amendment rights were clearly established
at the time of the challenged conduct. Therefore, the court had to de-
termine the first amendment rights of prison inmates relating to legal
literature and correspondence between 1969 and 1973. The court also
found that the plaintiff's right to the free exercise of religion, limited
only by security interests, was clearly established during the relevant
period of time. Therefore, the directed verdict on this aspect of the first
amendment claim was also reversed.676
ADDENDUM
After this article went to press, the Supreme Court decided Hudson
v. Palmer, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984), extending the Parratt
analysis to intentional deprivations of property. This article discussed
the lower court decision in Hudson, notes 216-220 and accompanying
text, and more generally the question of whether Parralt should be ex-
tended to intentional deprivations. In Hudson the Supreme Court rea-
soned that the underlying rationale of Parratt was that due process is
not violated where deprivations of property are affected through ran-
dom and unauthorized conduct of a state employee, making
predeprivation procedures impossible, provided the state has an ade-
quate post-deprivation remedy. It could "discern no logical distinction
between negligent and intentional deprivation of property insofar as
the 'practicability' of affording predeprivation process is concerned."
Because the state of Virginia provided an adequate remedy for the ran-
dom unauthorized intentional conduct of its employee, the destruction
674. 687 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1982).
675. Id. at 1007.
676. Id. at 1003-05.
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of the plaintiff's personal property did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.
On the other hand, note that the Supreme Court summarily af-
firmed the Seventh Circuit holding in Vail v. Board of Educ. of Paris
Union Sch. Dist. No. 95, discussed notes 226-247 and accompanying
text, refusing to extend Parratt analysis to an intentional termination of
an implied contract of employment, reasoning that Parratt applies only
where a predeprivation hearing would be meaningless. In Board of
Educ. of Paris Union Sch. Dist. No. 95 v. Vail, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct.
2141 (1984), the Supreme Court unfortunately affirmed the case in a
per curiam decision by an equally divided vote, thus casting little light
on the questions posed in this article regarding the potential scope of
the Parratt decision.
